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ABSTRACT 
 Three changes in the U.S. Social Security program affected recent cohorts of older 
individuals: repeal of the earnings test, increases in the normal retirement age, and increases in 
the delayed retirement credit. All three policy changes were expected to affect work decisions for 
those eligible for social security benefits. The first two chapters of my dissertation assess the 
impact of these policy changes. In the first chapter, using data from the Survey of Income 
Program and Participation (SIPP) for the years 1996-2013, I study the influence of the three 
policy changes on the retirement and benefit-claiming decisions of older men and women. There 
is minimal evidence in the recent literature investigating the sensitivity of estimated responses to 
the definition of retirement. In particular, I explore how responses to the policy changes differ 
when assessed using an objective relative to a subjective definition of retirement. The evidence 
from the empirical analysis indicates that the response to these policy changes is partly sensitive 
to the retirement definition. I find no effect of recent policy changes on retirement based on a 
labor force definition, while changes in the delayed retirement credit reduce self-reported 
retirement among men and women above the normal retirement age. There is stronger evidence 
of an effect of recent policy changes on the claiming behavior of older individuals. The earnings 
test repeal raised claiming among men above the normal retirement age, and changes in the 
delayed retirement credit reduced claiming among men and women who are directly affected. 
The second chapter examines the influence of the earnings test on the labor supply 
decisions of older workers. In analyzing the labor supply response to the earnings test, previous 
researchers have used a static labor supply framework and ignored the possible influence of the 
delayed retirement credit adjustments in mitigating the earnings test penalty. In contrast to the 
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past research, I assess the labor supply response to the earnings test within a life-cycle model that 
accounts for the delayed retirement credit adjustments. Using data from the SIPP covering years 
1996-2013, I consider the effect on both labor force participation and hours of work. Two 
potential responses to the policy changes have been relatively less studied: the intertemporal 
response by individuals and the differential response by sub-groups of individuals who possibly 
face liquidity constraints or misunderstand the rules of the earnings test. In my work, I provide 
evidence on both these responses. I find evidence in support of the view that both men and 
women perceive the earnings test as a tax, as older men and women above the normal retirement 
age and below age 70 respond to the earnings test by reducing their labor force participation. For 
working women, I also observe a reduction in the hours of work in response to the earning test, 
which indicates the somewhat greater flexibility in the choice of hours of work that may be 
available to women relative to men. 
The third chapter draws on reports of a rise in the share of young people living with their 
parents during and following the period after the 2007-2009 recession in the U.S. Previous 
research has analyzed the relationship between changes in economic conditions and living 
arrangements of young people by focusing on data based on infrequent (annual/biennial) 
interviews. In my empirical analysis I use high frequency SIPP data for the years 1996-2013. I 
examine the change in a young adult’s likelihood of living with a parent in response to changes in 
local labor-market conditions, and further identify the breakdown of this change into young adults 
returning home versus their changing their tendency to leave the parental home. Unlike, previous 
researchers I find no robust evidence that poor labor markets conditions affect the living 
arrangements of young adults. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EFFECT OF RECENT CHANGES IN SOCIAL SECURITY ON 
RETIREMENT AND CLAIMING DECISIONS OF OLDER WORKERS 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Confronted with the persistent decline in the labor force participation rate of older 
men and challenges facing the long term solvency of the social security program, the 
Social Security Reform Act of 1983 introduced important changes in the program to 
address these problems. Two of these changes – increases in the normal retirement age 
(NRA) and the delayed retirement credit (DRC) –  have affected recent cohorts of older 
individuals. An increase in the normal retirement age implies a reduction in the social 
security benefits, while an increase in the delayed retirement credit raises the reward for 
delaying the receipt of benefits for individuals above their NRA. In an unanticipated 
announcement in 2000, President Clinton repealed the earnings test, an unpopular tax on 
the earnings of older individuals who claimed benefits while earning above a certain 
threshold amount. All three policy changes were adopted to encourage work. Changes in 
the normal retirement age and the delayed retirement credit encouraged a delay in the 
receipt of benefits as well. The effectiveness of these policy changes in modifying the 
retirement and claiming behavior of older individuals, depends on how individuals 
respond to the different incentives provided by the social security system.
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Earlier research examining the effect of social security incentives on the 
retirement behavior of older men was spurred by the negative relationship between the 
rapidly rising level of social security benefits (and coverage) and the persistent decline in 
the labor force participation of older men observed in the 1950-1980 period. In a review 
essay, Mitchell and Fields (1982) note the inconclusive evidence provided by this early 
research. Even within studies that find evidence of a significant impact of the rise in 
social security benefits in raising the probability of retirement, there is large disagreement 
on the magnitude of this impact. Krueger and Pischke (1992) critique the early literature, 
noting the lack of exogenous variation that marred the cross-section studies, and the 
inability to distinguish the effect of social security benefits from other variables that 
trended over time and may have affected older individuals’ labor force participation. 
They make use of an exogenous reduction in the social security benefits resulting from a 
1977 reform to identify the effect of social security. They find no evidence that reducing 
social security benefits slows down the trend towards earlier retirement. Based on these 
findings they conclude that the observed negative relationship between benefit levels and 
labor force participation is due to factors other than increasing social security wealth.  
By the mid-1980s the labor force participation rate of older men had levelled off, 
and since the late 1990s it has been rising. Several changes took place over this period 
that may have contributed to the recent trends. The 1986 Amendment to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act eliminated mandatory retirement at all ages. The 
1980s were also a period when many companies adopted defined contributions plans 
which do not provide the strong incentives to retire at a particular age that were a feature 
of defined benefits plans. Moreover, the share of companies offering retiree health 
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insurance declined over this period. Beginning in 1990, the social security earnings test 
tax rate was lowered for those above the normal retirement age and the delayed 
retirement credit started rising. 
Recent research attempts to assess the impact of the latest changes in social 
security program: the repeal in the earnings test, the rising normal retirement age and the 
delayed retirement credit on the rising labor force participation among older men and 
women. Using aggregate CPS data, Gruber and Orszag (2003) examine the impact of the 
loosening of the earnings test on work and claiming decisions. They find no evidence of a 
change in the earnings test parameters on the work decision, but a significant increase in 
the claiming behavior of both older men and women. Blau and Goodstein (2010), create 
an aggregate synthetic panel data using CPS, SIPP and SSA files find that the increases in 
the NRA and the DRC explain 25-50 percent of the recent rise in the labor force 
participation of older men. Using CPS data, to focus on individuals below their normal 
retirement age (ages 61-65) Mastrobuoni (2009) finds a strong response to the increases 
in the normal retirement age.  
There is minimal evidence in the recent literature assessing the sensitivity of the 
response to the social security policy changes to the retirement definition used. In light of 
past research on the importance of divergent pathways into retirement chosen by older 
individuals, and the inability of objective definitions to account for discouraged workers, 
self-reported retirement status of individuals may provide useful insight into older 
workers response to the policy changes. As noted by Gruber and Orszag, there is sparse 
recent (or past) research on the response of the work decision of older workers to the 
earnings test repeal in the presence of labor market rigidities. Moreover, relatively few 
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recent studies examine the response of older women to the social security policy changes, 
even as the labor force participation of older women continues to rise. Blau and 
Goodstein’s study assessed only an impact of the increase in the NRA functioning 
through financial incentives, so they are unable to account for any norm related effects 
associated with the NRA changes. Mastrobuoni assesses the total effect, both the 
financial and any norm related effects of the NRA changes, but is unable to disentangle 
the two. With the availability of finer data that provides information on the birth year of 
the affected individuals, it is possible to separately identify the financial and norm related 
effects arising from the NRA changes.    
I assess the impact of the latest changes in the social security policies on the 
retirement and claiming behavior of older men and women using individual level data 
from the Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP). I find no evidence of an 
impact of the policy changes on the retirement behavior when retirement is assessed 
using an objectively defined criterion of retirement from the labor force. The changes in 
the delayed retirement credit, exert a statistically significant large impact on reducing the 
probability of self-reported retirement among men and women above their normal 
retirement age. The earnings test repeal raises the probability of claiming benefits among 
men. The increase in the normal retirement age raises claiming among men through norm 
effects only; women do not respond to these norm effects. 
1.2. BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
  Two of the recent policy changes – increases in the normal retirement age and 
increases in the delayed retirement credit – were introduced as part of the 1983 Reform, 
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while the most recent changes in the earnings test were unanticipated. The extent of these 
changes and their potential impact on retirement behavior is illuminated when viewed in 
the context of the major historical changes in these policies since the inception of the 
Social Security program. I first briefly describe the changes in the three policies over the 
course of time, and then discuss the predictions for the impact of these changes on the 
retirement age. 
1.2.1. BACKGROUND AND RECENT CHANGES IN SOCIAL SECURITY  
Normal Retirement Age (NRA): The size of the monthly Social Security benefit 
an insured worker receives depends on the age the benefit is first claimed. A worker is 
considered insured if forty or more quarters of his earnings are covered under Social 
Security.1 The Social Security Act of 1935 set the normal retirement age for both men 
and women at 65; it is the minimum age at which an insured individual can claim full or 
unreduced benefits based on his earnings history, equivalent to hundred percent of his 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA).2 Later amendments introduced the option of claiming 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper I focus on workers who claim benefits as primary insurer. A primary 
insurer receives benefits based on his own past earnings record.  Dependent or survivor 
beneficiaries collect benefits as secondary insurers based on the earnings record of a primary 
insurer. 
2 The monthly benefit for a worker is calculated in three steps. The first step is to index the annual 
taxable earnings of a worker to the national average wage index; the indexation is done to reflect 
the real value of the past earnings relative to the year in which the worker turns age 60 (two years 
prior to age of first eligibility, which under current law is age 62). From these indexed earnings, 
the highest 35 years of earnings between ages 21 and 62 are chosen to compute the Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). The second step is to compute the workers’ Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA) from the AIME; the PIA is the full benefit an individual is entitled to if 
he claims at the normal retirement age. The progressive nature of the formula used to compute the 
PIA from the AIME results in a decline in the ratio at which the monthly benefit (PIA) replaces 
the workers’ past average earnings (AIME) as the past earnings history (AIME) of the worker 
rises. The formula uses two bend points which are determined based on the year in which the 
worker turns 62. The third step is to compute the final benefit amount received by the worker; this 
amount could be higher or lower than the PIA depending on the age at which the benefit is first 
claimed.  
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reduced benefits below the normal retirement age at the early retirement age of 62; this 
option was provided to women in 1956 and men in 1961.  
Reduced benefits can be claimed at any age between the early retirement age of 
62 and the normal retirement age (NRA). For each year that an individual claims benefits 
below his NRA of 65, benefits are reduced by 6.67 percent of the full benefit amount 
available at the normal retirement age. 3  Early claiming can affect lifetime benefits of an 
individual in two ways: first, it results in a lower monthly benefit amount received by the 
individual relative to those available at the NRA, and second, the benefits are received for 
a longer duration than if claimed later.4 Above the NRA, under current law an individual 
can choose to delay the receipt of benefits until age 70 and receive a Delayed Retirement 
Credit (DRC). This delayed credit is awarded to increase the benefit level for 
postponement beyond the normal retirement age. I describe the DRC in detail below. 
 The Social Security Amendments of 1983 raised the normal retirement age for 
individuals’ born in 1938 and later from 65 to 67, while leaving the early retirement age 
unchanged at 62. The rise in the NRA is slated to be phased in over a twenty-two-year 
period.  For birth cohorts 1938-43 the NRA was raised by 2-month increments, until it 
reached 66 for individuals’ born in 1943; the normal retirement age will remain at 66 for 
                                                          
3 Alternatively, for each year after age 62 and before 65 (NRA) that benefit claiming is delayed, 
the age 62 benefit amount is increased by 6.67 percent. This adjustment of the benefit amount for 
postponement of benefits beyond the early retirement age and below the NRA is called actuarial 
adjustment.  
4 The incentive to claim early is impacted by individuals’ life expectancy and discount rate: a 
shorter life expectancy creates a stronger incentive to claim early because benefits are received 
for a shorter duration, while a higher discount rate also creates a stronger incentive to claim early 
because benefits received today are valued more highly. Other factors affecting the decision to 
claim early include: interest rates, risk aversion, and borrowing constraints. I describe these in 
more detail later.  
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birth cohorts 1943-54 and rise again at 2-month intervals for those born after 1954 until it 
reaches 67. The normal retirement age for birth years 1938-54 is listed in Table 1.1. The 
first cohort to be impacted by an increase in the NRA attained age 62 in 2000.  
An increase in the normal retirement age implies a reduction in current benefits at 
all ages above 62. When the normal retirement age rises above 65, there is a greater 
reduction in the current benefits if claimed below the normal retirement age. Specifically, 
current benefits are reduced by 6.67 percent per year when claimed up to 3 years before 
the NRA, and 5 percent per year when claimed in excess of 3 years prior to the NRA. 
Above the normal retirement age, change in the benefit levels is determined by the 
delayed retirement credit.  
Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC): The original Social Security Act of 1935 did 
not include a provision for increasing the benefits for individuals’ postponing benefit 
receipt beyond the normal retirement age. Benefits not claimed following the attainment 
of normal retirement age were essentially lost. To compensate individuals’ forfeiting 
benefits under the original system, the 1972 Amendments provided a delayed retirement 
credit which increased all subsequent benefits by 1 percent for each year in which 
benefits are postponed beyond the normal retirement age up to age 72 (which was later 
lowered to age 70). The credit applied to delayed benefits was raised to a yearly rate of 3 
percent in 1977.  
At an annual rate of 1 or 3 percent the delayed retirement credit adjustments were 
considered actuarially unfair, because the adjustments did not fully compensate for the 
loss in present value of future streams of benefits (Social Security Wealth) arising from 
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the delayed receipt.5Advancing the system towards actuarial fairness, the 1983 
Amendments included a gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit beginning in 
1990 and continuing until 2009 when the yearly rate of delayed retirement credit 
adjustments reaches 8 percent. The DRC increases were assigned by birth year and 
implemented every other year for individuals’ born in odd years between 1925-43. The 
delayed retirement credit per year ranges between 3-8 percent for birth years 1921-43 and 
later, is listed in Table 1.2. All cohorts born after 1943 have a DRC of 8 percent. At an 
annual rate of 8 percent per year the DRC is considered to be more than actuarially fair 
for the average individual.6  
Retirement Earnings Test (RET):  The retirement earnings test has been a 
controversial feature of the Social Security program since its inception. The 1935 Act 
included a very restrictive criterion under which an individual at or above his NRA could 
qualify for benefits: no earnings in regular employment. Any positive earnings for all 
individuals above age 65 resulted in a complete loss of current benefits, with no 
compensations made at a later date.  The earnings test has been modified numerous times. 
These modifications have been along four dimensions: the age range over which the 
earnings test is binding, the earnings amount under covered employment that is exempt 
                                                          
5 Burkhauser and Turner (1981) and Diamond and Gruber (1999). 
6 An actuarially fair rate for the average individual may still be considered unattractive for some. 
This will depend on an individual’s: life expectancy, discount rate, level of risk aversion, 
borrowing constraints, interest rates, and marital status. Coile, et al. (2002) note that for a given 
level of delayed retirement credit, incentives to delay are stronger among those with: longer life 
expectancy, higher level of risk aversion when the real annuity value of social security benefits is 
taken into account, and among married individuals when the value of spousal and survivor 
benefits is taken into account. Shoven and Slavov (2014) stress the importance of interest rates in 
determining the actuarial fairness of adjustments for the average individual: lower interest rates 
raise the present value of gains from delaying benefits. In their empirical work, however, they do 
not find evidence that individuals’ actual claiming behavior is influenced by lower interest rates. 
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from the earnings test (earnings test threshold); the rate at which benefits above the 
exempt amount are reduced (tax rate); and the actuarial adjustments made to benefits that 
are lost or postponed under the earnings test. Table 1.3 summarizes the recent changes in 
the annual earnings test threshold amount and tax rate which are described in detail 
below.  
 The original retirement earnings test applied to all individuals above age 65, but 
since then the age range has altered four times narrowing the scope of the earnings test.  
The Amendments of 1951 and 1954 exempted all individuals above age 75, and 72, 
respectively, from the earnings test; the exemption implies that individuals above age 75 
(or later 72) could claim their full benefits while remaining employed. With the 
introduction of the early retirement age for men in 1961, the earnings test was binding at 
ages 62-71 until the 1983 reform removed the test for those at and above age 70. The 
most recent change to the age bracket over which the RET applies became effective in 
2000, when the earnings test was eliminated for ages at and above the NRA (ages NRA-
69). After 2000, the earnings test applies to all individuals between ages 62 and less than 
their NRA; there is a looser earnings test that applies in the year an individual attains his 
NRA.7 
 An eligibility condition that requires complete withdrawal from employment with 
no later compensations for foregone benefits deters work at older ages. The 1939 
                                                          
7 In the year an individual attains his NRA, the earnings test exempt amount is higher and the tax 
rate is lower than for those age 62 and less than their NRA. For instance, someone born in June 
1944 has a NRA of 66, and turns his NRA on June 2010. If the individual is working between 
June 2006 and December 2009, he faces the stricter earnings test that applies to those between 
ages 62 and less than their NRA. Beginning in January 2010 (the year he attains his NRA), he 
faces the looser earnings test until the month he is at his NRA. 
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Amendment introduced an exempt amount (Earnings Test Threshold), which is an 
amount that serves as an upper limit up to which a worker can earn under Social Security 
covered employment and receive full benefits.8 The initial exempt amount was set at $15 
per month (25 percent of the monthly minimum wage in 1939). Over the years the 
earnings test threshold was raised several times on an ad hoc basis until 1972, when it 
was indexed to increases in the national average wage index. After the introduction of the 
early retirement age, the same exempt amount applied to all age ranges under the 
earnings test. The 1977 Amendment, however, separated the threshold level for those 
below and above the normal retirement age; the threshold level for ages 62 to less than 
normal retirement age was set at a lower amount than for ages at and above normal 
retirement age. The most recent changes in the earnings test threshold level were made in 
1996; these changes introduced ad hoc increases in the exempt amount of individuals (in 
real terms, above the increases due to indexation to average wage level) at and above the 
NRA. The higher threshold levels relax the earnings test for those working at and above 
the NRA, so more workers will have earnings that fall below the higher threshold and can 
claim full benefits while working. 
 Workers with earnings above the threshold level receive reduced current benefits 
if they claim while working; in other words their earnings were taxed. The1960 
Amendment lowered the rate at which benefits were reduced for earnings in excess of the 
threshold level by setting two tax rates; if the earnings were above the threshold amount 
but below another higher upper limit on earnings then benefits were reduced by 50 
                                                          
8 Under the earnings test, the earnings are defined as wages under covered employment and self-
employment. Payments from pensions, interest, dividend, and other unearned income are not 
included in earnings subject to the earnings test. 
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percent of earnings ($1 for every $2 of earnings) but for earnings above the higher upper 
limit benefits were reduced by 100 percent of earnings. A later Amendment in 1973 
removed the 100 percent tax rate on earnings extending the 50 percent tax rate for all 
earnings above the threshold. These changes lowered the penalty in terms of current 
benefits lost by workers for earning above the threshold. Until 1990, all individuals 
covered by the earnings test (below, at, and above NRA) faced the same tax rate on 
earnings. The 1983 Amendment, which became effective in 1990, lowered the tax rate for 
individuals at and above the NRA to approximately 33 percent of earnings while leaving 
the tax rate unchanged at 50 percent for those below the NRA. After the 2000 repeal of 
the earnings test individuals below the normal retirement age continue to have their 
earnings taxed at 50 percent, while in the year an individual attains his normal retirement 
age the tax rate is reduced to 33 percent. 
 Current benefits lost to the earnings test either due to postponement of receipt 
while working or lower current benefits received while continuing to work are 
compensated at a later date through an increase in future benefits.  Benefits lost to 
earnings test below the NRA are compensated at an annual rate of 6.67 percent, and 
benefits lost to earnings test above the NRA are adjusted by applying the DRC. 
1.2.2. LIFE-CYCLE PREDICTIONS OF RECENT CHANGES IN THE LAW  
To understand how changes in the normal retirement age, the delayed retirement 
credit and the earnings test should affect the retirement decision, it is useful to think of 
the decision problem facing an individual in a life-cycle context. In this section I present 
a stylized model of intertemporal utility maximization that serves two purposes. First it 
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describes the decision problem faced by an older worker and second it makes predictions 
about the response of the retirement age to changes in Social Security rules.9 
A far sighted individual who begins planning his retirement with the aim of 
maximizing his lifetime utility by choosing a retirement age z, is faced with the choice 
between working another year with benefits postponed and retiring now along with 
benefit receipt (this year or age 62). At every age in the foreseeable future, the individual 
chooses whether to retire or not by evaluating his utility in the two states: work and 
retirement. The state which provides the highest utility is chosen. Retirement is an 
absorbing state. In this simple model, with no uncertainty the individual is assumed to 
face no borrowing constraints and to have perfect foresight regarding the length of his 
life. For simplicity it is assumed that there are only two sources of income: earnings and 
social security benefits. The utility function is additively separable in consumption and 
leisure.  
Given the above setup, an older worker’s decision problem can be summarized as 
follows: 
max
𝑧𝑧 , 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 𝑉𝑉(𝑧𝑧) =  � 𝑒𝑒−𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑧𝑧0 𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊(𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  � 𝑒𝑒−𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅(𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑                           (1) 
s.t. 
                                                          
9 The model presented here uses the same approach to solving the intertemporal utility problem as 
followed by Colombino (2003) and Mastrobuoni (2006). Mastrobuoni derives the predictions 
arising from an increase in the normal retirement age only. I extend these results to changes in the 
delayed retirement credit. 
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� 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿 𝐶𝐶𝛿𝛿 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿 𝑊𝑊𝛿𝛿 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝛿𝛿 𝐵𝐵𝛿𝛿(𝑧𝑧,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑔𝑔,𝑊𝑊)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷
𝑧𝑧
𝑧𝑧
0
𝐷𝐷
0
     (2) 
where UW is the instantaneous utility of a working individual at time t, UR is the 
instantaneous utility of a retired person at time t given that he retired in year z, Ct is the 
consumption at time t, δ is the discount rate, D is the (known) date of death, r is the 
interest rate, and Bt is the level of social security benefits an individual receives upon 
retirement (t ≥ z). The discount rate is set equal to the interest rate, δ=r and real earnings 
Wt are assumed to be constant over the working life Wt=W, as these assumptions 
simplify the analysis. I also introduce a term ε that captures the disutility from work UW 
= UR – ε. To obtain interior solutions, the utility function is assumed to be logarithmic. 
The individuals’ objective is to maximize lifetime utility (1) with respect to z and Ct 
subject to the budget constraint (2).  
The size of the social security benefits, Bt, a worker receives upon retirement is a 
function of the workers’ past earnings R (W), the age at which the benefits are claimed z, 
and the social security policy variables g and NRA.10  
                               𝐵𝐵𝛿𝛿(𝑧𝑧,𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,𝑔𝑔,𝑊𝑊) = 𝑁𝑁(𝑊𝑊) [1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑧𝑧 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)]          (3) 
The term (z-NRA) captures the change in the benefit level based on whether the benefits 
are claimed at, before, or above the NRA. The size of benefits can change with each year 
of delayed retirement through adjustments made to benefits when they are postponed.11 
                                                          
10 I do not account for COLA (cost of living adjustments) adjustments made to benefits. The size 
of social security benefits an individual receives at any age t, such that t>z, is the same as the size 
of social security benefits received at age of retirement z, when benefits are first claimed.  
11 Benefits can be adjusted for two reasons: through benefit recomputation as higher earnings in 
years after an individual turns age 62 replace years of previous lower earnings used to compute 
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The variable g, captures the actuarial adjustments applied to benefits. To simplify the 
analysis, g the size of the actuarial adjustments is the same for individuals below and 
above the NRA.12  
Under the above assumptions, Colombino (2003) shows that the necessary 
condition for utility maximization can be expressed as a static comparison between the 
instantaneous utility from work at age z and the instantaneous utility from retirement 
minus the opportunity cost of retiring at age z. 
𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊𝑧𝑧(𝐶𝐶𝑧𝑧) = 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧(𝐶𝐶𝑧𝑧) − 𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧)  
where   𝑌𝑌(𝑧𝑧) =  𝜇𝜇 [ 𝑊𝑊 −𝐵𝐵𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧) +  ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑧𝑧−𝛿𝛿) 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡(𝑧𝑧)𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑]   and μ is the Lagrange multiplier.  
The term Y (z) captures the loss in utility when the individual chooses not to postpone 
retirement by one more year. This loss is given by the sum of the costs and benefits 
associated with retiring at age z which includes: the earnings, (W), foregone upon 
retirement, the social security benefits received if the individual retires at age z, Bz (z), 
and the foregone future gain in social security benefits that would have resulted from 
postponing benefits by one additional year. The above mathematical formalization of the 
problem yields two predictions (upon the satisfaction of certain conditions) that are 
derived in the appendix and summarized below. 
First, an increase in the normal retirement age increases the optimal retirement age. 
                                                          
the AIME and through adjustments made to benefits for postponement of receipt. In the analysis 
that follows, I do not account for benefits adjustment through automatic benefit recomputation.  
12 To derive predictions for the impact of changes in the DRC, I let g vary by focusing on the case 
only when z>NRA. 
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𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
=  𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁[−𝜀𝜀(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) − 1 +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷]
∆
   
where  ∆ = 𝑔𝑔𝑁𝑁��1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(−𝑧𝑧+𝐷𝐷)�(−1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) + 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧�𝑟𝑟(𝑧𝑧 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑧𝑧−𝐷𝐷) − 1�� 
− 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧(𝑊𝑊− 𝑁𝑁) 
The numerator of 𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑
  is always negative, so the sign of the derivative depends on the 
sign of ∆.      
For individuals retiring before their normal retirement age, an increase in the NRA 
always results in an increase in the optimal retirement age. But, among individuals who 
are above their NRA, an increase in the normal retirement age increases the optimal age 
of retirement only if the date of death, D, is not close to the age of retirement and the 
interest rate is between (0,10) percent.  
If ∆ < 0 , then  𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑
> 0 
Second, an increase in the delayed retirement credit has an ambiguous effect on the 
optimal retirement age of those above the NRA. 
        𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
=  𝑁𝑁[(𝜀𝜀(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) + 1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) (𝑧𝑧 − 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁) − 1𝑟𝑟 �1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑧𝑧−𝐷𝐷)�(1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷)]
∆
        
If ∆ < 0 , then the sign of    𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 ><  0   is ambiguous among individuals retiring above their 
NRA. 
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In the mathematical model, I adopted many simplifying assumptions some of 
which I relax in the discussion that follows. Following Mastrobuoni (2006), I assume in 
equation (3) a very straightforward relationship between the size of benefits and the 
actuarial adjustments. This formalization of the actuarial adjustments makes no 
distinction regarding the differential effect that an actuarially fair relative to an actuarially 
unfair adjustment has on the retirement decision. This specification of the actuarial 
adjustments also assumes that the adjustments are the same for all individuals above age 
62. Moreover, many older workers face borrowing constraints. In the presence of these 
borrowing constraints and actuarially unfair adjustments, the presence of the earnings test 
impacts the retirement decision if the older worker faces a discontinuous static budget 
constraint. Without formally introducing these intricacies in the mathematical model, I 
will instead discuss intuitively how the complex incentives provided by the social 
security benefit calculation formula impact the retirement decision at different ages.  
I begin with a graphical description of the consumption–retirement age tradeoff 
faced by an individual (Fig. 1.1) that highlights three things: the impact of a change in the 
normal retirement age; changes in the delayed retirement credit; and how the tradeoff 
changes based on the actuarial fairness of the credits. The slope expresses the tradeoff 
between annual consumption per year in postretirement years and the length of time spent 
in retirement for each possible age of retirement between ages 60 and 70.13 For each year 
that an individual postpones retirement beyond age 62 his benefits are automatically 
                                                          
13 Whether the slope of the tradeoff between ages 62-NRA is steeper or flatter relative to slope 
between ages 60-62 depends on the actuarial fairness of the adjustments: for the average 
individual the slope is steeper between ages 62-NRA, but if actuarial adjustments are unfair then 
this slope is flatter relative to the one before age 62. 
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adjusted. The tradeoff between annual consumption and age of retirement is impacted by 
the actuarial fairness of the adjustments applied to forgone benefits. Fig. 1.1 is drawn 
under the assumption of zero interest and discount rates, perfect capital markets, and with 
no uncertainty regarding age of death. 
The three budget constraints shown in Fig. 1.1 highlight how the consumption – 
retirement age tradeoff changes with the normal retirement age and the delayed 
retirement credit applied to postponed benefits. Birth cohorts 1917-24 faced a normal 
retirement age of 65 and an annual delayed retirement credit of 3 percent. These DRC 
adjustments are considered actuarially unfair. An actuarially unfair delayed retirement 
credit affects the tradeoff by introducing a convex kink at the NRA; at every age beyond 
the NRA there is a decline in the rate of growth of lifetime benefits. In other words, the 
flatter slope of the constraint to the right of the kink reflects that upward adjustments to 
future benefits do not completely make up for the loss of benefits after the normal 
retirement age. At an actuarially neutral rate of DRC, there is no kink in the budget 
constraint, as reflected by the tradeoff for birth cohort 1937 (NRA is 65, and DRC is 6.5 
percent).  Delayed retirement credit adjustments at an annual rate of 8 percent are 
considered more than actuarially fair for the average individual. A more than actuarially 
fair adjustment introduces a non-convex kink at the normal retirement age as seen in the 
budget constraint facing an average individual in the birth cohort 1943-54 (NRA is 66, 
and DRC is 8 percent).   
To intuitively derive the theoretical predictions for the impact on retirement age 
of the recent policy changes I evaluate each policy change in isolation (holding constant 
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all other policies). The theoretical predictions of the life-cycle model arising from the 
recent changes in social security law are summarized in Tables 1.4 A and B. 
Changes only in Normal retirement age: Changes in the normal retirement age 
affect the retirement decision through their impact on anticipated lifetime wealth. In the 
life-cycle context, the present value of the stream of benefits an individual expects to 
receive by retiring at any given age (Social Security Wealth), can be thought of as 
providing increments to the anticipated lifetime wealth. Fig. 1.1 shows the impact of a 
change only in the NRA and a change in the DRC. Between ages 60-65, we see an impact 
of a change in the normal retirement age (only, no change in the DRC) for birth cohorts 
1943-54 relative to that of cohorts 1917-24 and 37. While between ages 65-70, we see the 
impact of changing both the DRC and the NRA for the affected cohorts. An increase in 
only the normal retirement age causes a parallel downward shift in the constraint, 
encouraging later retirement at all ages due to an income effect if leisure is assumed to be 
a normal good.14 
Changes only in Delayed Retirement Credit: Recent increases in the delayed 
retirement credit affect the retirement decision of those working beyond their NRA in 
two ways: by changing their tradeoff; and increasing their social security wealth. First, a 
higher delayed retirement credit raises the tradeoff between retiring today and continuing 
work for another year while postponing benefits; it increases the return to postponement 
                                                          
14 Between ages 62-63, birth cohorts with a normal retirement age of 66 have an actuarial 
adjustment of 5 percent instead of the 6.67 percent. Individuals between these ages, thus, 
experience two opposing effects on their retirement age as a result of an increase in the NRA: a 
decline in their SSW (negative income effect) and a decline in the return to an additional year of 
work (negative substitution effect). The net effect on the retirement age of those between ages 62-
63 is, thus, ambiguous. 
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of benefits by making retirement leisure more expensive (substitution effect), thus 
encouraging workers to postpone retirement. Second, the value of anticipated SSW 
depends on the assumptions regarding the DRC an individual expects to receive; an 
increase in the DRC increases the SSW of a worker, encouraging earlier retirement 
through an income effect.15 Changes in the delayed retirement credit, thus, have an 
ambiguous effect on retirement age for those between ages 65-70. 
In the life-cycle model in the presence of the earnings test, increases in the 
delayed retirement credit also change the net wage workers expected to earn above their 
normal retirement age. Earnings above the earning test threshold amount are taxed and 
returned later by increasing benefits through actuarial adjustments. The actuarial 
adjustment, thus, impacts the net wage an individual expects to earn over different 
periods of his life. As the delayed retirement credit rises to 8 percent per year, it raises the 
relative wage workers expect to earn. Realizing these changes, individuals might wish to 
increase their work effort more at ages above the normal retirement age while reducing 
work below the normal retirement age due to increases in the reward for working at older 
ages. The direct effect of an increase in the delayed retirement credit on ages below the 
normal retirement age will be to lower the retirement age. These individuals may leave 
work earlier, with the expectation to return at a later age when they can earn a higher 
return on their work. If, however, there are large labor force entry and exit costs 
(transition costs) then I expect spillover effects to arise among those below the normal 
                                                          
15 As the delayed retirement credit rises, individuals planning to retire at the normal retirement 
age experience only an increase in the tradeoff they face (substitution effect). 
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retirement age. These spillover effects may lead younger workers to stay at work, so they 
can avail the higher net wage at older ages.16  
Changes only in the Retirement Earnings Test: Whether the earnings test impacts 
the retirement decision depends on two factors:  if the earnings test is a tax on earnings in 
the life-cycle perspective; and if there are discontinuities in the static labor – leisure 
budget constraint facing an individual.17 The earnings test is a tax altering the net wage in 
the life-cycle perspective only if the actuarial adjustments are unfair and/or if workers are 
unware of the actuarial adjustments applied to withheld benefits. Researchers in the past 
have debated the actuarial fairness of these adjustments. Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 
(1980) showed that the actuarial adjustments applied between age 62 and 65 (normal 
retirement age) are actuarially fair while at an annual rate of 1 percent the DRC 
adjustments applied above NRA were actuarially unfair.18 They contend that the earnings 
test is irrelevant for individuals below the normal retirement age because an actuarially 
fair adjustment does not cause social security wealth to fall.19 Regardless of the actuarial 
fairness of these adjustments the earnings test is a tax in the life-cycle context if many 
older workers are unware of the adjustments made to benefits lost to the earnings test. 
Friedberg (1998) and Gruber and Orszag (2003) ignore the DRC adjustments applied to 
benefits foregone to the earnings test under the assumption that most older workers are 
unware of these adjustments and view the earnings test as a pure tax. 
                                                          
16 Workers might lose their skill or their skills might be outdated; there may be large search costs. 
17 Reimers and Honig (1993, 1996). 
18 They find that the actuarial adjustments are fair even for individuals above age 65 when 
automatic benefit recomputation is taken into account. This recomputation increases benefits by 
replacing lowest earnings in an individuals’ earnings history with higher earnings in later years. 
19 Burkhauser and Turner (1981) show that the actuarial fairness of adjustments for workers 
between ages 62-65 is very sensitive to the choice of interest rates (real versus nominal).  
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The standard life-cycle model implicitly assumes the presence of perfect capital 
markets, risk neutrality, and certainty of death. If the actuarial adjustments are fair; in the 
presence of perfect capital markets the earnings test is not a tax because individuals can 
simply transfer purchasing power over time by borrowing and lending. This assumption 
of free access to borrowing and lending is, however, untenable if a majority of older 
individuals face borrowing constraints.20 In the presence of liquidity constraints, risk 
aversion, high interest rates or lower than average life expectancy, individuals above 62 
will perceive the earnings test as a tax. 
The presence of the earnings test with actuarially unfair adjustments impacts the 
retirement decision only if there are rigidities in the labor market preventing the worker 
from participating. If the budget constraint facing an individual choosing his labor supply 
is continuous, then the presence of an earnings test will not impact his decision to work. 
An individual who would have chosen to work in the absence of the earnings test, will 
choose to work even in its presence if the budget constraint is continuous by limiting his 
hours of work below the threshold level so as to avoid the tax on his earnings. The budget 
constraint, however, is discontinuous if there are constraints on minimum hours of work, 
few available part time jobs, and large fixed costs of working.21  In Fig. 1.2A the 
presence of minimum hours constraints or scarcity of acceptable part time jobs gives rise 
to gaps in the budget constraints if some hours and wage combinations are unavailable to 
the worker.22 If an individual who would have chosen to work at point H2 in the absence 
                                                          
20 Diamond and Hausman (1984b) and Kahn (1988). 
21 Hurd (1996) notes the presence of minimum hours constraints in jobs for older workers due to 
productivity gain from team production and high fixed costs borne by the employers. 
22 Figure 1.2 A and B are taken from Reimers and Honig (1993) 
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of the earnings test is unable to find an hour wage combination that will allow him to 
earn below the threshold, in the presence of the earnings test he may choose to retire.  
Fixed costs of work create a discontinuity at zero hours in the budget constraint as 
shown in Fig. 1.2B. High fixed costs can impact the retirement decision by shifting the 
budget constraint down and imposing a restriction on the minimum number of hours an 
individual must work to cover his fixed costs. If the fixed costs are very large and if in 
the absence of an earning test the individual would have chosen to work above the 
earnings test threshold; in the presence of the earnings test, these large fixed costs can 
enhance the possibility of earlier retirement.  
An increase in the threshold amount only raises the optimal retirement age of the 
affected individuals, while an increase in the tax rate lowers it. A higher threshold level 
increases the likelihood of finding jobs below the exempt amount (that can also cover the 
high fixed costs), thereby allowing workers who face a discontinuous budget constraint to 
avoid the tax on their earnings while continuing to work. The tax rate for individuals 
below the NRA is 50 percent while for those above (before the 2000 repeal) was 
approximately 33 percent. After the 2000 repeal all individuals above age 65 and below 
their new NRA saw an increase in their tax rate from 33 percent to 50 percent while the 
tax rate remained at 33 percent for individuals in the year they attain their NRA. As the 
tax rate rises from 33 percent to 50 percent lowering the return to work, an individual 
who would have earlier chosen to work might choose to retire if he is either unable to 
find a job with earnings below the threshold level. A complete removal of the earnings 
test raises the retirement age of the affected individuals.  
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 The life-cycle model predicts that removal of the earnings test above the normal 
retirement age and below age 70 encourages work between these ages by raising the net 
wage, while lowering work below the NRA (ages 62-NRA). If there are spillover effects, 
however, then the repeal of the earnings test might increase work at ages below the 
normal retirement age and at ages above 70 as well. These spillover effects may arise 
because individuals below the NRA perceive a higher return to their work at ages above 
normal retirement age, but if it is difficult to find a new job after a break from work at 
older ages, so to avail this higher return they might continue working below NRA. It is 
also possible that before the repeal of the earnings test individuals who retired from work 
to avoid the tax on earnings could not return to work at a later age of 70 and above where 
the earnings test ceased to apply. This possibility is also a consequence of transitions 
costs that may keep workers from entering and exiting work as they desire. The repeal of 
the earnings test could potentially raise retirement age among those above 70, if more 
individuals who work between normal retirement age and age 70 continue to work past 
age 70. 
1.3. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
  The changes in normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit impact the 
retirement decision only in the life-cycle model through a change in the SSW. But, the 
earnings test can affect the retirement decision in the life-cycle context only under 
conditions that make the actuarial adjustments less than fair and if labor market rigidities 
restrict the choices available to an individual. The approach chosen by previous 
researchers studying the response of work decision among older individuals to earnings 
test changes depends on whether they model the earnings test as a tax in the life-cycle or 
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static context.23 I attempt to assess the impact of the earnings test on the retirement 
decision of individuals in a life-cycle context. 
Researchers in the 1980s studied the impact of increases in SSW on the labor 
force participation of older men using time series variation in benefits. These increases in 
SSW arose either due to ad hoc changes implemented in the late 1960s and early 1970s or 
due to overindexation of benefits in the 1970s. The findings from these studies support 
the view that higher social security benefits lower labor force participation among older 
men.24 Krueger and Pischke (1992) note the difficulty in separately identifying the 
impact of social security benefit increases in time-series analysis from other variables that 
have trended over time. They instead identify the effect of social security benefits by 
relying on an exogenous unanticipated downward movement in benefits as a result of the 
1977 Amendment which permanently lowered the benefit level for a cohort of individuals 
termed the “notch babies”. They use aggregated CPS data from 1976-88. In their analysis 
they control for actuarial adjustments applied to foregone benefits by including a measure 
for accrual of benefits. They assess the impact of social security benefit reductions on the 
labor supply of men by examining the response along three dimensions: labor force 
participation, self-reported retirement, and the number of weeks worked last calendar 
year. They find no robust significant influence of social security benefit reductions on the 
retirement decision.25   
                                                          
23 As described in the previous section, given the recent increases in the DRC, at an actuarially 
fair level of DRC, the earnings test is not a tax in the life-cycle model. But, if individuals are 
unaware of these credits, face borrowing constraints, or have lower than average life expectancy 
then the earnings test may still be a tax in the life-cycle context.  
24 Krueger and Pischke (1992) discuss the methodology used in these studies. 
25 Moulton and Stevens (2015) emphasize that the Notch legislation changed both retirement 
wealth and incentives for delaying retirement in offsetting ways. They note that the Notch 
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The finding of Krueger and Pischke’s study analyzing the effect of benefit 
reductions cannot be directly applied in evaluating the response in retirement age due to 
the recent benefit reductions. The recent benefit reductions are instituted through a 
change in the normal retirement age instead of a permanent benefit cut with an 
unchanging normal retirement age. In light of past evidence of large spikes in the 
retirement hazard at the social security early and normal retirement age, and recent 
evidence of a shift in these spikes it may be important to control for any noneconomic 
norm related effects that may impact the retirement decision in addition to the financial 
incentives. This norm related effect may arise if older individuals view the normal 
retirement age as a focal point (guidance) for retirement.  
Gruber and Orszag (2003) use aggregate CPS data from 1973-98 to examine the 
effect of earnings test policy changes on the work decision, hours worked, and claiming 
behavior of older men and women.26They also evaluate the impact of the 1983 earnings 
test repeal for individuals between ages 70-72. In their study they identify the ad hoc 
increases implemented from 1996 onwards in the earnings test threshold amount as an 
important source of variation in earnings test parameters among individuals for whom the 
earnings test was still in place. But, they find no robust evidence of a change in work 
decision of older men and women in response to a loosening of the threshold amount. 
                                                          
legislation reduced incentives for delaying retirement as it changed the benefit computation 
formula to not include earnings beyond age 61; it is, thus, inaccurate to interpret Kruger and 
Pischke’s findings as evidence of insensitivity of retirement to wealth levels.   
26 Some other studies that have analyzed the impact of the earnings test on work decision are as 
follows: Tran (2002), Disney and Smith (2002), and Friedberg and Webb (2009). 
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They, however, find robust evidence that the threshold amount increases lead to higher 
benefit receipt among both men and women.  
In their analysis Gruber and Orszag note that their finding of no impact of 
earnings test parameters on the work decision of older workers is best understood when 
applied to individuals facing the earnings test. Due to the relatively fewer observations 
available for individuals between ages 70-72, they are unable to precisely measure the 
full impact of the earnings test repeal. They also ignore the effect of the delayed 
retirement credit under the assumption that older workers either are misinformed, or do 
not understand delayed retirement credit adjustments, and hence the earnings test acts as 
a tax for all individuals. This view may be correct for the time period covered in their 
study, but cohorts reaching normal retirement age in 2002 and later have a delayed 
retirement credit of 6.5 percent per year or higher (which is approximately actuarially fair 
for the average individual). The birth cohorts affected by the recent earnings test repeal of 
2000 experienced increases in their normal retirement age, and/or delayed retirement 
credit. Keeping in mind the recent increases in the delayed retirement credit and normal 
retirement age (which did not affect the cohorts studied in Gruber and Orszag’s analysis), 
it seems important to try and assess how changes in earnings test parameters affect 
individuals’ retirement decision in a life-cycle context controlling for the influence of 
DRC and NRA changes.  
Three recent studies have examined the effect of both changes in normal 
retirement age and changes in the delayed retirement credit on the labor force 
participation or employment decision of older men; two of these studies also control for 
the effect of the 2000 earnings test repeal. Blau and Goodstein (2010) create a synthetic 
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panel data using CPS and SIPP which is aggregated by birth cohort, year of age and four 
education groups covering for the time period 1962-2005. They use Social Security 
Administrative (SSA) data to match the average lifetime earnings for each cohort which 
are then used to derive the average social security benefits for each cohort. Blau and 
Goodstein’s specification only accounts for financial incentive effects of NRA changes, 
but it does not allow them to capture the norm effects. They ignore the earnings test 
noting that there is no straightforward way for measuring its effect in their framework. 
They find the changes in normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit explain 
about one fourth to one half of the recent increase in the labor force participation of older 
men.  
Mastrobuoni (2009) focuses on the effect of changes in normal retirement age. He 
uses CPS data from 1989-2007 to identify the impact of NRA increases on the retirement 
age of both men and women by using a regression discontinuity design, and he restricts 
his analysis to individuals between ages 61-65. He identifies the impact of the normal 
retirement age by estimating the difference between the yearly trend in average 
retirement age of cohorts born before 1938 (not affected by the NRA increases) relative 
to cohorts born after 1937, while controlling for the influence of the DRC changes and 
earnings test repeal. He finds that a 2-month increase in the normal retirement age 
increases the average retirement age of the affected cohorts by 1-month.  
Pingle (2006) focuses on the effect of DRC changes.  Using data from SIPP 
panels covering a period of 1983-2003, he finds that a delayed retirement credit increase 
of 1 percent raises the employment rate of 65-70-year-old men by 1.5 percent. Pingle’s 
analysis extends only until 2003 when individuals in the first cohort affected by the NRA 
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increases attain their normal retirement age, so he is unable to assess the impact of 
normal retirement age changes among those above their NRA. Both Mastrobuoni and 
Pingle’s study control for effect of the earnings test repeal on labor force participation. 
Their specifications allow them to capture the norm related effects of normal retirement 
age changes because they capture these changes by including a variable indicating the 
change in the NRA assigned by birth year instead of a variable for changes in social 
security benefits. But they are unable to separately identify the norm and financial effects 
associated with NRA changes. 
The three studies that analyze the recent policy changes can be improved upon in 
at least four ways. First, none of these studies incorporate the sizeable variation in the 
earnings test threshold amount (noted by Gruber and Orszag) that were introduced 
through the ad hoc changes implemented after 1996. Second, even though older women 
are a sizeable part of the labor force there is only one study (Mastrobuoni, 2009) 
analyzing the impact of recent changes in the NRA and DRC on the retirement decision 
among older women between ages 61-65, and none examining the retirement decision 
changes of women above their normal retirement age. Third, there is little work in the 
recent research disentangling the financial and norm related effects arising from the NRA 
changes. It is possible to separately identify these effects through use of a dataset that 
includes accurate birth year information of individuals. Finally, previous researchers have 
only focused on changes in the labor force participation decision of older workers in 
response to the recent changes in Social security policy. Given the large evidence of the 
variety of options explored by older individuals in their transition to retirement, it seems 
important to analyze how older workers response differs when evaluated using alternative 
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definitions of retirement. I attempt to include these suggested changes to the previous 
work in my empirical analysis.  
1.4. DATA AND SPECIFICATION OF THE RETIREMENT MODEL 
My aim in this study is to analyze the change in older workers’ retirement 
decision in response to recent changes in Social Security policies, and to pursue this aim I 
employ a reduced form strategy. Because of the diverse pathways into retirement actually 
chosen by older individuals leaving work, previous literature has emphasized the 
inadequacy in relying on a single definition of retirement to capture retirement 
behavior.27 I, therefore, define retirement age in two ways: the age at which individual 
withdraws from labor force; or the age at which the individual assesses himself to be 
retired. This approach allows me to explore the sensitivity of the estimation results to the 
different definitions of retirement.  
I focus on the first observed retirement among individuals who are working and 
have not previously retired. Both the retirement definitions include only individuals at 
work (or looking for work) at the time of sampling wave. I condition on work for two 
reasons. First, even though many older workers reenter the labor force after retirement, 
there are many others for whom the transition costs to work following retirement may be 
very high either due to loss of skills, or high search costs. If I do not condition on work 
and include all individuals regardless of their current labor force status, then the response 
of older workers to policy changes may be difficult to discern. Second, to analyze the 
                                                          
27 Diamond and Hausman (1984), Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990), Ruhm (1990), Blau 
(1994), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000). 
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change in the retirement behavior of older women in response to these policy changes, it 
is useful to focus on women retiring conditional on working at a prior date. This is 
beneficial because even though the work attachment of older women has increased 
substantially over time, there are still many older women with no work history. Other 
researchers have also noted the importance of reentry behavior among older men, the idea 
that individuals return to work at a later date after retiring.28 Following the first observed 
retirement from work, I, however, ignore any subsequent return to the labor market by 
the individual.29 
1.4.1. DATA  
   Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP): To empirically assess the 
validity of the theoretical predictions, the data used are from the four most recent panels 
1996-2008 of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which include 
data from years 1996-2013. The SIPP has a rotating panel design, and individuals within 
a panel are followed for a period of 3 to 4 years. Table 1.5 summarizes the length of each 
panel used in the study along with the reference period for which the data are available. 
Beginning in 1996, the SIPP was redesigned to include a larger initial sample than earlier 
panels. Panel members are randomly assigned to four different rotation groups, and each 
month members of one of the rotation groups are interviewed. These interviews are 
scheduled at intervals of four months; at each interview individuals are asked questions 
about their activity in the preceding four months. The SIPP oversamples households from 
                                                          
28 Diamond and Hausman (1984), Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990), and Maestas (2010). 
29 I do this for two reasons. First, as Diamond and Hausman (1984) note, allowing for reentry 
behavior will require a more elaborate formal model. Second, the SIPP dataset that I use for the 
empirical analysis follows individuals for a relatively short duration of 3 to 5 years, which does 
not provide enough time to observe un-retirement behavior following retirement from work. 
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areas with high poverty concentration.30 Due to Census budget cuts the sample for the 
2004 panel was cut in half at the end of the eighth wave (reference period June 2006-
December 2007).31 
In comparison to the two other recently used datasets (the Health and Retirement 
Study and the Current Population Survey) the SIPP has both strengths and weaknesses.  
The main strengths of the SIPP relative to the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) are its 
larger sample size and the shorter duration between interviews.32 Compared to the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) the SIPP has more accurate birth year information.33 
This is useful because both the normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit 
policy changes are assigned by birth year. Moreover, unlike the CPS, the SIPP follows 
individuals when they relocate. The main weaknesses in using the SIPP relative to the 
HRS are its shorter panel length and the unavailability of detailed pension plan incentives 
(defined benefit or defined contribution) information, and information on retiree health 
insurance. The SIPP contains information on both these variables in its topical wave 
modules which are administered once in a panel.34 I do not include these variables 
because of the infrequency of the topical modules and the associated decrease in sample 
                                                          
30 Survey of Income and Program participation User Guide Chapter 2, 2009. 
31 After the eighth wave fifty percent of the sample was dropped and not interviewed in 
subsequent months. The data for wave 1 through wave 8 was collected for the full sample. 
32 In the Health and Retirement Study individuals are interviewed every two years while in the 
SIPP individuals are interviewed every four months. 
33 The birth year information had some inconsistencies for individuals in panel 2004 and 2008. In 
such cases, for the affected individuals I kept only those observations where the individual 
responds to the interview personally and his birth year and month are not imputed. 
34 The data on both these variables are available in the following topical modules of the SIPP: 
Retirement Expectations and Pension Plan Coverage, and Employer Provided Health Benefits. 
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size as fewer individuals are present in survey at the time of data collection on these 
variables. 
1.4.2. RETIREMENT MODEL SPECIFICATION    
I analyze the retirement decision using a hazard model framework. An individual 
is at risk of retiring between ages 60 to 75. The discrete-time retirement hazard at any age 
is the probability of retiring at that age conditional on not having already retired. The 
retirement hazard at a particular age depends on various explanatory variables that make 
retirement more or less appealing than staying at work, I discuss these variables in detail 
below. The discrete-time retirement hazard hit for an individual i at any age t (in the 
interval (t-1, t]) 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 = Pr(𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 = 1 | 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿−1 = 0  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = Pr(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∈ (𝑑𝑑 − 1, 𝑑𝑑] |  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 > 𝑑𝑑 − 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) 
where T is the random variable denoting the age at retirement (beginning at age 60), and 
xit,  yi are a set of time varying and time constant explanatory variables respectively that 
affect the retirement hazard rate. Following Allison (1982), I use a logit model to specify 
the dependence between the retirement hazard and the explanatory variables. 
log � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿)� =  𝛼𝛼𝛿𝛿 +  𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝛾𝛾′𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  
 αt  is a set of constants (age dummies) denoting the non-parametric baseline hazard; this 
specification allows the retirement hazard to vary by age while holding other explanatory 
variables constant.   
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The explanatory variables included in xit and yi that affect an individuals’ 
retirement hazard include both Social Security policy variables and socio-economic 
variables. I capture the effect of changes in the Social Security policies by including a 
variable for the normal retirement age which indicates (in months) the NRA assigned to 
individuals by their birth cohort, and another variable for the delayed retirement credit 
which indicates (in percent) the DRC assigned to each birth cohort. The impact of these 
two policy changes can be separately identified because the DRC changes started 
affecting cohorts born after 1924 and were implemented every other year for individuals 
born in odd years. The full impact of the earnings tests being in place among individuals 
above the NRA relative to not having the earnings test is identified through the inclusion 
of two variables: an earnings test in place dummy (equals 1 if individual is within the age 
range covered by the earnings test) and the difference between the earnings test threshold 
amount (in thousands of real 2013 dollars) and the amount at which the threshold was 
before the 2000 repeal.  
Recent evidence by Mastrobuoni (2009) and Blau and Behaghel (2012) notes a 
shift in the hazard for retirement and claiming social security benefits at the new NRA. 
The life-cycle model predicts the NRA as the optimal retirement age only in the presence 
of a convex kink in the lifetime budget constraint, but with an actuarially fair or more 
than fair delayed retirement credit there is no such kink and hence, no reason to observe 
the spike at the new NRA. The recent evidence, thus, points in the direction of a norm 
effect or reference dependence effect of the normal retirement age. Under norm effects, 
workers view the NRA as a focal point at which to retire. I examine the strength of the 
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influence of these norm effects on the retirement probability by including dummy 
variables for being below, at, or above the NRA.  
Aside from these policy variables, there are two other variables that could 
potentially cause retirement probabilities to differ among individuals by changing the 
value of their SSW: marital status and education. The retirement probability of married 
workers can differ from single individuals because for married men the benefit from a 
change in the SSW from an additional year of work is not restricted only to them but also 
extends to their spouse through spousal (if she claims spousal benefits) and/or survivor 
benefits.35 The probability of retirement among older individuals may also differ by 
educational attainment for two reasons: difference in opportunities available for 
continued work and education may be correlated with mortality. To assess differences in 
retirement probabilities arising due to marital status and education, I include dummy 
variables for being married and for educational attainment. 
Health insurance and the availability of pension are two other factor affecting 
older workers retirement probability. Rust and Phelan (1997) find that men with 
employer provided health insurance and no retiree insurance are less like to leave labor 
force before age 65 than those with retiree health insurance. They also note that even 
after age 65, these men have a lower retirement hazard suggesting that employer provided 
health insurance may be more generous.36 To control for differences in the retirement 
                                                          
35 A workers’ wife is entitled to 50 percent of his PIA, and a surviving spouse is entitled to 100 
percent of the workers’ PIA. If the wife has an earnings record, she can choose to claim the 
higher of the benefits either based on her own record or as a dependent spouse. 
36 Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) suggest one reason for this generosity could be the availability of 
coverage of dependents that is provided by employer health insurance but not by Medicare. 
Another reason could be that Medicare coverage is not comprehensive. Older individuals covered 
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hazard arising from the availability of employer provided health insurance I include two 
dummy variables. The first variable is a lagged dummy variable indicating whether an 
individual is covered by employer provided health insurance, intended to capture the 
difference in the retirement probability among individuals with and without employer 
provided health insurance at all ages 60 to 75. The second variable captures the 
differential effect of employer provided health insurance on those below age 65. The 
availability of a pension may also impact the retirement decision of older workers. 
Without knowledge regarding the detailed pension plan incentives I am unable to account 
for the precise incentives faced by a worker.37 I try to capture the effect of availability of 
a pension plan by the inclusion of a union dummy variable which indicates whether an 
individual is covered by a union. 
The race of an individual may also affect the retirement hazard. Past researchers 
have suggested that differences in retirement probabilities by race may arise due to 
difference in preference for leisure, but Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) attribute these 
differences in retirement to difference in time preference rates. I include race dummies to 
capture these differences. Other factors affecting the probability of retirement may 
include difference in opportunities for work available at older ages; to allow the hazard to 
vary by these differences I include region dummies and the state specific unemployment 
rate. Personal responsibilities and financial needs may also cause otherwise similar 
individuals to have varying retirement propensities. I capture the impact of these factors 
                                                          
by retiree health insurance, however, will not be affected by health insurance availability and 
eligibility for Medicare in making their retirement decisions. 
37 Freeman (1985) shows that the presence of unions increases pension coverage. 
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by including three variables: a dummy variable indicating whether an individual has 
children under 18, a dummy variable for ownership of home, and the number of members 
in the household. 
1.5. RETIREMENT DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS  
1.5.1. DEFINITIONS OF RETIREMENT 
There is no universal definition of retirement. With the availability of different 
pathways to retirement for older individuals, it has become increasingly difficult to 
understand retirement behavior by relying on a single definition. Many researchers have 
documented the varied options explored by older individuals. For example, the transition 
from full time work can happen abruptly with complete retirement from work, gradually 
through part time work at the current job or at a new and final job, or by a temporary 
withdrawal from work followed by reentry into the labor force at a later date.38 These 
empirically observed diverse choices stress the need to understand that the idea of 
retirement means different things to different individuals, and any attempt to study these 
choices using a single definition may prove inadequate.  
In the past, researchers have explored the retirement behavior of older individuals 
using both objective and subjective definitions. I use two definitions of retirement 
summarized in Table 1.6.39 The retirement from labor force definition relies only on 
                                                          
38 Gustman and Steinmeier (1984 a), Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990), Ruhm (1990), and 
Blau (1994).  
39 In the above retirement criterion, retirement is defined as an absorbing state. Once an individual 
satisfies the criterion he cannot un-retire; I drop all observations on the individual following first 
incidence of retirement. For individuals who leave the sample and then return later, I keep only 
the first uninterrupted spell of observations. The sample used in the analysis also does not include 
individuals who were currently serving in the armed forces (this question is asked only until age 
60). Individuals living in the following states were also excluded from all panels, because the 
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objective measures in classifying an individual as retired, while the second definition 
relies only on a subjective self-reported measure of retirement. In both the definitions 
described below only individuals ages 60 to 75 are considered. 
Retirement due to Withdrawal from Labor Force: This definition is the broader of the two 
employed in the study, and is also the one most frequently used by researchers studying 
retirement behavior. The initial sample consists of all individuals who have a paid 
job/business or have looked for work sometime in the four months preceding their first 
interview.40 An individual is viewed as retiring at some point in a four month interval 
prior to the first interview at which he first reports not working at any job/business and 
not looking for work. Since I do not observe the actual month of retirement, I calculate 
the retirement age of an individual by choosing the second month in the four month 
interval as the month of retirement.41  
                                                          
states could not be separately identified to assign state specific unemployment rate in the 1996 
and 2001 panels: Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Individuals are 
asked if they worked at least one job/business in the four months preceding the month of 
interview or in the month of interview, but all subsequent questions refer to the four-month period 
prior to the month of interview. Among the individuals who do not have a job during the entire 
four-month period, the question looking for work is asked only of those who did not stop working 
because of retirement or disability. First interview refers to the first time an individual was 
interviewed when he falls between the ages 60 and 75 (which may be different from the first time 
the individual was interviewed when he entered the survey).  I determine the retirement age for 
all definitions by assuming that the individual retired in the second month of the four-month 
window. 
40 The question looking for work is only asked of those individuals who when asked the reason 
for not having a paid job do not state themselves either as retired or unable to work because of a 
chronic condition. 
41 I am unable to make full use of the birth year information available in the SIPP because of the 
inability to accurately observe the timing of retirement. To calculate the age of retirement in the 
four-month window in which an individual is observed to retire, I recode the birth month/year 
information provided by the individual. I code the birth month for each individual by rotation 
groups to fall on the second month of the four-month interval and then calculate the retirement 
age using the recoded birth month. For some individuals I also changed the birth year assigned to 
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An advantage of selecting the initial sample at the sampling wave on the basis of 
labor force status in the previous four months is that it allows for a larger sample size. 
The number of men and women included under each definition of retirement are 
summarized in Tables 1.7 and 1.8. The larger sample size for both men and women under 
this definition arises because of its broad scope: any individual with a job/business or 
looking for work. Regardless of whether it is full time work, or part time work at reduced 
pay and possibly reduced work load, any worker is considered a part of the initial sample 
and treated as if not retired. The total number of men and women participating in the 
labor force at older ages do not differ by a large amount from men confirming the 
increasing attachment of older women to the labor force. Under this definition an 
individual is labeled retired based on a researchers’ retirement criterion of being out of 
the labor force. A limitation of this definition is that it misclassifies discouraged workers 
(who might reenter the labor force at a later date) as permanently retired. 
Self-Reported Retirement (Ever Retired): Objective measures of retirement allow a 
researcher to avoid the ambiguity attached with self-assessed measures of retirement, but 
they miss vital information conveyed by individuals’ own view of his retirement status 
which may be different due to difficulty in objectively measuring retirement. The sample 
under this definition includes individuals who are working and state themselves as having 
never-retired from any paid work. An individual is considered retired when he first 
declares himself retired. 
                                                          
the individuals. For instance, in the 1996 panel for someone in rotation group 1 who was born in 
December 1938, I recode the birth month to January and the birth year to 1939.  
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Self-reported or subjectively assessed retirement status may vary by individuals. 
If all older individuals viewed retirement as a complete disassociation from any 
subsequent involvement with paid work, then the self-assessed retirement status will be 
unambiguously determined. All older individuals, however, do not view retirement in the 
same way, and different individuals may attach their own meaning to the idea of being 
retired. For instance, two individuals employed full time at the same bridge job may view 
their retirement status differently.42 Such nuances cannot be completely captured by 
objective measures. 
Under this definition the observed number of women in the sample is higher than 
the number of men at all ages (Tables 1.7 and 1.8) suggesting that among those employed 
at a job more women do not view themselves retired than men. There could be two 
possible explanations for this observation. One, it is possible that some women 
continuing part-time employment at their career job may not view themselves retired. 
Two, women’s intermittent labor supply over their lifetime, along with the higher number 
of women employed at part-time jobs may lead some to view any attachment with work 
as a state of being not retired. The difference between the number of women employed in 
the labor force and those declaring themselves not retired, however, indicates that the 
above explanations while true for some women are not true in general; many women, like 
men, continue to work after declaring that they have retired from work at least once.  
 There are two additional advantages in using this definition. First, it does not 
misclassify individuals leaving paid work due to termination or layoff or any other 
                                                          
42 Ruhm (1990) describes bridge jobs as jobs held after departure from a long time held career job 
but before complete withdrawal from labor force. 
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reason, who do not view themselves as retired even after they have stopped looking for a 
job in the last four months (discouraged workers). Second, it also does not misclassify 
those older workers who do not view themselves retired when they leave the labor force 
intending to reenter at a later date. The disadvantage in relying on a subjective measure of 
retirement is its inconsistency. Instead of relying on a universal retirement criterion 
chosen by a researcher, a subjective definition relies on each individuals’ personal 
retirement criterion.  
To better understand the differences in behavior under the two retirement 
definitions I compare the number of individuals at the sampling wave and the number of 
individuals actually observed retiring in the sample under each definition. The higher 
number of men and women under the labor force definition relative to the self-reported 
definition (in Tables 1.7 and 1.8) suggests that many older workers continue to work 
while viewing themselves as retired. In Table 1.9, I further explore the relationship 
between the two retirement definitions by focusing on the actual retirement behavior of 
individuals in the sample to understand how the timing of withdrawal from labor force 
may differ from self-reported retirement. The first row indicates the percentage of men 
for whom the timing of self-reported retirement is greater than timing of withdrawal from 
the labor force. The first column focuses on those individuals whose retirement status is 
based on withdrawal from the labor force, while the second column focuses on 
individuals who report themselves as retired at some point in the survey. I find that in the 
SIPP data, only about 5 percent of men who are categorized as retired based on their 
withdrawal from labor force have not yet described themselves as such. Among 
individuals who report themselves retired only 11 percent withdraw from the labor force 
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before they claim to be retired. This suggests that most individuals declare themselves 
retired before they leave the labor force. The second row indicates the amount of overlap 
in the two retirement definitions. I find some support for the view that many older 
workers today continue to work after retiring from a (career) job, in the higher percentage 
of individuals reported in the third row for whom the timing of withdrawal from labor 
force is greater than the timing of self-reported retirement.  
1.5.2. HAZARD RATES   
 The plots of the hazard rate into retirement at various ages for the different SIPP 
panels provide a convenient snapshot that aides in carrying out a preliminary visual 
analysis of the change in retirement behavior over time (without accounting for 
covariates). I model retirement age in discrete-time to account for the discrete nature of 
the available data, and in doing so I also assume that the true nature of the underlying 
retirement age is discrete.43 The discrete Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard at each possible 
retirement age is the fraction of individuals who retire at that age conditional on not 
having retired at any age prior to that.44 Figures 1.3-1.4 show the hazard rate plots into 
retirement for the retirement definitions discussed above. 
                                                          
43 Allison (1982) notes that regardless of the assumption about the true underlying nature of time 
(discrete or continuous), the results from estimating models that take into account the discrete 
nature of the available data are very similar. 
44 Specifically, the hazard rate at any age t, Ht = Number of failurest / Number of Individual at 
riskt is the ratio of the number of individuals who retire (fail) between the age interval (t-1, t] and 
the number of individuals at risk of retiring at the beginning of the interval (at age t-1). The 
number of individuals at risk of retiring at age t includes all individuals who have not retired in 
any previous age interval and who were not censored at the beginning of the age interval (t-1, t]. 
Number of individuals censored at age t includes those who were observed in the sample at the 
beginning of the interval (t-1, t] at age t -1 but not at age t, we do not observe the retirement age 
for such individuals. Individuals can be censored for three reasons: they leave the survey 
(attrition), they are no longer in the age range 60-75, or they have not retired at the time of the last 
survey interview (last wave). 
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 The hazard rate plots for the labor force retirement definitions are shown in Fig 
1.3. Among older men observed in the 1996 panel, there is a higher initial peak at age 62 
relative to age 65.45 This highlights the well documented preference among men (due to 
liquidity constraints) to leave the labor force at age 62 when social security benefits first 
become available. The hazard declines after age 62 then increases at age 65, but after age 
65 the hazard into retirement is higher at all ages as the increasingly fewer individuals 
who remain in the labor force at these advanced ages withdraw. Women have a higher 
hazard than men at most ages (except age 62) which indicates that at every possible age 
of retirement the probability that an older woman will retire at that age conditional on not 
having retired earlier is higher than that of an older man. 
The retirement hazard peaks observed in the 1996 panel at ages 62 and 65 among 
older men diminish in the later panels, while a new peak emerges in the 2008 panel at age 
66 (new NRA). For older women, the age 65 spike continues to remain prominent even in 
the 2008 panel suggesting that women persist in their earlier retirement behavior either 
because they continue to view age 65 as a focal point for retirement or due to the 
eligibility for Medicare. The hazard for women below age 69 declines in later panels but 
this decline is less than the one experienced by men, and is offset by slight increases in 
the 2008 panel. The peak in the retirement hazard at age 66 observed among older men is 
surprising, this behavior among older men points to other reasons such as social norms 
                                                          
45 Due to the fewer number of individuals at ages above 70 who are observed both at work and in 
the sample, while computing the hazard rate of retirement at these advanced ages I do not observe 
any individual retiring for certain age intervals. To avoid the sharp declines in hazard rate to zero 
within such empty intervals I assign the hazard rate observed in the previous age interval to the 
empty age interval. This explains the flat hazard rates observed at older ages in some of the 
definitions. 
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which may lead individuals to associate the Social Security normal retirement age with a 
focal point for retirement.46 
 Unlike the hazard rates discussed above, the hazard rate for self-reported 
retirement (Figures 1.4 A and B) among men in the 1996 panel has a much higher peak at 
age 65 than at age 62. Among women in the 1996 panel the peaks at ages 62 and 65 are 
not as prominent as among men. The hazard into self-reported retirement in the 1996 
panel does not vary much between men and women below age 70. The higher hazards 
observed for men at both ages 62 and 65 decline in the later panels as can be seen in 
Figures 1.3 A and B.47 For men a new peak also emerges at age 66 in the 2008 panel but 
it is relatively smaller than the one that existed at age 65, and not much higher than the 
hazards of retiring at neighboring ages. A visual inspection of the hazard for self-reported 
retirement among men and women in the four panels suggests a decline at all ages in the 
2001 and 2004 panel, but in the 2008 panel the hazard increases for those above age 65. 
For women the age 65 spike in the hazard does not diminish with time, and there is no 
evidence of a higher retirement hazard into retirement at age 66 in the 2008 panel.  
 To summarize, a common feature of the hazard plots discussed above is the 
existence of pronounced spikes in the retirement hazard at ages 62 and 65 for both men 
and women in the 1996 panel. With the course of time these spikes decline for men and a 
new modest spike in the hazard appears at age 66. The age 65 spike diminishes but does 
                                                          
46 Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1996). 
47 The number of observations listed next to each hazard plot indicates the number of individuals 
who were in the labor force at the beginning of the sample, and who subsequently retired or left 
the sample at an age greater than 60. Individuals who are 60 years of age and who retire or leave 
the sample after being observed for only one wave are not included in the hazard rate 
calculations. This explains why the number of men and women listed next to the hazard plots 
differ from those present in the initial sample selected from each panel. 
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not completely disappear.48 Interestingly, unlike men among women the observed spike 
in the hazard at age 65 does not diminish even in later panels, while the decline in the 
spike at age 62 is less than that observed among men, and the spike at age 66 is missing. 
1.5.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The summary statistics for men included in the sample under the labor force 
retirement definition are provided in Tables 1.10 A and B.  The average birth year of the 
individuals included is 1940 or higher (range 1921-53) which indicates the prevalence of 
relatively younger age individuals in the sample. This concentration of younger 
individuals at the sampling wave was also previewed in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, where almost 
half the number of individuals observed under each definition at the time of first 
interview were those below age 62. Because of the higher presence of younger birth 
cohorts the average delayed retirement credit is also approximately 7 percent (range 3-8 
percent) which is considered actuarially fair for the average person with no borrowing 
constraints. About half of the men and women observed under the labor force definition 
face the earnings test at some point in the sample. Among individuals facing the earnings 
test there is not enough variation in the tax rate for clearly identifying the differential 
impact of the earnings test among those with a tax rate of 50 percent relative to those 
                                                          
48 Previous studies have documented a spike in the retirement hazard at the normal retirement age 
of 65 and ascribed the following reasons for the spike: actuarially unfair DRC which creates a 
convex kink at NRA, the NRA acts as a focal point, the eligibility for Medicare at age 65, and the 
incentives available in defined benefits pension plans. The significance of some of these reasons 
have reduced over time: the delayed retirement credit has increased and is actuarially fair for the 
average person with no borrowing constraints; and as companies shift away from defined benefits 
plans more workers are covered under defined contributions plans which do not provide early 
retirement incentives. It is difficult to test the Medicare eligibility hypothesis because the 
eligibility age has not changed since the beginning of the program in 1965. 
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with a tax rate of 33 percent. Approximately 80 percent of men and 55 percent of women 
are married.49  
1.6. METHOD OF ESTIMATION  
I estimate the discrete-time hazard model using maximum likelihood. The 
particular initial specification is: 
log � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿)� =  𝛼𝛼𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃2 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃3 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃4 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 ∗ (𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 − $21.67) + 𝜃𝜃5 𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜃𝜃6 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿  + 𝜃𝜃7 𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒  𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 +  𝜃𝜃8 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 
To estimate the model, following Jenkins (1995) I arrange the data into person wave 
observations representing the time at risk for each individual. In doing so I take into 
account the sample selection process, because not all individuals are observed entering 
into the initial unretired state at age 60 (the beginning of an individuals’ time at risk of 
retirement). I assume a flexible non-parametric specification for the baseline hazard, and 
treat the time varying variables as constant within each discrete-time interval.50  
                                                          
49 I define all those individuals as single who are currently not married. Single individuals include 
all those who are: divorced, widowed, and never married. In defining individuals as single in this 
way, I am unable to account for the different incentives in the social security law for divorced and 
widowed individuals. These incentives may especially be important for divorced and/or widowed 
women who claim benefits on their husband’s record.  
50 In estimating the model parameters, I do not account for any unobserved source of variation in 
the retirement hazard among individuals. 
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 Suppressing the conditioning on covariates, the log likelihood function as derived 
by Jenkins for a stock sample of n individuals is as follows: 
log 𝐿𝐿 =  ��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 . log  � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿)� +  �� log( 1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿)𝜏𝜏+𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿=𝜏𝜏
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝜏𝜏+𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿=𝜏𝜏
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where τ represents the age at which an individual i was selected into the sample of each 
retirement definition and first became at risk of retiring. τ may differ by individuals for 
two reasons. First, only individuals who are 60 to 75 years of age are included in the 
estimation sample, so we will observe a different τ for younger individuals as they attain 
age 60 at different points and enter the sample. Second, individuals falling in this age 
range may enter the actual SIPP survey sample at different waves. si represents number 
of waves in the sample for each individual. For individuals who are observed retiring in 
the survey (uncensored), τ + si represents the SIPP wave at the time of retirement. Those 
individuals who have not retired at the time of the last interview wave of the SIPP survey, 
or who have not retired at the time they leave the survey are viewed as censored, because 
their retirement age is not known. For censored individuals, τ + si  represents their last 
wave of observation in the survey. yit represents the retirement status of the individual; 
the last observation of an individual who retires in the sample (uncensored) is set to yit = 
1 (if t = τ + si). All other observations (other than the last observation) of uncensored 
individuals have yit = 0, and it is also set to zero for all observations of censored 
individuals.    
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1.7. FINDINGS FROM ESTIMATION OF RETIREMENT MODELS 
In this section I present the estimation findings from the labor force and the self-
reported definitions of retirement separately for men and then women. In presenting these 
findings I first discuss the basic estimation results from the retirement models, and then 
the robustness checks. The dependent variable in the estimation of both retirement 
models is a dichotomous dummy variable indicating whether an individual has retired 
since the last wave, where retirement status is determined based on the retirement 
criterions described earlier.51  
1.7.1. ESTIMATION FINDINGS FOR MEN   
 Retirement due to Withdrawal from Labor Force: The results from the estimation 
of the retirement model for men based on withdrawal from the labor force definition are 
presented in Table 1.11. To assess the sensitivity of the estimation results to the inclusion 
of different variables, I estimate the retirement models with seven different 
specifications. All seven specifications include controls for age dummies (age in years), 
quarter/year dummies to control for variation over time, and panel dummies to control for 
overlapping panels.52 The first specification shown in column 1 captures the effect of the 
                                                          
51 Diamond and Hausman (1984) note that a selection rule which conditions on working in the 
previous four months introduces a “dynamic self-selection” bias in the estimation findings. They 
raise the concern that individuals who are observed at risk of retiring in a given time frame may 
not be representative of the population at risk for given past values of policy variables. For 
instance, if the delayed retirement credit increases cause individuals above the normal retirement 
age to retire earlier, then the individuals who continue to work after many years of being affected 
by the policy change are the one who are less likely to retire. With the exception of Gruber and 
Madrian (1993), most researchers do not account for this dynamic selection problem. In my 
empirical analysis, I also do not account for the dynamic selection. 
52 The last wave of SIPP panel 2001 and the first wave of SIPP panel 2004 both cover the months 
of October, November and December 2003.  
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main Social Security policy variables on the retirement hazard without controlling for the 
influence of other covariates. Both the delayed retirement credit and the normal 
retirement age variables assess the impact of a change in these policy variables on 
individuals of all ages. Each individual regardless of his current age is assigned a time 
constant value for the delayed retirement credit (percent) and normal retirement age 
(months) based on their birth year.  
The specification in column 1 also includes a dummy variable set to one if the 
individual currently faces the earnings test. I also include an earnings test threshold 
variable that is implicitly interacted with the earnings test dummy. Among individuals 
facing the earning test the earnings test threshold variable is set to the amount based on 
whether the individual is between ages 62-NRA or ages NRA-70, while it is set to zero 
for individuals not facing the earnings test.  Before the earnings test was repealed in 
2000, the threshold amount for the affected individuals who were above their NRA (and 
below age 70) was approximately at $21, 671. In each of the seven specifications I 
include the difference between the threshold amount applicable for each individual facing 
the earnings test and $21,671. The benefit of specifying the threshold amount variable as 
the difference from $21,671 is that the coefficient on the earnings test in place dummy 
can now be interpreted as measuring the impact of having the earnings test in place at 
$21,671 relative to not having the earning test among individuals above their normal 
retirement age. In other words, I can, thus, assess the impact of repealing the earnings test 
at the higher threshold amount which was in place before 2000. 
The coefficient for the earnings test in place dummy has an unexpected negative 
sign suggesting the presence of the earnings test at a threshold amount of $21,671 
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reduces the probability of retirement from labor force, but it is not significant. The 
coefficient for the normal retirement age has the expected negative sign, but it is also not 
significant. In this specification the normal retirement age variable captures both the 
financial and norm related effects related to the normal retirement age increases. The 
threshold level coefficient has the expected sign and is statistically significant, indicating 
a significant impact of each thousand-dollar increase in the threshold amount above 
$21,671 in reducing the probability of retiring from labor force among men.  
In the second specification, I allow the retirement hazard to vary by individual 
specific characteristics, financial circumstances, and local labor market conditions 
through the inclusion of controls for race, education, children, ownership of home, 
number of members in household, region dummies and the state specific unemployment 
rate. Controlling for these variables does not alter the estimated impact of the policy 
variables. As found in previous studies, the probability of leaving the labor force is higher 
among black men relative to whites. Married men have a lower probability of retiring 
from labor force relative to single men, but the impact is not significant. Older men with 
less than a high school degree are more likely to retire from the labor force relative to 
those with only a high school degree, while men with at least a college degree are less 
likely to retire from the labor force. In the third specification I control for any influence 
on the retirement hazard that may function through norm related effects of the NRA by 
including two dummy variables for being at, and above the normal retirement age.53 The 
inclusion of these variables does not alter the previous findings. The coefficient on the 
                                                          
53 Since, I do not accurately observe each individuals’ age at the time of retirement, I code the 
dummy variable for being at the normal retirement age to equal one at the first observed age after 
the individual has attained his normal retirement age. 
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dummy for being at the normal retirement age has a positive sign indicating the higher 
probability of retirement among individuals who are at their NRA relative to those below 
the NRA, but the impact is not significant. 
The theoretical prediction for the impact of an increase in the DRC on the 
retirement probability differs depending on whether the affected individual is above or 
below the normal retirement age. There is a clear theoretical prediction of an increase in 
the probability to retire for those below their NRA, but an ambiguous prediction for those 
above their NRA (and below age 70).54 To examine these predictions I include an 
interaction term in the fourth specification that interacts the DRC with a dummy for being 
outside the age range affected by the DRC changes. The interaction term captures the 
differential response to delayed retirement credit changes among those above the NRA 
and below age 70 relative to those below the NRA and those above age 70. The 
coefficient for the DRC interaction term, indicates that a higher DRC lowers the 
retirement probability among those outside the affected age range relative to those above 
the NRA and below age 70, and the effect is statistically significant. This unexpected 
finding suggests the stronger influence of the delayed retirement credit functioning 
through the spillover effects on individuals below their normal retirement age. In the 
presence of the DRC interaction term, the coefficient on the delayed retirement credit 
variable now captures the effect of the DRC increases among individuals above the 
normal retirement age who are directly impacted by the policy change. 
                                                          
54 In the presence of labor force entry and exit costs, increases in the DRC may reduce probability 
to retire among individuals below the NRA.  
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 With the inclusion of the DRC interaction, the coefficient on the earnings test in 
place dummy has the expected sign, but the impact remains insignificant. Interestingly, 
the coefficient for being at the NRA dummy variable now has a negative sign suggesting 
a lower probability of retirement among men at their NRA and the effect is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. I also observe that the probability of retirement is 
lower among those above the normal retirement age relative to those below, and the 
effect is statistically significant. The coefficient for the NRA variable also has an 
expected negative sign, and the effect is statistically significant suggesting that as the 
normal retirement age rises it reduces the probability of retirement among men at all 
ages. In this specification the NRA variable captures only the impact arising through the 
financial incentives of changing the normal retirement age. 
The retirement hazard may also vary by the availability of health insurance with 
current employer, and this impact may differ among those below the age of eligibility for 
Medicare (age 65). I control for the influence of health insurance availability by including 
two dummy variables for lagged health insurance with current employer in the fifth 
specification. The coefficient on the interaction of health insurance among those below 
age 65 is negative and statistically significant indicating the lower probability of 
retirement from labor force among men below age 65 who are at a job which provides 
their health insurance coverage relative to similar men above age 65. Accounting for this 
reduction in retirement probability for ages below 65, reduces the strength of the relative 
impact of the delayed retirement credit among individuals not directly affected by the 
changes. Both the dummy variable capturing the norm effects and the NRA variable 
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capturing the financial incentives of the NRA changes now have a statistically 
insignificant impact on the probability of retirement. 
In the sixth specification I try to capture the effect that the availability of a 
pension may have on the retirement hazard by including a dummy variable indicating 
whether the individual is covered by union. I find that individuals covered by a union 
have a higher probability of retirement relative to individuals not covered, and the effect 
is statistically significant. This finding suggests that the availability of a pension raises 
the probability of retirement from the labor force among men. In the final specification, 
to capture the differential impact of having the earnings test among those below the 
normal retirement age relative to those above, I include another dummy variable 
indicating the presence of the earnings test at a tax rate of 50 percent. The impact of the 
earnings test at 33 percent, captured by the earnings test in place dummy remains 
insignificant. There is a statistically significant negative impact of the earnings test with a 
tax rate of 50 percent, suggesting that the presence of the earnings test among men below 
the normal retirement age reduces their probability of retirement. The negative sign on 
the earnings test with tax rate of 50 percent dummy is in contrast to the theoretical 
predictions of the life-cycle model, however, this sign is not surprising if spillover effects 
are taken into account. If individuals below the normal retirement age respond to the 
repeal of the earning test (for those above the normal retirement age), by planning to 
work longer at older ages, then in the presence of transition costs we will observe less 
retirement among them. The coefficient on the DRC interaction term now becomes 
insignificant. 
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In Table 1.12, I present the partial effects of these estimated coefficients.55 
Following Greene (2010), I do not report statistical tests for either partial effects or cross 
partial effects (interaction terms) because of the difficulty in interpretation of the 
hypothesis tests. A one percentage point increase in the DRC reduces the probability of 
retirement among men outside the affected age range by approximately 0.5 percentage 
points relative to those directly affected (in specifications 4-6), which is approximately 
30 percent of the average retirement hazard. The probability of retirement among older 
men below their NRA who face the earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent reduces by 4 
percentage points. This reduction is large, as the presence of the earnings test below the 
NRA reduces the retirement hazard by more than two times the average hazard among 
men.  
Self-Reported Retirement: The findings from the retirement behavior of older men 
based on a subjectively assessed retirement criterion summarized in Tables 1.13-1.14, are 
different from the objectively assessed definition of retirement from labor force in several 
ways. In specifications 1-3, the delayed retirement credit changes have a significant 
impact on reducing the probability of self-reported retirement among older men at all 
ages. With the inclusion of the DRC interaction term, the main DRC variable remains 
statistically significant indicating the reduction in the self-reported retirement probability 
among men above their NRA and below age 70. A one percentage point increase in the 
                                                          
55 The partial effects for continuous variable are estimated using Stata’s margins dydx option. The 
margins dydx(drc nra) command gives the average effect of the DRC and the NRA variable 
increases while holding all other variables constant. The cross partial effects are estimated using 
r.margins (contrast) option. The command:  margins, over(r.outside age range affected by DRC) 
dydx(drc), gives the partial effect of the DRC interaction term by contrasting the effect of DRC 
increases on those outside the affected age range relative to those between the affected age range.                                                                                                                                              
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DRC reduces the probability of retirement among men directly affected by the delayed 
retirement credit increases by approximately one percentage point. This effect is large: a 
one percentage point increase in the DRC reduces the retirement hazard of individuals 
directly affected by approximately forty percent of the average retirement hazard. But, 
the delayed retirement credit does not significantly alter the relative probability of 
retirement among those directly versus those not affected by the DRC changes. 
 The coefficient on the dummy variable for being at the normal retirement age has 
a positive sign in specifications 3-4, and is statistically significant. This finding suggests 
that being at the normal retirement age increases the probability of self-reported 
retirement among men through norm effects. This finding, however is fragile, and not 
robust to the inclusion of health insurance dummies. The impact of the earnings test 
being in place at the threshold amount before the repeal remains insignificant in all the 
specifications. Similar to the labor force definition, I find that the earnings test at a 50 
percent tax rate significantly reduces the probability of self-reported retirement among 
men below their NRA. The presence of the earnings test among men below their NRA 
has a large statistically significant effect on reducing their probability to self-report 
themselves as retired. It lowers their retirement hazard by approximately hundred and 
twenty-five percent of the average retirement hazard. Men with a college degree are less 
likely to report themselves retired relative to those with a high school degree only.  
1.7.1.1.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS  
Gruber and Orszag (2003) documented strong trends over time in labor force 
participation by age groups among older individuals, and note that models which control 
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for these underlying age specific trends are more reliable. Following Gruber and Orszag, 
I also check the sensitivity of the estimation findings to the inclusion of age specific 
trends in retirement and age specific sensitivity to business cycles. To perform robustness 
checks, I estimate four specifications for both the labor-force and the self-reported 
retirement definitions. The findings are reported in Table 1.15. The first specification 
adds linear age specific trends to specification 7 presented in the Tables 1.11 and 1.13. In 
the second specification I include interaction terms of the age dummies with the state 
specific unemployment rate. Gruber and Madrian (2004) review the sizeable literature 
investigating the effect of health insurance availability (with current employer that may 
or may not continue providing retiree health insurance) on the retirement decision. They 
note that reduced form studies examining the relationship between retiree health 
insurance availability and retirement may suffer from a selection problem if there is a 
correlation between retiree health insurance availability and an individual’s taste for 
leisure. In my study the estimates for health insurance availability and union coverage 
may be biased if the individuals working at jobs that offer health insurance and/or 
pension are selecting themselves into such jobs (maybe individuals with stronger taste for 
work seek and find employment at such jobs). In the third and the fourth specifications, I 
examine the robustness of the findings to the exclusion of lagged health insurance and 
union dummies.  
Similar to Gruber and Orszag, I find no robust influence of the full impact of the 
earnings test repeal on the probability of retirement from labor force for men. Unlike 
them, the common finding from all four specifications for the labor force and self-
reported retirement is the influence of the earnings test threshold increases in reducing 
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the probability of retirement from labor force among older men who face the earnings 
test. This supports the earlier discussion about the presence of substantial fixed costs, 
minimum hours constraints or lack of part time jobs available to men which may be 
keeping them from participating in the labor force in the presence of the earnings test. 
The looser threshold level enhances the work options available to men. My findings for 
retirement from labor force definition are also similar to those of Kruger and Pischke; I 
do not find any impact of the benefit reductions on the probability of retirement among 
older men. My findings are not directly comparable to those of Mastrobuoni’s because in 
his specification he captures the total effect of the increase in the normal retirement age, 
which includes both the financial and any norm related effect. Unlike Blau and 
Goodstein, I do not find any influence of the NRA or the DRC changes on the probability 
of retirement from labor force among older men.  
A robust finding from the estimation of models based on subjectively assessed 
retirement behavior among older men is the significant impact of delayed retirement 
credit increases in reducing the probability of self-reported retirement among individuals 
directly affected by these policy changes. The influence of the delayed retirement credit 
on the self-reported retirement but not the retirement based on withdrawal from the labor 
force suggests that discouraged workers who are not observed under the labor force 
definition but are observed under the self-reported retirement definition might be 
responding to the delayed retirement credit while assessing their retirement status.56 
                                                          
56 As noted earlier, the SIPP oversamples poor individuals. The above estimation findings are 
unweighted. To assess the validity of these findings for the entire population, I estimate both the 
retirement and claiming models (described in the next section) using person weights provided in 
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1.7.2. ESTIMATION FINDINGS FOR WOMEN  
 For women, I report only the findings that are robust to the inclusion of linear age 
trends and age specific effects of business cycles in Table 1.16. Similar to men, I do not 
find a response in the retirement from labor force among women to the main policy 
changes. I find a robust influence only from the threshold level in reducing retirement 
probability among women conditional on the presence of the earnings test. This finding 
does not concur with Reimers and Honig’s (1996) prediction that loosening the earnings 
test threshold may affect the labor force participation of older men, but not women. This 
suggests that even though a higher number of older women are concentrated in part time 
jobs, and may thus not face the same minimum hours constraints as men, the loosening of 
the earnings test annual amount still prompts women to extend the duration of their work 
life. The presence of the earnings test seems to reduce the probability of retirement 
among women above their NRA, which is an unexpected finding, but the impact is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that even though loosening the earnings test 
threshold reduces the probability of retirement among women who face the earnings test, 
a complete repeal of the earnings test does not alter the behavior of women above their 
NRA in a significant manner relative to women who do not face the earnings test. I am 
also unable to find support for Reimers and Honig’s prediction that since women are far-
sighted in their behavior they are more likely to respond to increases in the delayed 
retirement credit than men. Increases in the delayed retirement credit reduces the 
probability of retirement from labor force among women above their NRA, but the 
                                                          
the SIPP. I do not report those results here, but they are very similar to the unweighted findings 
discussed above.  
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impact is not statistically significant indicating that like men, women are not sensitive to 
the DRC changes in the timing of their departure from the labor force. 
 The response in self-reported retirement behavior among women above their 
normal retirement age and below age 70 to the DRC changes is similar to men. The main 
DRC variable captures a statistically significant reduction in the self-reported retirement 
behavior among women directly affected by the policy. Unlike men, I find that in 
specifications which include the union coverage dummy the DRC interaction variable has 
a marginally statistically significant effect in reducing the self-reported retirement 
probability among women outside the affected age range relative to those directly 
affected. This finding provides some evidence for the impact of the DRC operating 
through spillover effects among women not directly affected by the changes. The main 
normal retirement age variable capturing the financial incentive effects of the NRA 
changes is statistically significant in all the specifications but the sign is unexpected. A 
one month increase in the NRA raises the probability of self-reported retirement among 
women at all ages.57 Thus, for both men and women I do not find an impact of the recent 
changes in the Social Security policy variables on the probability of retirement when 
retirement is assessed using an objective measure, but find a statistically significant 
response to the DRC changes among individuals directly affected by the policy changes 
when retirement is assessed based on a subjective measure.    
                                                          
57 To assess if the unexpected sign on the normal retirement age variable was due to the 
interaction between married women and their husband’s retirement decision, I estimated separate 
models for married and single women. I find that the normal retirement age variable has a 
statistically significant positive impact on the self-reported retirement behavior of both married 
and single women.  
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1.8. CLAIMING BENEFITS AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY  
 Increases in the normal retirement age or delayed retirement credit impact 
individuals by changing their social security wealth; these changes in social security 
wealth are tied only to the timing of initial receipt of social security benefits and not to 
earnings (except through automatic benefit recomputations (ABR)). It is possible that 
individuals below and above the NRA may retire but continue delaying the receipt of 
benefits to avail the actuarial adjustments applied to postponed benefits.58 Coile, et al. 
(2002) emphasize that retirement is a necessary but not sufficient condition for claiming 
social security benefits by noting a variety of circumstances under which delayed 
claiming is optimal for an individual. If the timing of retirement is distinct from the 
timing of benefit receipt, then increases in the normal retirement age or delayed 
retirement credit will not impact retirement age, instead we will observe only a change in 
the benefit claiming behavior.    
 The earnings test, however, ties earnings of workers within the affected age range 
to their social security wealth.59 Older workers earning above the threshold amount see 
their social security wealth decline. By providing a direct link between work and social 
security wealth, the earnings test affects the timing of both retirement and benefit receipt 
among older workers. Complete removal of the earnings test will impact older workers in 
two ways: delay retirement and hasten benefit receipt. Gruber and Orszag (1999, 2003) 
oppose the removal of earnings test for individuals below the normal retirement age with 
                                                          
58 The argument seems plausible only for those individuals for whom the adjustments for 
delaying benefits are actuarially unfair. 
59 In the life-cycle model, the earnings test ties earnings of workers to their social security wealth 
only in cases where it acts as a tax. 
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the argument that it will increase benefit receipt among individuals while continuing to 
work. 
 To understand the change in timing of initial receipt of benefits in response to the 
changes in the Social Security policies, I analyze the benefit claiming decision separately 
from the retirement decision. The sample selection criterion is summarized in Table 1.15, 
and the actual number of men and women observed at the sampling wave are summarized 
in Tables 1.16-1.17. The sample consists of all individuals who work at a job/business 
and have not claimed social security benefits as a primary beneficiary at the time of their 
first interview. Individuals claiming disability benefits at any point in the survey are 
excluded.60 An individual is viewed as claiming benefits when he first claims benefits as 
a primary beneficiary (regardless of his work status following the first interview).61  
 A comparison of the number of individuals present at the sampling wave under 
the labor force retirement definition and claiming definition in Tables 1.7 and 1.18 
highlights the difference between those continuing work without receiving benefits and 
                                                          
60 In total all observations for 392 men and 367 women claiming disability benefits (at any point 
in the survey) were dropped. An individual claiming disability benefits below the normal 
retirement age receives a benefit amount equivalent to his full PIA that he would have received at 
his normal retirement age. When individuals receiving disability benefits reach the normal 
retirement age their disability benefits are automatically converted to social security benefits. The 
work incentives under the social security disability program differ from the work incentives under 
social security. Individuals receiving disability benefits can also receive Medicare coverage at an 
age before 65 (the eligibility age for Medicare). 
61 I ignore all observations on the individual after he is observed (within the sample) to claim 
social security for the first time, in effect I ignore individuals who may change their mind 
regarding receipt of benefits following initial claim. Individuals above the normal retirement age 
and below age 70 can change their mind, and suspend receiving their benefits at any point. 
Individuals below the normal retirement age can withdraw their application at any point within 
the first twelve months of becoming entitled. I also exclude individuals who are above age 70 and 
have not yet claimed benefits because under social security rules all eligible beneficiaries 
automatically receive benefits at that age. It is also possible that based on their earnings history 
these individuals may not be eligible for social security benefits, these individuals may then not 
respond to social security incentives, so I do not include them in the analysis. 
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those continuing work while receiving benefits. In making this comparison I focus only 
on individuals at and above age 62 because this is the earliest age at which benefits can 
be claimed. Only one third of the older men employed at a job/business have not claimed 
benefits. Among working older women, approximately one fourth have not claimed 
benefits, suggesting that more women claim benefits while continuing to work than 
men.62 More than sixty percent of the men who are working and view themselves as not 
retired have also not claimed their social security benefits. Upon further calculations not 
seen in the table, among those who are employed and are not claiming benefits, only one 
fifth report themselves as having retired from a previous job.63 The above comparison 
reveals that for many older men and women the decision to claim benefits is separate 
from the decision to continue work. It appears that most men and women decide to claim 
benefits before they leave the labor force. For older men, there is also a suggestion that 
those working and not claiming social security benefits do not assess themselves as 
retired.   
 The difference between the timing of retirement and the claiming of social 
security benefits is also apparent from a comparison of the claiming hazard plot with the 
retirement hazard plots described earlier. One clear difference between the hazard rate 
plots for both men and women claiming benefits in the 1996 panel (Figures 1.5 A and B) 
and the retirement hazard rate plots described earlier, is the presence of very conspicuous 
                                                          
62 The larger difference between the number of women who are employed at ages below 62 and 
those not claiming benefits while employed at these ages could arise because some women may 
indicate claiming benefits as a widow. Reduced widow benefits can be received as early as age 
60. If the surviving spouse is disabled, then she can begin receiving benefits as early as age 50. 
63 Among men 62 years and older who are at a job and not claiming social security benefits at the 
time of first interview, 421 individuals report themselves as having retired from a job. Among 
women 62 years and older, only 5 declare themselves as having retired from a previous job. 
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claiming spikes at ages 62, 65, and 70 relative to the retirement spikes at these ages. A 
second difference is the relatively flat hazard rates of claiming benefits at all other ages 
below 70. The flat hazard rates imply that most individuals who are at a job and have not 
claimed social security benefits tend to claim benefits at ages 62, 65, and 70, while the 
retirement hazard rates vary at other ages below 70 as individuals continue to retire at 
other ages as well. With the passage of time for both men and women a much higher 
spike emerges at the new higher normal retirement age than at any other age. The peaks 
at ages 62 and 65 remain stable over time. There is also a change in the behavior of men 
and women who are between the normal retirement age and age 70, as their hazard rate is 
no longer flat but rather it increases in the later panels indicating an increase in the 
benefit claiming activity among these older individuals.64  
1.8.1. ESTIMATION FINDINGS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR MEN 
 I first present the findings for estimation of claiming hazard for men without 
controls for age specific linear time trends and age specific business cycle effects in 
columns 1 through 4 of Table 1.19. The partial effects are summarized in Table 1.20. 
Similar to the retirement definitions, I do not find any effect of the earnings test repeal on 
the probability of claiming benefits when evaluated at the threshold level in place before 
the earnings test repeal of 2000. The changes in the delayed retirement credit, reduce the 
probability of claiming benefits among older men above the normal retirement age, and 
the effect is statistically significant. I also find that men with at least a college education 
have a lower likelihood for claiming benefits relative to men with a high school degree 
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only. Men below the age of 65 who are covered by health insurance through their current 
employer also have a statistically significant lower claiming hazard relative to men above 
age 65 whose current employer provides their health insurance coverage.  
 When I include controls for age specific linear time trends in columns 5 through 8 
of Table 1.19, the evidence for an impact of the delayed retirement credit on the claiming 
hazard of men above their NRA dissipates. The effect is no longer significant once I 
include controls for health insurance. Similar to the finding of Gruber and Orszag (2003), 
I also observe a robust statistically significant effect of the presence of the earnings test in 
reducing the claiming hazard among older men. The claiming hazard among these men is 
reduced by 8-11 percentage points relative to men who did not face the earnings test.  
The size of this impact is almost two times the average claiming hazard at all ages. 
Another robust finding is of a norm related impact of the normal retirement age in 
accelerating claiming among men. I find a positive, statistically significant impact of 
being at the normal retirement age. The magnitude of this effect is fairly large ranging 
from a 20-40 percentage points increase in the probability of claiming at the NRA 
relative to below.65 I also find weak evidence that changes in the delayed retirement 
credit, reduce the probability of claiming social security benefits among older men who 
are within the affected age range relative to those outside the affected range, but this 
                                                          
65 The unusually large partial effects for the earnings test repeal and for being at the normal 
retirement age warrant further investigation due to two reasons. First, the earnings test repeal and 
the norm effect at the normal retirement age exert a statistically significant influence only when I 
control for linear age trends. To understand the large partial effects of these two variables, I need 
to explore how the linear age trends are affecting the claiming behavior. I am working on this. 
Second, the dummy for being at the normal retirement age may be capturing the effect of 
Medicare. I attempt to control for the effect of Medicare by including an age 65 dummy but it is 
possible that an individual whose normal retirement age is 65 years and 2 months may claim 
his/her benefits at this age either due to norm effects or Medicare or by choosing to coordinate the 
two. I am working on isolating the impact on claiming behavior that arises through norm effects.   
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effect is only marginally significant in the presence of controls for employer provided 
health insurance and the effect vanishes when control for union coverage is added.  
1.8.2. FINDINGS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR WOMEN  
 Women’s claiming behavior summarized in Table 1.21 differs from that of men in 
at least three ways. First, the earnings test in place variable exerts a significant influence 
on the claiming hazard of women only in specifications which do not control for linear 
age trends, and then too in the opposite direction from men. In the first four columns of 
Table 1.21, I find that the earnings test repeal reduces claiming among women, but this 
effect disappears when I add linear age trends to the model. Thus, I am unable to provide 
evidence in support of the finding by Gruber and Orszag (2003) that loosening of the 
earnings test raises claiming among both men and women.66 One explanation for the non-
response in claiming behavior of women to the earnings test repeal suggested by Reimers 
and Honig (1996) could be that women have more opportunities for part time work 
relative to men which provides them the option to be employed in part time jobs and 
receive full social security benefits. A repeal of the earnings test may prompt these 
women to work more hours but will not influence their benefit claiming decision. 
Second, being at the normal retirement age reduces claiming among women, but this 
effect is not robust to the exclusion of health insurance dummies in the specification 
where I control for linear age trends.  
                                                          
66 One possible reason for the difference in my findings could be that I am evaluating the impact 
of the full earnings test repeal, while Gruber and Orszag (2003) focus on the impact of a 
loosening of the earnings test threshold. 
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Third, I find weak evidence that an increase in the delayed retirement credit 
reduces claiming more among women below the normal retirement age relative to those 
above; the finding is sensitive to the exclusion of controls for employer provided health 
insurance. If benefit delay is tied to work for women, particularly single women, then 
men and women may vary in their response to the changes in the delayed retirement 
credit possibly due to differences in their work attachment. Younger women who 
continue to work may be able to afford the postponing their benefits more easily than 
older single women above the normal retirement age. I also find that married women 
have a higher claiming hazard relative to single women.  
1.8.3. CLAIMING BEHAVIOR BY MARITAL STATUS 
           A feature of the Social Security system is that upon a married worker’s death 
his/her spouse is eligible for survivor’s benefits based on the worker’s earnings records. 
Because of this feature, when a married worker delays receiving benefits for one year, the 
actuarial adjustment applied to his benefits exerts two effects: it increases his future 
benefits and raises the benefits that his surviving spouse may receive.67 Coile et. al. 
(2002) highlight the different incentives faced by a married relative to a single worker by 
simulating the change in the expected present discounted value of net future benefits 
from delayed claiming.68 They find that gains from delayed claiming are greater for 
                                                          
67 A non-disabled surviving spouse can receive reduced benefits as early as age 60, and is eligible 
to receive full survivor’s benefits at his/her normal retirement age. If the surviving spouse is also 
eligible for social security benefits based on his/her own earnings record, the higher of the two 
benefits will be awarded.  
68The simulations are performed for a married worker with a non-working wife (she has no 
earnings history), assuming the worker retires at age 62, his wage history is calculated from the 
economy-wide median earnings profile for his cohort of workers between ages 20 to 50, a 
household discount rate of 3 %, and mortality risks are taken from the Social Security 
Administration’s sex- and cohort-specific survival tables. 
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married relative to single men, so married men have a stronger financial incentive to 
delay. 
Coile et. al. (2002) empirically test this prediction for men by using Social 
Security Administration’s New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS). Contrary to their 
prediction, they find that single men are more likely to delay claiming benefits relative to 
those married. They reconcile this unexpected finding, by noting that even though 
married workers face a greater incentive to delay, they may not do so because the 
presence of a spouse may provide self-insurance against the uncertainty of death. Figinski 
(2012) examined differences in the claiming behavior of women, but he assessed the 
difference by separating women based on the type of benefit that they are eligible for: 
spousal relative to primary. He finds that the earnings test repeal raised claiming among 
men and women; for women, he observes higher claiming by both primary and spousal 
beneficiaries. Based on his findings, it appears that women who are primary beneficiaries 
respond to the repeal in a manner similar to men, while spousal beneficiaries may be 
influenced by their husband’s claiming decision.69 It is possible, however, that the 
claiming behavior is impacted by marital status of the woman. Married women who are 
primary beneficiaries may also be influenced by their husband’s incentives, or 
coordinating their claiming decision with their husband.70 Similar to Coile et. al.’s 
                                                          
69 A woman eligible for Social Security spousal benefits can file to receive her benefits, only after 
her husband (the primary beneficiary) has claimed his benefits. Figinski (2012) is unable to 
examine the link between the claiming behavior of spousal beneficiaries and that of their 
husband, as in his administrative data he unable to match spouses.  
70 The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000, also introduced the claim and suspend 
policy. A feature of the claim and suspend option is that it permits one individuals from a married 
couple who has attained normal retirement age to claim his/her primary benefits, thus, allowing 
their spouse to file for the spousal benefits. The primary beneficiary who initially claimed the 
benefits, can then choose to suspend his/her primary benefits so as to earn delayed retirement 
credit actuarial adjustments on them. With this option, married women with high earnings may 
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finding for men, we may observe delayed claiming by single women because they may 
lack the self-insurance provided by a spouse. I extend the previous studies in two ways. 
First, I investigate the existence of any difference in claiming behavior of married and 
single men in response to the recent changes in Social Security policies. Second, I also 
explore whether the benefit claiming response varies between married and single women. 
In Tables 1.22 and 1.23, I present the findings from the estimation of separate 
claiming models for married and single men and women. I report the estimation findings 
from four different specifications in columns 1 through 4, each specification includes 
controls for age-group specific trends in benefit receipt. Specifications 1 and 2 assess the 
sensitivity of the findings to the inclusion of controls for employer provided health 
insurance and union coverage status of the individual. Under the earnings test, the 
earnings of individuals below the normal retirement age are taxed at a higher rate of 50 
percent relative to the 33 percent tax rate faced by individuals above the normal 
retirement age. In specification 3, I account for the presence of a higher tax on the 
earnings of individuals below the normal retirement age by including an earnings test tax 
at 50 percent dummy which takes a value of one for all individuals between ages 62-
NRA; specification 4 examines the robustness of the findings in specification 3 to 
inclusion of controls for health insurance and union coverage by employer. In order to 
assess whether married couples account for their spouse’s incentives in making their 
                                                          
claim spousal benefits initially, while postponing their primary benefits and accruing a delayed 
retirement credit on them. If spousal benefits are used strategically by married couples then it is 
not clear how one should interpret the empirical findings related to spousal beneficiaries. 
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claiming decision, the four specifications for married individuals include the incentives 
faced by the spouse as well. 
Findings for Married and Single Men: The first set of results in Table 1.22 
pertains to single men. I find some weak support that the earnings test repeal raised 
claiming among single men; this finding surfaces only in the absence of controls for 
health insurance and union coverage. Apart from this weak evidence of the influence 
exerted by the earnings test repeal, I find no other response in the claiming behavior of 
single men to changes in the Social Security policies.71 The second set of results for 
married men highlights the stronger responsiveness of their claiming behavior relative to 
single men in response to the policy changes. I find that the repeal of the earnings test 
lead married men above the normal retirement age to hasten their claiming, this finding is 
robust to controls for health insurance and union coverage, as well as the control for the 
higher tax at 50 percent. I also find that married men are more likely to claim when they 
reach their normal retirement age.72   
Changes in the delayed retirement credit reduce claiming among men above the 
normal retirement age as well those below, but this reduction is larger among men above 
the normal retirement age. This implies that as the actuarial adjustments applied to future 
benefits rise, older married men directly affected by the policy change respond more 
strongly than younger men by modifying their claiming behavior. The claiming response 
                                                          
71 In specification 3 there is evidence of a larger reduction in the claiming hazard of men above 
the normal retirement age relative to those below in response to changes in the delayed retirement 
credit, but even in specifications that exclude controls for health insurance and union coverage, 
this finding is not robust to the exclusion of tax at 50 percent dummy.  
72 As I noted earlier, this finding warrants further investigation as the dummy for being at the 
normal retirement age may be picking up the effect of Medicare eligibility that begins at age 65.  
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of married men to the earnings test repeal and changes in the delayed retirement credit 
provides evidence in support of the prediction made by Coile et. al. (2002) that married 
men have a stronger financial incentive to delay than single men.  
I find weak evidence that suggests husband’s account for the incentives faced by 
their wife while making their claiming decision. The repeal of the earnings test raises 
claiming among men whose wife’s are above the normal retirement age and no longer 
subject to the earnings test, this finding is not robust to controlling for the differential 
effect of the earnings test on individuals below the normal retirement age who face a tax 
of 50 percent. An increase in the delayed retirement credit of a wife who is above the 
normal retirement age also influences the claiming decision of her husband by leading 
him to delay his claiming. These responses may arise if married couples coordinate their 
claiming decisions; they may file for benefits together.73 The response of the husband’s 
claiming decision to changes in the wife’s delayed retirement credit, in particular, 
suggests coordination of benefit claiming, because for wives above the normal retirement 
age an increase in the delayed retirement credit only affects their own primary benefits.74 
As older women respond to the delayed retirement credit by postponing benefit receipt, 
their husband’s may match their wives’ filing decision. To summarize, I find that the 
response in the claiming decision of men to the policy changes is driven by married men.  
Findings for Married and Single Women: I begin by discussing the findings from 
the estimation of the claiming models for single women presented in the first four 
                                                          
73 In the claiming sample the average age difference between husband and wife is three years 
(standard deviation is 5 years). It is possible some of this response could arise due to the 
correlation in the policy changes affecting husbands and wives of similar ages.  
74 The changes in the delayed retirement credit do not affect spousal benefits.  
 70 
columns of Table 1.23. I do not find any robust response to the policy changes by single 
women.75 The second set of findings refers to married women, for whom I do not find 
robust evidence of an effect of the earnings test repeal. I find weak support that the repeal 
increased claiming among married women, only in specification which do not control for 
employer provided health insurance and union coverage. The earnings test repeal, thus, 
exerts opposite influences on the claiming behavior of married relative to single women, 
which explains the finding of no response in the claiming behavior of women to the 
earnings test repeal when estimated on the full sample. Changes in the delayed retirement 
credit reduce claiming among married women above the normal retirement age, but the 
effect is not statistically significant. Similar to married men, I find weak support that the 
earnings test repeal for husband raises benefit claiming by wife possibly either due to 
wife’s ability to now claim spousal benefits (because husband claims) or co-ordination in 
claiming decisions of spouses, this finding is not robust to controlling for the higher tax 
rate face by individuals below the normal retirement age.  
1.9. SUMMARY  
Three changes in the U.S. Social Security program affected recent cohorts of 
older individuals: repeal of the earnings test, increases in the normal retirement age, and 
increases in the delayed retirement credit. All three policy changes were intended to 
encourage work for those eligible for social security benefits. Three recent studies, Blau 
and Goodstein (2010), Mastrobuoni (2009), and Pingle (2006) have examined the effect 
of these policy changes on the labor force participation or retirement behavior of older 
                                                          
75 For the analysis of single women, I exclude widowed women.  
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men and women. I improve upon the work of these researchers in four ways. First, there 
is minimal evidence in the recent literature investigating the sensitivity of estimated 
responses to the definition of retirement for a broad age-range of older individuals. 
Given the variety of options explored by older individuals in their transition to 
retirement, it seems important to analyze how older workers’ response to the policy 
changes differs when evaluated using alternative definitions of retirement. I examine 
how responses to the policy changes differ when assessed using an objective relative to a 
subjective definition of retirement. Second, none of the recent studies evaluating the 
influence of the earnings test on labor force participation or retirement from labor force 
incorporate the sizeable variation in the earnings test threshold amount (noted by Gruber 
and Orszag) that was introduced through the ad hoc changes implemented after 1996. 
Third, there is little work in the recent literature that attempts to disentangle the financial 
and norm related effects arising from the NRA changes. In my work I am able to 
separately identify these effects because the SIPP data includes accurate birth year 
information of individuals. Finally, although older women are a sizeable part of the 
labor force none of the recent studies have examined the changes in the retirement 
behavior of older women (particularly those above the normal retirement age) in 
response to changes in the Social Security policies. I provide evidence for the response 
in retirement behavior for both men and women between ages 60 – 74.  
My findings indicate that the response to the recent policy changes is sensitive to 
the retirement definition under consideration. I find no effect of the recent policy 
changes on retirement based on labor force activity. The lack of response in retirement 
from labor force to the reduction in benefits associated with the rising normal retirement 
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age supports the finding of Krueger and Pischke (1992), while the non-response in 
retirement from labor force to the earnings test repeal supports the findings of Gruber 
and Orszag (2003). In contrast, to other researchers I find that increases in the delayed 
retirement credit reduce the probability of self-reported retirement among men and 
women above the normal retirement age. There is stronger evidence of an effect of the 
recent policy changes on claiming behavior of older individuals. I observe that increases 
in the delayed retirement credit reduced claiming among men and women who are 
directly affected by these changes. Similar to Gruber and Orszag (2003), I find that the 
earnings test repeal raised claiming among men, and the effect is large. Unlike Gruber 
and Orszag, I find no impact of the earnings test repeal on the benefit claiming decision 
of older women. 
I do find evidence that changes in the delayed retirement credit had a significant 
impact in modifying the self-reported retirement and claiming behavior of older men and 
women above the normal retirement age. In Table 1.9, I show that the self-reported 
retirement behavior differs from the retirement from labor force behavior; many older 
workers continue to participate in the labor force while stating themselves as retired. 
Older workers may consider themselves retired when they end their full time 
employment at a long held career job but continue work at a new part-time job, switch to 
part-time work or reduced work load at their career job, or move to a job where their 
earnings are substantially reduced, self-reported retirement behavior might capture that 
response. The findings from my paper suggest that self-reported retirement may also be 
linked to the decision to claim Social Security benefits. It is possible that older workers 
who have not yet claimed their Social Security benefits respond to increases in the 
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delayed retirement credit by postponing the receipt of their benefits, this delay in 
claiming benefits may in turn induce affected individuals to be less likely to view 
themselves as retired.  
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Year of birth Normal Retirement Age 
(NRA)
1937 and prior 65
1938 65 and 2 months
1939 65 and 4 months
1940 65 and 6 months
1941 65 and 8 months
1942 65 and 10 months
1943-54 66
Table 1.1 Normal Retirement Age by Birth 
Note: Source --  U.S. Social Security Admin.  
The normal retirement age is scheduled to rise 
again in increments of 2 months for birth cohorts 
born after 1954 until it reaches age 67. 
Year of birth Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
per year 
1921-24 3.00%
1925-26 3.50%
1927-28 4.00%
1929-30 4.50%
1931-32 5.00%
1933-34 5.50%
1935-36 6.00%
1937-38 6.50%
1939-40 7.00%
1941-42 7.50%
1943 and later 8.00%
Table 1.2 Delayed Retirement Credit by Birth Year
Note: Source --  U.S. Social Security Administration.
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Table 1.3 Earnings Test Annual Threshold Amount and Tax Rate 
 
 
Year Threshold Amount ($)
Tax Rate      
(%) Threshold Amount ($)
Tax Rate      
(%)
Threshold Amount 
($)
Tax Rate        
(%)
1996 8,280 50 8,280 50 12,500 33.33
1997 8,640 50 8,640 50 13,500 33.33
1998 9,120 50 9,120 50 14,500 33.33
1999 9,600 50 9,600 50 15,500 33.33
2000 10,080 50 17,000 33.33
2001 10,680 50 25,000 33.33
2002 11,280 50 30,000 33.33
2003 11,520 50 30,720 33.33
2004 11,640 50 31,080 33.33
2005 12,000 50 31,800 33.33
2006 12,480 50 33,240 33.33
2007 12,960 50 34,440 33.33
2008 13,560 50 36,120 33.33
2009 14,160 50 37,680 33.33
2010 14,160 50 37,680 33.33
2011 14,160 50 37,680 33.33
2012 14,640 50 38,880 33.33
2013 15,120 50 40,080 33.33
 Note: Source -- U.S. Social Security Administration.                                                                                                                                                             
The threshold amount is in nominal dollars. As the normal retirement age for a  specific birth cohort changes, the above rules 
extend to the new higher normal retirement age. In any giver year members of various birth cohorts fall either below or 
above the normal retirement age. Here, the normal retirement age refers to the normal retirement age specific to each birth 
cohort.                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1 Below normal retirement age refers to all ages 62 and older that are below the normal retirement age (specific to each birth 
cohort).                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 Year an individual reaches normal retirement age, refers only to months before an individual reaches his normal retirement 
age in the year that he attains his normal retirement age.                                                                                                                                                      
Earnings test eliminated in 2000 
for those at and above normal 
retirement age.
Below normal retirement age1
At and Above normal 
retirement age - age 70 
Year individual attains normal 
retirement age2
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60 to 62 Substitution 
effect
No effect ↑                       No effect No effect No effect
Income effect ↓                       No effect No effect No effect No effect
Overall ↓ ↑                      No effect No effect No effect
62 to 63 Substitution 
effect
↑ ↑                    ↑                        ↑ ↑ 
Income effect ↓ No effect No effect No effect No effect
Overall Ambiguous ↑                  ↑                        ↑ ↑ 
63 to 65 Substitution 
effect
No effect ↑                      ↑                        ↑ ↑ 
Income effect ↓ No effect No effect No effect No effect
Overall ↓ ↑                  ↑                        ↑ ↑ 
Table 1.4A Theoretical Predictions for impact on Probability of Retirement of recent changes in Social Security Law 
Age 
Group
Changes in Social Security law
Normal retirement 
age rises
Delayed retirement 
credit  rises
Earnings Test
Threshold rises Tax rate falls Complete 
repeal
Note: The policy changes and their impact on retirement age summarized here are described for each policy change in 
isolation (holding all other policy variables constant). The analysis for the delayed retirement credit and earnings test changes 
are summarized assuming the normal retirement age stays at age 65, while the earnings test predictions of the recent changes 
are made for those above their normal retirement age of 65.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
** The substitution effect from an increase in the normal retirement age applies between age 65 and the new higher NRA. 
For instance if the new higher NRA is 65 years and 6 months then the susbtition effect applies between age 65 and 65 years 
and 6 months only. As the normal retirement age increases to 66, the substitution effect extends over the entire age range 65-
66.   
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65 to 66 Substitution 
effect
    ↓**                     ↓ ↓                       ↓                       ↓                       
Income effect ↓ ↑ No effect No effect No effect
Overall ↓ Ambiguous ↓                       ↓                       ↓                       
66 to 70 Substitution 
effect
No effect ↓ ↓                       ↓                       ↓                       
Income effect ↓ ↑ No effect No effect No effect
Overall ↓ Ambiguous ↓                       ↓                       ↓                       
70 to 75 Substitution 
effect
No effect No effect No effect No effect No effect
Income effect ↓ No effect No effect No effect No effect
Overall ↓ No effect No effect No effect No effect
Table 1.4B Theoretical Predictions for impact on Probability of Retirement of recent changes in Social Security Law 
Age 
Group
Changes in Social Security law
Normal retirement 
age rises
Delayed retirement 
credit  rises
Earnings Test
Threshold rises Tax rate falls Complete 
repeal
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Panel Date of First 
Interview
Date of Last 
Interview Data Available for Reference Period
Number of 
Waves
Length of Panel 
(years)
1996 Apr. 1996 Mar. 2000 Dec. 1995  -  Feb. 2000 12 4
2001 Feb. 2001 Jan. 2004 Oct. 2000  -  Dec. 2003 9 3
2004 Feb. 2004 Jan. 2008 Oct. 2003  -  Dec. 2007 12 4
2008 Sep. 2008 Aug. 2013* May 2008  -  Jul. 2013* 15* 5*
Table 1.5 Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP) Panel Details
Note: Date of first interview refers to the date of interview for rotation group 1 which was the first group to be interviewed, while 
the date of last interview refers to the date of interview for rotation group 4 which was the last group to be interviewed. The data is 
available for four months preceding the date of each interview. Length of the panel refers to the number of years that members of a 
specific rotation group were interviewed (alternatively, the maximum number of years for which an individual can be observed in a 
given panel).                                                                                                                                                                                                                
*The full set of data files for 2008 panel was not available at the time of compiling the dataset used in the analysis here. The date of 
the last interview for panel 2008 listed above refers to the last interview for the data used in the paper. The actual date of the last 
interview for panel 2008 is December 2013. The panel has 16 waves in total, but I use only the first 15 waves because the data for 
the 16th wave was unavailable.
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Retirement Definition  Selection of Sample Retirement Criterion
Withdrawal from 
Labor Force
All individuals between ages 60 and 75 who are                                                               
i)  with a job/business1                                                                                                         
or                                                                                                                                                    
ii)  looking for work2                                                                                                   
sometime in the four months preceding the first 
interview3.
An individual is considered retired if he states that he                                                           
i)  has not worked at any paid job/business                                                                                  
and                                                                                                                                  
ii) not looked for work                                                                                                             
in any of the four months preceding the month of interview.                                                                                                           
I consider the individual to have retired sometime in the four 
month period prior to the one in which  he reports complete 
withdrawal from the labor force4. 
Self-Reported 
Retirement 
All individuals between ages 60 and 75 who are                                                          
i)  with a job/business                                                                                                       
and                                                                                                                                        
ii)  report themselves as having never retired from a 
job/business in any of the four months preceding the 
first interview.
An individual is considered retired when he                                                                           
i)  first reports that he has retired from a job/business                                                                
sometime in the four months precdeing the month of interview.                                                                                     
I consider the individual to have retired sometime in the four 
month period when he first reports himself as retired.
Table 1.6  Retirement Definitions and Selection at Sampling Wave
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Retirement 
Definition Panel
Number of Men        
(all ages 60-75)
Number of Men         
At and Above age 62
Number of Men     
Below age 62
1996 2434 1265 1169
2001 2246 1233 1013
2004 2852 1579 1273
2008 4058 1975 2083
Total 11,590 6,052 5,538
1996 1475 631 844
2001 1418 656 762
2004 1801 835 966
2008 2757 1151 1606
Total 7,451 3,273 4,178
Table 1.7 Total Number of Men under each Retirement Definition
Withdrawal from 
Labor Force
Self-Reported 
Retirement 
Note: I split the total number of men into those above and below age 62 because 62 is the earliest age of 
eligibility for social security benefits. The number of men below and above age 62 indicates only those who are 
below and above 62 at the time of their first interview. As the survey progresses some men below age 62 may 
provide observations above age 62.                                                                                                                                              
The number of individuals at the sampling wave for each retirement definition are restricted to those initially 
working.
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Retirement 
Definition
Panel Number of Women     
(all ages 60-75)
Number of Women    
At and Above age 62
Number of Women 
Below age 62
1996 2153 1111 1042
2001 1852 979 873
2004 2722 1423 1299
2008 3801 1666 2135
Total 10,528 5,179 5,349
1996 1589 744 845
2001 1363 638 725
2004 2033 953 1080
2008 2915 1097 1818
Total 7,900 3,432 4,468
Table 1.8 Total Number of Women under each Retirement Definition
Withdrawal from 
Labor Force
Self-Reported 
Retirement 
 Refer to Table 1.7  notes.
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WLF < SR 4.74 11.27
Same 8 21.13
WLF > SR 87.27 67.60
Table 1.9 Relationship between Retirement Definitions for Men
Timing of 
Retirement
Retirement Definition
Withdrawal from Labor Force  
(WLF) observed                
(%)
Self-Reported Retirement                 
(SR) observed                         
(%)
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Table 1.10A Descriptive Statistics for Men: Retirement from Labor Force 
 
 
 
Time Constant 
Variables
Normal retirement age (years) 65.51                             
(0.44)
65 66
Delayed retirement credit (percent) 6.8                               
(1.32)
3 8
Birth year 1939.91                          
(6.75)
1921 1953
Black 0.09 0 1
Asian 0.03 0 1
Time Varying 
Variables
Age (years) 64.4                              
(4.11)
60 75
Earnings test in place dummy 0.34 0 1
At normal retirement age 0.02 0 1
Below normal retirement age 0.67 0 1
Above normal retirement age 0.31 0 1
Retirement ratea 0.26 0 1
Age at retirement (years)a 65.2                                
(4.27)
60 75
Unemployment rate 6.12                         
(1.93)
2.22 13.82
Number of members in household 2.34                               
(1.07)
1 14
Married 0.8 0 1
Union coverage 0.12 0 1
Employer health insurance 0.48 0 1
Less than high school 0.14 0 1
Some college 0.27 0 1
College 0.33 0 1
Children under 18 0.23 0 1
Ownership of home 0.87 0 1
Number of individuals 11,590
Note: The mean and standard deviation for time varying variables are calculated by first averaging over all 
the observations available for each individual (person wave information).                                                                                                                         
a  The retirement rate and average age at retirement variables are not averaged over the person wave 
information, instead the numbers reported here are the means among individuals at the time of their last 
observed wave in the sample.
Maximum
Mean             
(Standard deviation) Minimum
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Table 1.10B Descriptive Statistics for Men: Retirement from Labor Force 
Individuals facing earnings test 
Threshold amount - $21.67                   
(thousands of dollars)
-5.83                             
(3.65)
-9.38 19.23
Taxrate of 50 percent dummy 0.85 0 1
Number of individuals 5731
Mean             
(Standard deviation) Minimum Maximum
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Table 1.11 Estimates of Retirement Hazard for Men: Withdrawal from Labor Force 
 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) 0.005 0.005 -0.044 -0.024 -0.003 -0.007 -0.082
(0.045) (0.045) (0.057) (0.059) (0.067) (0.067) (0.073)
Normal retirement age (months) -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 -0.019** -0.013 -0.012 -0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Earnings test in place dummy -0.087 -0.097 -0.105 0.172 0.251 0.246 0.068
(0.095) (0.095) (0.106) (0.166) (0.188) (0.188) (0.199)
-0.115*** -0.116*** -0.114*** -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.182***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.940***
(0.312)
At normal retirement age dummy 0.065 -0.507* -0.502 -0.479 -0.531
(0.164) (0.308) (0.357) (0.356) (0.357)
Above normal retirement age dummy -0.244 -0.742*** -0.712** -0.682** -0.735**
(0.161) (0.273) (0.318) (0.317) (0.319)
-0.123** -0.121* -0.117* -0.038
(0.055) (0.063) (0.062) (0.070)
Black 0.247*** 0.245*** 0.243*** 0.246*** 0.200*** 0.199***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076)
College -0.390*** -0.390*** -0.389*** -0.400*** -0.373*** -0.375***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Lagged union coverage dummy 0.426*** 0.426***
(0.065) (0.065)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy -0.061 -0.125* -0.116*
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068)
-0.263*** -0.263*** -0.280***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Number of observations 64,927 64,927 64,927 64,927 53,244 53,244 53,244
Number of individuals 11438 11438 11438 11438 9473 9473 9473
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 dummy
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
(6)
Note: The above findings are coefficient estimates from the estimation of a dicrete hazard logit model. All seven specifications include controls for 
age dummies (age in years) to allow the retirement hazard to vary by age (non-parametric baseline hazard), quarter dummies, and panel dummies. 
Specifications 2 through 7 also include controls for region,  number of household members, children under age 18, and ownership of home. Cluster 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                               
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Delayed retirement credit (percent) 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0019 -0.0051 -0.0040 -0.0040 -0.0046
Normal retirement age (months) -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0003
Earnings test in place dummy -0.0038 -0.0042 -0.0046 0.0076 0.0107 0.0104 0.0028
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.0402
At normal retirement age dummy 0.0029 -0.0180 -0.0172 -0.0165 -0.0180
Above normal retirement age dummy -0.0104 -0.0317 -0.0294 -0.0281 -0.0304
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
-0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0047 -0.0010
-0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0076
Note: Partial effects are computed using stata's margins and over command. 
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars) -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0052
Table 1.12  Partial Effects of Retirement Hazard for Men: Withdrawal from Labor Force
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)(6)
     
87 
 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.347*** -0.347*** -0.299*** -0.306*** -0.231*** -0.242*** -0.290***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)
Normal retirement age (months) 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Earnings test in place dummy 0.008 0.012 0.114 -0.062 0.047 0.031 -0.079
(0.114) (0.115) (0.131) (0.192) (0.195) (0.195) (0.203)
-0.103*** -0.103*** -0.115*** -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.143***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.650**
(0.308)
At normal retirement age dummy 0.384** 0.798** 0.467 0.484 0.461
(0.184) (0.382) (0.380) (0.378) (0.378)
Above normal retirement age dummy 0.211 0.584* 0.229 0.252 0.224
(0.183) (0.345) (0.342) (0.341) (0.340)
0.084 0.026 0.031 0.088
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.073)
Lagged union coverage dummy 0.498*** 0.498***
(0.067) (0.067)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy 0.078 -0.005 0.000
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073)
-0.335*** -0.334*** -0.346***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098)
Number of observations 41,687 41,687 41,687 41,687 37,071 37,071 37,071
Number of individuals 7184 7184 7184 7184 6579 6579 6579
Note:  Refer to Table 1.11.                                                       
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 dummy
Table 1.13  Estimates of Retirement Hazard for Men: Self-Reported Retirement
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.0160 -0.0160 -0.0138 -0.0112 -0.0109 -0.0112 -0.0115
Normal retirement age (months) 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0010
Earnings test in place dummy 0.0004 0.0006 0.0052 -0.0029 0.0024 0.0016 -0.0041
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.0340
At normal retirement age dummy 0.0206 0.0508 0.0290 0.0301 0.0284
Above normal retirement age dummy 0.0101 0.0304 0.0123 0.0135 0.0119
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit  dummy 0.0114 0.0068 0.0073 0.0111
-0.0054 -0.0074
Note: Partial effects are computed using stata's margins and over command. 
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
-0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0053 -0.0051 -0.0054
Table 1.14  Partial Effects of Retirement Hazard for Men: Self-Reported Retirement
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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Table 1.15 Robustness Check: Coefficient Estimates of Retirement Hazard for Men 
 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.063 -0.109 -0.135 -0.146 -0.247** -0.236** -0.262** -0.288**
(0.098) (0.110) (0.110) (0.097) (0.103) (0.118) (0.118) (0.116)
Normal retirement age (months) -0.016 -0.012 -0.011 -0.020 -0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Earnings test in place dummy 0.043 0.073 0.038 0.100 0.078 0.008 -0.029 0.072
(0.219) (0.222) (0.222) (0.195) (0.229) (0.228) (0.227) (0.225)
-0.183*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.172*** -0.196*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.149***
(0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.091 -0.835
(0.520) (0.523)
At normal retirement age dummy -0.294 -0.220 -0.084 -0.135 0.867 0.514 0.639 0.529
(0.624) (0.663) (0.663) (0.583) (0.656) (0.678) (0.676) (0.670)
Above normal retirement age dummy -0.308 -0.228 -0.091 -0.174 0.794 0.495 0.621 0.519
(0.606) (0.649) (0.648) (0.570) (0.636) (0.660) (0.658) (0.652)
-0.030 -0.031 -0.008 -0.027 0.176 0.081 0.103 0.081
(0.114) (0.107) (0.107) (0.095) (0.120) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108)
Lagged union coverage dummy 0.424*** 0.423*** 0.338*** 0.499*** 0.504*** 0.448***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy -0.116* -0.114* -0.010 -0.012
(0.068) (0.068) (0.073) (0.073)
-0.281*** -0.285*** -0.327*** -0.330***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.098)
Interaction of unemployment rate with age dummies no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Number of observations 53,244 53,244 53,244 64,927 37,071 37,071 37,071 41,687
Number of individuals 9473 9473 9473 11438 6579 6579 6579 7184
Retirement from Labor Force Self-Reported Retirement
Specification Specification
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 dummy
Note: All four specifications include controls for age dummies (age in years), quarter dummies, panel dummies, marital status, education dummies, state 
specific unemployment rate, race dummies, region dummies,  number of household members, children under age 18, ownership of home, and linear age 
trends. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 1.16 Robustness Check: Coefficient Estimates of Retirement Hazard for Women 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.140 -0.046 -0.075 -0.061 -0.496*** -0.533*** -0.551*** -0.553***
(0.110) (0.120) (0.120) (0.102) (0.102) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118)
Normal retirement age (months) 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.008 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Earnings test in place dummy -0.221 -0.178 -0.194 -0.199 -0.108 -0.087 -0.097 -0.063
(0.217) (0.221) (0.220) (0.198) (0.222) (0.225) (0.225) (0.224)
-0.163*** -0.177*** -0.178*** -0.170*** -0.176*** -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.189***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.030) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy 0.192 0.093
(0.542) (0.521)
-0.050 -0.094 -0.081 -0.064 -0.220* -0.207* -0.199* -0.178
(0.120) (0.111) (0.111) (0.100) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Lagged union coverage dummy 0.405*** 0.407*** 0.314*** 0.500*** 0.506*** 0.420***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) (0.065)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy -0.119* -0.120* -0.202*** -0.205***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073)
-0.324*** -0.323*** -0.140 -0.140
(0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.095)
Interaction of unemployment rate with age dummies no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Number of observations 47,610 47,610 47,610 58,183 40,523 40,523 40,523 45,517
Number of individuals 8572 8572 8572 10369 7035 7035 7035 7643
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Retirement from Labor Force Self-Reported Retirement
Specification Specification
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 
dummy
(3)(1) (2) (4)
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
Variables
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Table 1.17 Claiming Definition and Selection into Initial Sample
Initial Selection of Sample Claiming Criterion
All individuals between ages 60 and 75 who are                                                               
i) with a job/business in the four months preceding the 
first interview                                                                         
and                                                                                                                           
ii) have not claimed social security benefits as a primary 
beneficiary in the four months preceding the first 
interview                                                                      
and                                                                                                                          
iii) do not report receiving disability benefits throughout 
their duration in the sample.
An individual is considered to claim social security benefits as a 
primary beneficiary when he first reports                                                                                                                              
i)  receiving social security benefits as a retired person                                                                
or                                                                                                                                           
ii) receiving social security benefits for some reason other than as 
retired, disabled, widower, or a dependant spouse                                                                                                
sometime in the last four months.                                                                                              
I consider the social security benefits to be first claimed in the four 
month period when the individual first meets the above criterion1.
Note: While choosing the initial sample, I assumed that all 60 to 75 year olds are covered by social security (that is they 
meet the social security requirement of having 40 quarters of covered earnings). In the above claiming criterion, claiming is 
defined as an absorbing state. Once an individual satisfies the criterion he cannot change his claiming decision, I drop all 
observations on the individual following first incidence of claiming benefits. Refer to Table 6 notes for other restrictions on 
sample.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 Since, the actual date of claiming social security benefits is not reported by the indivdual, I consider him to have claimed 
the benefits during the second month of the four month window during which benefits were first claimed. 
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Panel Number of Men         
(all ages 60-75)
Number of Men          
At and Above age 62
Number of Men     
Below age 62
1996 1247 254 993
2001 1377 422 955
2004 1719 517 1202
2008 2665 793 1872
Total 7,008 1,986 5,022
Panel Number of Women    
(all ages 60-75)
Number of Women    
At and Above age 62
Number of Women 
Below age 62
1996 1016 198 818
2001 1060 278 782
2004 1561 398 1163
2008 2410 557 1853
Total 6,047 1,431 4,616
Table 1.18  Total Number of Men and Women at the time of first inclusion in the sample: Claiming Definition
Men
Women
Note: These individuals include only those who are working and have not claimed social security benefits at the 
time of their first interview. Individuals claiming disability benefits at any point in the survey are not included. Refer 
to Table 1.7 notes.
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Table 1.19 Estimates of Claiming Hazard for Men 
 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.432** -0.543*** -0.543*** -0.389* -0.578** -0.276 -0.271 -0.283
(0.202) (0.207) (0.207) (0.216) (0.265) (0.278) (0.278) (0.278)
Normal retirement age (months) -0.038 -0.036 -0.036 -0.075** 0.014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
Earnings test in place dummy -0.519 -0.400 -0.397 -0.101 -1.696*** -1.293*** -1.292*** -1.234***
(0.340) (0.352) (0.350) (0.361) (0.343) (0.355) (0.354) (0.376)
-0.146*** -0.144*** -0.145*** -0.352*** -0.280*** -0.252*** -0.253*** -0.298***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.042) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031) (0.056)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -2.686*** -0.464
(0.531) (0.688)
At normal retirement age dummy 1.331 1.090 1.107 1.143 4.018*** 2.213** 2.197** 2.301**
(0.810) (0.824) (0.824) (0.817) (0.978) (0.977) (0.977) (0.995)
Above normal retirement age dummy -0.734 -0.991 -0.975 -0.989 2.566*** 0.707 0.692 0.790
(0.759) (0.774) (0.774) (0.767) (0.965) (0.974) (0.973) (0.991)
0.077 0.033 0.035 0.167 0.545*** 0.263* 0.260 0.286*
(0.131) (0.135) (0.135) (0.140) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.169)
Lagged union coverage dummy 0.148* 0.145* 0.151* 0.150*
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy -0.127 -0.145 -0.138 -0.143 -0.162* -0.161*
(0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094)
-1.028*** -1.026*** -1.036*** -0.997*** -0.994*** -0.996***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Linear age Trends no no no no yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 34,502 30,199 30,199 30,199 34,517 30,199 30,199 30,199
Number of individuals 6485 5876 5876 5876 6487 5876 5876 5876
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 dummy
Note: All specifications include controls for age dummies (age in years), quarter dummies, panel dummies, region dummies,  number of household members, 
children under age 18, and ownership of home. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
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Delayed retirement credit (percent) -0.0155 -0.0243 -0.0243 -0.0117 -0.0049 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0019
Normal retirement age (months) -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0035 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
Earnings test in place dummy -0.0256 -0.0211 -0.0209 -0.0049 -0.1132 -0.0845 -0.0844 -0.0795
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -0.2258 -0.0242
At normal retirement age dummy 0.0863 0.0720 0.0734 0.0764 0.3989 0.1891 0.1870 0.1999
Above normal retirement age dummy -0.0252 -0.0358 -0.0354 -0.0357 0.2102 0.0400 0.0390 0.0457
Linear age Trends no no no no yes yes yes yes
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
0.0484 0.0582 0.0583 0.0477
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
-0.0062 -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0166
Table 1.20 Partial Effects of Claiming Hazard for Men
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0139
0.0419
(5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.0117
0.0819
-0.0117
0.0402
-0.0118
0.0395
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Table 1.21 Estimates of Claiming Hazard for Women 
 
Delayed retirement credit (percent) 0.028 0.067 0.069 0.197 -0.213 0.186 0.189 0.187
(0.241) (0.249) (0.249) (0.258) (0.314) (0.311) (0.311) (0.312)
Normal retirement age (months) -0.028 -0.033 -0.034 -0.062* 0.032 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Earnings test in place dummy 1.091** 1.271*** 1.281*** 1.500*** -0.133 0.321 0.331 0.339
(0.443) (0.454) (0.453) (0.465) (0.430) (0.445) (0.445) (0.466)
-0.155*** -0.153*** -0.153*** -0.304*** -0.296*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.279***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.040) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.067)
Earnings test with tax rate at 50 percent dummy -2.060*** -0.070
(0.567) (0.810)
At normal retirement age dummy -2.679*** -2.807*** -2.811*** -2.929*** -0.725 -2.396** -2.402** -2.388**
(1.005) (1.025) (1.024) (1.019) (1.242) (1.194) (1.194) (1.206)
Above normal retirement age dummy -4.455*** -4.590*** -4.596*** -4.736*** -2.108* -3.829*** -3.834*** -3.821***
(0.931) (0.951) (0.951) (0.945) (1.226) (1.176) (1.176) (1.188)
-0.623*** -0.662*** -0.664*** -0.572*** -0.264 -0.535*** -0.537*** -0.534***
(0.166) (0.171) (0.171) (0.174) (0.203) (0.197) (0.197) (0.205)
Lagged union coverage dummy -0.102 -0.100 -0.093 -0.093
(0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Lagged employer health insurance dummy -0.291*** -0.275** -0.264** -0.272** -0.258** -0.257**
(0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113)
-0.977*** -0.983*** -0.997*** -0.991*** -0.996*** -0.997***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.129) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
Linear age Trends no no no no yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 30,441 26,540 26,540 26,540 30,445 26,540 26,540 26,540
Number of individuals 5625 5108 5108 5108 5626 5108 5108 5108
Lagged employer health insurance  *  Below age 65 
dummy
Note: All specifications include controls for age dummies (age in years), quarter dummies, panel dummies, region dummies,  number of household members, 
children under age 18, and ownership of home. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                                                                                                                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Earnings test dummy * (Earnings threshold - $21.67)                                     
(thousands of dollars)
Delayed retirement credit  *  Outside age range affected by 
delayed retirement credit dummy
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Table 1.22 Estimates of Claiming Hazard for Men by Marital Status 
 
Earnings Test in Place dummy -1.717** -1.499 -1.971** -1.419 -1.704*** -1.265*** -1.788*** -1.396***
(0.842) (0.921) (0.864) -1.004 (0.403) (0.409) (0.433) (0.440)
Earnings Test Tax at 50 percent dummy -1.371 -0.460 -1.423 -0.327
(1.742) (1.540) (1.918) (0.839)
Normal Retirement Age (months) 0.075 0.065 0.054 0.057 -0.010 -0.023 -0.023 -0.032
(0.087) (0.093) (0.092) (0.104) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
At Normal Retirement Age dummy 0.079 -0.377 2.871** -0.261 4.611*** 2.715** 5.049*** 2.954***
(2.333) (2.404) (1.152) (2.469) (1.103) (1.114) (1.173) (1.141)
Delayed Retirement Credit (percent) -0.262 -0.264 -0.606 -0.270 -0.650** -0.352 -0.696** -0.373
(0.677) (0.729) (0.629) (0.728) (0.297) (0.313) (0.300) (0.314)
0.015 -0.051 0.508*** -0.020 0.615*** 0.315* 0.715*** 0.370*
(0.369) (0.382) (0.153) (0.411) (0.182) (0.184) (0.202) (0.195)
Wife's Earnings Test in Place dummy -0.266** -0.305** 0.464 0.323
(0.131) (0.137) (0.292) (0.306)
Wife's Earnings Test Tax at 50 percent dummy -1.726*** -1.518***
(0.467) (0.489)
Wife's Normal Retirement Age (months) 0.039** 0.044** 0.036** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Wife At Normal Retirement Age dummy -0.080 -0.058 -0.229 -0.188
(0.317) (0.323) (0.322) (0.329)
Wife's Delayed Retirement Credit (percent) -0.162* -0.207** -0.109 -0.160*
(0.093) (0.090) (0.096) (0.093)
-0.011 -0.015 0.007 0.001
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
Number of Observations 4,884 4,634 4,884 4,634 27,006 23,644 27,006 23,644
Number of Individuals 1057 1013 1057 1013 5091 4626 5091 4626
yesno
Wife's Delayed Retirement Credit  * Wife Outside 
Age Range Affected by Delayed Retirement Credit 
Delayed Retirement Credit  *  Outside Age Range         
Affected by Delayed Retirement Credit dummy
no yes no yes
All regressions control for earnings test threshold amount for both husband and wife, and linear age trends for men. Cluster robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Single Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Married Men
(4)
yesLagged Union and Employer Health Insurance             dummies (for Both Husband and Wife) no
     
97 
Table 1.23 Estimates of Claiming Hazard for Women by Marital Status 
Earnings Test in Place dummy 0.657 0.372 0.343 0.494 -1.216* -0.613 -1.256* -0.672
(0.739) (0.799) (0.806) (0.849) (0.627) (0.648) (0.641) (0.663)
Earnings Test Tax at 50 percent dummy -0.444 -0.993 0.875 1.198
(1.764) (2.105) (1.481) (1.053)
Normal Retirement Age (months) 0.040 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.099* 0.086* 0.098* 0.088*
(0.066) (0.069) (0.070) (0.073) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
At Normal Retirement Age dummy -1.513 -2.053 -1.830 -1.815 0.198 -2.062 -0.048 -2.435
(2.126) (2.096) (2.164) (2.174) (1.686) (1.625) (1.733) (1.637)
Delayed Retirement Credit (percent) -0.571 -0.164 -0.185 -0.185 -0.623 -0.205 -0.600 -0.178
(0.548) (0.597) (0.579) (0.600) (0.419) (0.417) (0.426) (0.419)
-0.481 -0.512 -0.469 -0.459 -0.033 -0.398 -0.088 -0.484*
(0.356) (0.354) (0.376) (0.379) (0.279) (0.270) (0.295) (0.279)
Husband's Earnings Test in Place dummy -0.236* -0.280** 0.113 0.164
(0.135) (0.140) (0.223) (0.231)
Huband's Earnings Test Tax at 50 percent dummy -1.297*** -1.626***
(0.476) (0.507)
Husband's Normal Retirement Age (months) -0.013 0.002 -0.013 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Husband At Normal Retirement Age dummy 0.631*** 0.542** 0.449* 0.318
(0.232) (0.235) (0.252) (0.252)
Husband's Delayed Retirement Credit (percent) 0.050 0.038 0.073 0.061
(0.090) (0.088) (0.093) (0.090)
0.034 0.037 0.035 0.038
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Number of Observations 8,956 7,770 8,956 7,770 17,843 15,538 17,843 15,538
Number of Individuals 1683 1499 1683 1499 3333 3055 3333 3055
Lagged Union and Employer Health Insurance             
dummies (for Both Husband and Wife)
Variables (4)
Married Women
(1) (2) (3)
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Single Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
no yes no yes no yesyes no
Delayed Retirement Credit  *  Outside Age Range         
Affected by Delayed Retirement Credit dummy
Huband's Delayed Retirement Credit  * Husband Outside 
Age Range Affected by Delayed Retirement Credit dummy
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Figure 1.1 Annual Consumption-Retirement Tradeoff 
 
Note: Birth cohorts 1917-24 have an NRA of 65 and annual rate of DRC of 3 percent (the    
before 1983 Reform, actuarially unfair rate). Birth cohort 1937 has an NRA of 65 as well and 
annual rate of DRC of 6.5 percent (approx. actuarially fair). Birth cohorts 1943-54 have an NRA 
of 66 and annual rate of DRC of 8 percent (more than actuarially fair). The actuarial adjustment 
for postponement of benefits between age 62 and NRA is 6.67 percent for birth cohorts 1927-
1937. For birth cohorts 1943-54, the actuarial adjustment for postponing benefits between ages 
62-63 is 5 percent and between ages 63 and NRA is 6.67 percent. The discount rate is assumed to 
be zero.  
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Figure 1.2A Budget Constraint with Hours Constraint 
 
 
Figure 1.2B Budget Constraint with Fixed Costs
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Figure 1.3A Hazard Rate for Retirement due to Nonparticipation in Labor Force 
 
Note: The vertical line at age 62 indicates the earliest age at which social security 
benefits can be claimed (which is the same for all panels), while the vertical line at age 65 
indicates the normal retirement age that was in effect before the recent changes in NRA 
that began in 2000. The dashed vertical line at age 66 indicates the new higher normal 
retirement age for the younger birth cohorts in the 2008 panel. The vertical line at age 70 
indicates the age at which the earnings test ended before it was repealed in 2000 and the 
age at which delayed retirement credits cease to apply.  
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Figure 1.3B Hazard Rate for Retirement due to Nonparticipation in Labor Force 
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Figure 1.4A Hazard Rate for Self-Reported Retirement 
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Figure 1.4B Hazard Rate for Self-Reported Retirement 
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Figure 1.5A Hazard Rate for Claiming Social Security as Primary Beneficiary 
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Figure 1.5B Hazard Rate for Claiming Social Security as Primary Beneficiary 
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CHAPTER 2 
LIFE-CYCLE LABOR SUPPLY RESPONSE TO THE EARNINGS TEST 
2.1. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
In March 2000, U.S. Congress passed the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act 
that repealed the earnings test for older workers above the normal retirement age; the aim 
of the repeal was to “avoid penalizing seniors who chose to work in retirement.”1 This 
view stems from the assumption that prior to the repeal the earnings test was perceived as 
a tax that reduced current benefits of Social Security beneficiaries above the normal 
retirement age (NRA) whose earnings exceeded the annual exempt amount.2 A related 
feature of the earnings test complicates the analysis, however, as current benefits 
withheld under the earnings test are later returned to individuals through increases in their 
future benefits. The size of these future increases depends on the actuarial adjustment; for 
individuals above the NRA future benefits are increased by the delayed retirement credit 
(which is assigned by birth year).3 According to this alternate view, if people do not face 
any borrowing constraints and are aware of these future actuarial adjustments, the 
earnings test is not a tax; depending on the size of the actuarial adjustments, they either 
weaken or completely remove any work related penalty imposed by the earnings test. 
Thus, the earnings test repeal may have a negligible or even zero effect on labor supply. 
                                                          
1 A Brief History. Social Security Administration. (http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-21-059.pdf) 
2 The earnings test is still in place for individuals between ages 62 and NRA. 
3 For individuals below the NRA (ages 62-NRA), future benefits are increased at a rate of 6.67 
percent. 
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Despite the commonly held view that the earnings test reduces labor supply, the 
early empirical research investigating the influence of the earnings test as a tax has 
arrived at a consensus opinion of a relatively small negative effect on labor supply 
behavior. This conclusion was more mixed in later studies. Leonesio (1990) summarizes 
a large number of studies that analyzed the reforms prior to the 2000 repeal, and arrived 
at the conclusion that the earnings test had a small impact on the labor supply of older 
workers.4 Burtless and Moffitt (1985) model the kinked budget constraint that arises 
under the earnings test and find that the earnings test exerts little effect on hours of work 
of older individuals. Their analysis, however, is based on a period that witnessed no 
major changes in the earnings-test characteristics, which raises the concern that their 
estimates rely on between individual variation in the wage rate and unearned income.5 
Friedberg (2000) adds to these earlier structural studies, by estimating the labor supply 
response (along different parts of the non-linear budget constraint) to the 1983 Social 
Security Reform that repealed the earnings test for individuals above age 70. She creates 
a repeated cross-section to examine the labor supply response before and after the policy 
change, and unlike previous studies, finds a much larger response in hours of work of 
affected individuals to changes in the earnings test rules. Gruber and Orszag (2003), 
adopt a reduced form approach to examine the effect on both hours of work and the labor 
force participation decisions while accounting for trends in the labor supply of older men 
and women. They do not find any robust evidence of an influence from changes in the 
                                                          
4 Leonesio (1990) notes that the earliest studies attempted to assess the effect of the earnings test 
by either examining various changes in the earnings test using bunching analysis or relied on a 
structural approach to model the kinked budget constraint created by the earnings test.  
5 Such estimates may be biased if unobserved tastes for work of an individual are correlated with 
his current wage rate or unearned income. 
 108 
earnings test characteristics (prior to the 2000 repeal) on either hours of work or labor 
force participation.6 Based on these recent studies, Krueger and Meyer (2002) modify the 
consensus opinion of a small effect summarized by Leonesio (1990) to “mixed”. 
Recent studies evaluating the earnings test repeal of 2000 in the U.S., and the 
repeal of the earnings test in Canada and United Kingdom, concur in finding a negligible 
effect on labor force participation, a small rise in hours of work, and evidence supporting 
the existence of strong labor market rigidities that impede the ability of older workers to 
adjust their labor supply. 7 Tran (2002), Haider and Loughran (2008), and Engelhardt and 
Kumar (2009) use difference-in-differences estimation to examine the effect of the 
earnings test repeal of 2000 in the U.S. These studies find that older workers ages 65-69 
respond to the repeal by increasing hours worked, but little evidence of an effect on labor 
force participation. Tran (2002) finds weak support for an increase in labor force 
participation among older white men between ages 65 to 69. Baker and Benjamin (1999) 
evaluate the sequential elimination of the earnings test in the Canadian Pension Plan (in 
1975) and the Quebec Pension Plan (in 1977) by using the geographic variation offered 
by these reforms as their main source of identification. Similar to the findings for the 
U.S., they report no effect of the repeal on labor force participation, but an increase in 
weeks worked conditional on working. The United Kingdom repealed the earnings test 
for older workers in 1989; Disney and Smith (2002) assess the response to this repeal by 
                                                          
6 Haider and Loughran (2008) note that one reason Gruber and Orszag (2003) did not find any 
response to the earnings test repeal of 1983 is that it affected relatively older individuals between 
the ages 70-71 who could not respond as much as the relatively younger individuals affected by 
the 2000 repeal. Gruber and Orszag (2003) also caution that their findings are best interpreted as 
effects of changes in the earnings test parameters (threshold amount, tax rate) in the presence of 
the earnings test. 
7 Engelhardt and Kumar (2014). 
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comparing the changes in labor supply of individuals directly affected by the policy 
before and after the repeal to changes in the labor supply of two other groups of older 
individuals ages 60-64 and 70-74 who were not directly affected. They find no effect of 
the earnings test repeal on labor force participation, but an increase in weekly hours of 
work.8 In contrast to early research, these recent studies (relying on both survey and 
administrative data) highlight the existence of strong labor market rigidities that may 
obscure the response to the earnings test. 
There are two main concerns with the difference-in-differences approach adopted 
by recent studies analyzing the short-run effect of the earnings test repeal. First, most 
recent studies analyze the effect of the earnings test within a static labor supply model 
using slightly younger individuals between ages 62-64 and slightly older individuals 
between ages 70-74 as control groups in their analysis, and ignoring the delayed 
retirement credit (DRC) actuarial adjustments applied to future benefits.9 For instance, 
Friedberg and Webb (2009) ignore the DRC adjustments in their analysis under the 
assumption that most people either misunderstand or are misinformed about this feature 
of the Social Security program. The DRC has increased substantially from 3 to 8 percent 
for recent cohorts of older individuals. In the life-cycle model of labor supply an increase 
in the net wage at ages 65-69, may influence short-run labor supply decisions at other 
ages through intertemporal substitution. Younger age groups may not serve as adequate 
control groups, if there is intertemporal substitution of labor supply in response to the 
                                                          
8 Disney and Smith (2002) find a strong statistically significant response in hours of work only 
when the control group includes both 60-64 and 70-74 year olds.  
9 Appendix Table B.1 provides a list of acronyms used in the paper and the associated 
expansions.  
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earnings test repeal.10  Second, most previous studies assume that in the absence of the 
earnings test repeal the labor supply of older individuals in different age groups would 
have followed a common trend; the data used in these studies is often restricted to a few 
years after the earnings test repeal which makes it difficult to analyze the common trends 
assumption. Gruber and Orszag (2003) documented differential trends by age in the labor 
supply behavior of older individuals and emphasized that models which include controls 
for age specific trends in labor supply are more reliable.  
Two studies have attempted to address some of these concerns. Tran (2000) 
examines the impact of the earnings test in a life-cycle model by first showing that the 
earnings test is a tax in a life-cycle context, (even after accounting for the DRC 
adjustments) if individuals have shorter than average life expectancy. He uses Outgoing 
Rotation Group CPS monthly data from 1995-2002 to study the immediate effect of the 
earnings test repeal of 2000 on older white men between ages 65-69; he also studies the 
intertemporal response to the earnings test repeal among younger individuals between 
ages 55-61 and those between ages 62-64. Tran employs a difference-in-differences 
method as well, and assumes that individuals above age 70 who do not face the earnings 
test are unaffected before and after the earnings test repeal. He, however, does not 
explicitly control for the effect of changes in the DRC. He finds that the repeal increases 
the employment rate of men between ages 65-69 and this increase is due to men 
continuing to work longer rather than through reentry of older people who had left the 
labor force. He observes intertemporal substitution of labor supply among members of 
                                                          
10 Friedberg and Webb (2009) also note that it is possible that in the long run individuals at ages 
other than 65-69 may increase their labor supply through spillover effects because of the presence 
of constraints that limit transitions into and out of work at older ages. 
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the youngest group. Men between ages 55-61 reduce their labor supply in response to the 
repeal, but, he does not find any intertemporal effect on the labor supply of men between 
ages 62-64. Tran further provides evidence that the response to the earnings test repeal is 
concentrated among subgroups of individuals with less education. 
Michaud and Van Soest (2008) use data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) covering the years 1992-2004 to examine the immediate effect of the earnings test 
repeal on work expectations of younger individuals between ages 51 to 61. They study 
the impact of the repeal on younger individual’s self-assessed probability of working full-
time after age 62 and after age 65. In their analysis, they use Social Security 
Administrative data to link each individual’s earnings history with their record in the 
HRS and determine the percentage of social security benefits predicted to be lost for each 
individual if he does not change hours of work at the NRA. They divide individuals into 
four groups based on their predicted losses and then use difference-in-differences 
method. In the empirical analysis they estimate the labor supply response using panel 
data models with fixed and random effects that allow them to implicitly control for birth 
cohort effects and the common effect of changes in the DRC at all ages. They find 
evidence indicating that the earnings test is perceived as a tax at ages above the NRA; the 
repeal raises the self-assessed probability of younger workers to work full-time after age 
65. They do not find any effect of the repeal on self-assessed probability of working full-
time after age 62. Interestingly, they do not find any effect of the repeal on the subjective 
probability of working full-time past age 62 and 65 for women between ages 51 to 61. A 
third study by Friedberg and Webb (2009) explores the effect of the earnings test repeal 
on younger individuals as well, but, unlike the previous two studies (and the focus of my 
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work) Friedberg and Webb study the long run effect of the earnings test repeal by 
including a set of variables that reflect currently applicable and future thresholds for 
cohorts at their current age and when the cohort is age 62 (or 65). Given the emphasis of 
their study on long run effects they believe the response among younger workers is due to 
constraints on labor supply transitions and not due to intertemporal substitution.  
I add to the work of Tran and Micahud and Van Soest in several ways. In the 
present study, I use the latest four panels from the Survey of Income Program and 
Participation (SIPP) data to examine the immediate effect of the earnings test repeal on 
older men and women between ages 62 to 74. First, in my work I implicitly control for 
the effect of the DRC at all ages and explicitly control for the differential effect of the 
DRC changes along the age range directly affected by the DRC relative to those that are 
not directly affected. Thus, I am able to assess whether the earnings test is perceived as a 
tax even after accounting for the effect of changes in the reward for postponing benefits. 
Second, I use panel data models with fixed-effects which allow me to implicitly control 
for birth cohort effects, the effect of actuarial adjustments that raise the reward for future 
benefits, and any fixed individual tastes for work that may be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Third, in contrast to previous studies I assess the response in hours 
of work decisions using a modeling framework that reflects the discrete and constrained 
nature of the labor supply adjustments made by older workers. Moreover, I use the SIPP 
data covering years 1996 to 2013, which allows me to observe and control for trends in 
labor supply of different age groups. Finally, I explore whether the response to the 
earnings test repeal or changes in the future reward to work is driven by the particular 
subgroups of individuals that possibly facing liquidity constraints or those who are more 
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likely to be unaware of the earnings test rules. I find that the earnings test is perceived as 
a tax by both men and women as both reduce their labor force participation in response to 
the earnings test. The labor supply response for men is driven by the changes in their 
labor force participation behavior, while for women I observe a response along both 
participation and hours of work (among those who continue working).  
2.2. MODIFICATIONS TO THE EARNINGS TEST 
The Social Security Act of 1935 laid the foundation for the old age pension 
program in the U.S.; a key feature of the Act was the earnings test, a test that all eligible 
individuals above age sixty-five must pass to receive their benefits.11 In its earliest form 
the earnings test withheld complete monthly benefits of an eligible individual who had 
positive earnings in that month. Older workers who lost their benefits to the earnings test 
were not compensated at a later date upon cessation of work. 12 The 1939 Amendment set 
an “exempt” amount on earnings is an upper limit which an employed older worker could 
earn and still qualify to receive full benefits. Workers who claimed benefits while earning 
above the exempt amount had their full benefits withheld, in other words their benefits 
were taxed at a rate of hundred percent. The earnings test in its early form, thus, actually 
provided and was accurately perceived by workers as providing a strong disincentive to 
work. In an effort to reduce the work impeding effects inherent in the initial version of 
the earnings test, it was modified on several occasions. The major modifications to the 
                                                          
11 The Social Security Act of 1935 also set the NRA (NRA) for both men and women to 65. The 
NRA is the earliest age at which an individual can receive his full social security benefits based 
on his earnings record.  
12 In its original version, the earnings test reduced incentives to work for individuals above age 
sixty-five in a manner similar to a cash grant welfare program. 
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earnings test can be succinctly summarized by considering how they affected the age 
range covered by the earnings test and the earnings test parameters that apply within each 
age range. 
Ages 62-NRA: Later amendments to the Social Security Act introduced the early 
retirement age of sixty-two to provide individuals below the NRA (NRA) early access to 
their benefits. This option was extended to women in 1956, and men in 1961; earlier 
access to benefits, however, imposed a penalty by reducing the size of the benefits 
available at age sixty-two.13 The eligibility for early retirement benefits also extended the 
earnings rules to ages below the NRA. Until the late 1970s individuals below the NRA 
faced the same earnings test parameters as individuals above the NRA. Both age ranges 
shared a common exempt amount, and earnings in excess of the exempt amount were 
also taxed at the common rate of 50 percent.14 The Social Security Amendment of 1977 
introduced the first major change in the earnings test parameters that applied differently 
for those below relative to those above the NRA. Beginning in 1978, social security 
beneficiaries below the NRA faced a lower exempt amount than those above. 15 The 
                                                          
13 An insured individual can claim unreduced benefits based on his earnings history and 
equivalent to hundred percent of his Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) at his NRA. The monthly 
benefit for a worker is calculated in three steps. The first step is to index the annual taxable 
earnings of a worker to the national average wage index. From these indexed earnings, the 
highest 35 years of earnings between ages 21 and 62 are chosen to compute the Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings (AIME). The second step is to compute the workers’ PIA from the AIME; the 
PIA is the full benefit an individual is entitled to if he claims at the NRA. The third step is to 
compute the final benefit amount received by the worker; this amount could be higher or lower 
than the PIA depending on the age at which the benefit is first claimed.  
14 In 1961, the earnings test was modified to include two exempt amounts, earnings above the 
lower exempt amount were taxed at a rate of 50 percent while earnings in excess of the upper 
exempt amount were taxed at a rate of 100 percent. The Amendment of 1972 removed the100 
percent tax rate, all individuals between ages 62-69 who earned above the exempt amount faced a 
tax rate of 50 percent until benefits were fully exhausted.  
15 Over the years the earnings test threshold was raised several times on an ad hoc basis until 
1972, when it was indexed to increases in the national average wage index. 
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Greenspan Commission led to the Social Security Reform Act of 1983 that laid down 
further provisions separating the earnings test parameters that applied to those below 
relative to above the NRA. The 1983 Reform, which became effective in 1990, stipulated 
that working beneficiaries above the NRA whose earnings exceeded the exempt amount 
would face a lower tax penalty of 33 percent while individuals below the NRA would 
continue to face a penalty of 50 percent. Since the late 1970s, when the labor force 
participation rate of older men declined precipitously, the general direction of the 
modifications to the earnings test rules have been towards loosening them for individuals 
above the NRA relative to those below. Table 2.1 summarizes the earnings test rules 
faced by individuals ages 62 and above during the time period 1996-2013.  
 Another important difference in the set of rules that apply to individuals below the 
NRA relative to those above is the treatment of delayed or postponed receipt of benefits. 
Since the creation of the early retirement age, individuals below the NRA receive a 
compensation for delayed receipt of benefits. If an individual below the NRA delays 
receiving benefits for one year, his future benefits are raised to compensate for the loss of 
current benefits by applying an adjustment called the actuarial adjustment factor. The size 
of the actuarial adjustment factor has remained constant at an annual rate of 
approximately 6.67 percent.16 These actuarial adjustments to future benefits also apply to 
benefits that are withheld under the earnings test. In other words, when older 
beneficiaries between the ages 62-NRA earn more than the exempt amount and lose some 
                                                          
16 Between ages 62 – NRA, each year of delayed receipt of benefits raises future benefits by 6.67 
percent. In recent years the NRA has also risen from 65 to 66. For older individuals with a NRA 
of 66, the actuarial reduction factor between ages 62 – 63 is lowered to an annual rate of 5 
percent.  
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or all of their benefits to the earnings test, their future benefits are raised at an annual rate 
of 6.67 percent to compensate for the loss of current benefits. The actuarial adjustments 
for benefits withheld under the earnings test, however, apply only after the individual 
attains the NRA. To summarize, despite the modifications to the earnings test parameters 
over time, in recent years the two main parameters that apply to individuals below the 
NRA have been fairly constant. During the time period 1996-2013 working beneficiaries 
below the NRA face an unchanging tax rate of 50 percent for earnings above the exempt 
amount, and the loss of current benefits withheld due to the earnings test is later 
compensated by applying an unchanging annual actuarial adjustment of 6.67 percent to 
future benefits.17 
NRA-age 69: Although individuals below and above the NRA faced a common 
exempt amount until 1978 and a common tax rate of 50 percent until 1990, they differed 
in the rate at which delayed/postponed current benefits were compensated. Before the 
1972 Amendment, individuals above the NRA were not compensated for current benefits 
that were lost either due to delayed claiming or benefits that were withheld under the 
earnings test. To compensate individuals above the NRA for delayed/postponed claiming, 
a DRC provision was first introduced in 1973, it raised future benefits at an annual rate of 
1 percent. At an annual rate of 1 percent, however, the DRC actuarial adjustment was 
much lower than the actuarial adjustment of 6.67 percent that was applied to future 
benefits of individuals below the NRA. To encourage work among older individuals, the 
                                                          
17 Since the earnings test repeal of 2000, a looser earnings test applies in the year an individual 
attains his NRA. An individual below the NRA faces a higher exempt amount and a lower tax 
rate of 33 percent in the year he reaches his NRA, the looser earnings test applies only in the 
months prior to the month is which the individuals is at his NRA. 
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1983 Reform to Social Security raised the NRA and the DRC for future cohorts of older 
workers. Both these policy changes affected individuals based on their birth cohort. Table 
2.2 summarizes the birth cohorts affected by each policy change. The NRA increased 
from 65 to 66 for birth cohorts 1938-43 in increments of two months, while the DRC 
increased every other year at a rate of half a percentage point from 3-8 percent for birth 
cohorts 1925-43. Viewed in light of the historical context of the Social Security program, 
these recent increases in the DRC from 3 to 8 percent are quite generous, and 
substantially raise the reward for delayed benefit receipt for older individuals above the 
NRA. 
 The most prominent change in the Social Security system that has directly 
affected older workers between NRA-age 69 is the unanticipated repeal of the earnings 
test in April 2000. As described above, prior to the 2000 elimination older workers 
eligible for social security benefits were subject to the earnings test between ages 62-69, 
and workers between NRA-age 69 faced a higher exempt amount and a lower tax rate of 
33 percent relative to older workers below the NRA. The earnings test repeal of 2000 did 
not affect the earnings test parameters for individuals below the NRA.  
 The repeal of the earnings test in the year 2000 also affected the manner in which 
older workers can benefit from the DRC. Before 2000, older individuals above the NRA 
could raise their future social security benefits through the DRC in two ways, by either 
postponing the receipt of benefits if the individual has not already claimed, or by working 
above the exempt amount if already collecting benefits. Beneficiaries who worked above 
the exempt amount and lost some or all of their benefits to the earnings test could 
increase future benefits through the DRC adjustments. After the earnings test repeal of 
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2000, however, beneficiaries above NRA could take advantage of the DRC through the 
“claim and suspend” policy. In the absence of the earning test, the claim and suspend 
policy allows beneficiaries who have claimed their benefits to temporarily suspend them 
and receive DRC adjustments on the foregone (suspended) benefits. In summary, during 
the 1990s, individuals above the NRA faced looser earnings test parameters in the form 
of a higher exempt amount and a lower tax rate than those below the NRA, and in April 
2000 the earnings test was completely eliminated for those above the NRA. In the time 
period after the 1990s, older individuals above the NRA also experienced a substantial 
increase in the DRC adjustments that compensate them for loss of current benefits by 
raising future benefits.  
Ages 70-74: Under the Social Security Act of 1935 the earnings test applied to all 
older workers above age 65. This restriction on the age limit was first relaxed in 1951, 
when older workers above age 75 were exempted from the earnings test. Four years later 
another amendment repealed the earnings test for all workers above age 72. The 1983 
reform further repealed the earnings test for individuals between ages 70-72. Since, the 
year 1983 all workers above age 70 have not faced the earnings test. Age 70 is also the 
maximum age until which social security benefits can be postponed; after age seventy 
benefits are automatically paid to all eligible beneficiaries. The upper limit on the age 
until which social security benefits can be postponed is important because it signifies that 
the DRC adjustments also cease to apply after age 70. In recent years, thus, older workers 
above age 70 were not subject to either the earnings test or any DRC adjustments.  
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2.3. PERCEPTIONS OF EARNINGS TEST AND THEORETICAL 
PREDICTIONS 
The theoretical predictions from the life-cycle model regarding the impact of the 
earnings test repeal of 2000 depend on how individuals between NRA-age69 perceive the 
earnings test. As described above, prior to 2000 the earnings test was in place for ages 
62-69; social security beneficiaries within this age range who earned above the exempt 
amount experienced a reduction in the size of their current benefits. The size of the 
reduction in current benefits depended on the tax rate (which differs for those below or 
above the NRA), but the earnings test is not a tax as benefits lost to the earnings test were 
returned later by raising future benefits by the size of the actuarial adjustments. Below 
the NRA these adjustments have remained almost unchanged at an annual rate of 6.67 
percent, while above the NRA these adjustments have risen from 3 to 8 percent in recent 
years. In effect, these features of the Social Security program induce older beneficiaries 
to participate in a forced savings plan that withholds current benefits and returns them 
later by applying an adjustment factor to future benefits. 
Previous literature on the earnings test in the U.S. has debated whether individuals 
are aware of the actuarial adjustments and if so, whether these adjustments fully 
compensate the loss of current benefits. The DRC adjustments applied to foregone 
benefits are considered actuarially fair if they fully compensate older beneficiaries above 
the NRA (with an average life expectancy) for foregone current benefits; in other words, 
actuarially fair adjustments leave the present value of social security wealth unchanged. 
If older individuals are unaware of the actuarial adjustments or if the adjustments are 
actuarially unfair then the earnings test is a tax even in the life-cycle context and affects 
life-cycle labor supply by introducing a kink in the budget constraint. Reimers and Honig 
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(1993) note that in this case Social Security beneficiaries will behave myopically taking 
into account their current benefits while making their labor supply decisions. But, if 
instead, older workers fully comprehend the “forced saving” features of the Social 
Security system and the adjustments are actuarially fair then the earnings test does not 
create a kink in the budget constraint. In such a scenario, the earnings test repeal should 
have no effect on labor supply. In their work Reimers and Honig (1993) emphasize that 
the response of older beneficiaries to any modification of the earnings test parameters 
and/or the size of the DRC adjustments relies crucially on older workers’ perception 
regarding the link between current earnings and future Social Security benefits. 
2.3.1. PERCEPTIONS OF THE EARNINGS TEST 
How do older workers between ages 62-69 perceive the budget constraint in the 
presence of the earnings test? The answer depends on whether older individuals respond 
to the actuarial adjustments applied to foregone benefits. The responsiveness to the 
actuarial adjustments in turn depends on two factors, an older individual’s awareness of 
the complicated features of the Social Security program and the actuarial fairness of these 
adjustments.  
Awareness of Actuarial adjustments: There is limited evidence on older worker’s 
awareness of the interaction between the earnings test rules and the actuarial adjustments 
applied to foregone benefits. Most researchers in the past ignored the actuarial 
adjustments and treated the earnings test as a tax. For instance, Gruber and Orszag (2003) 
and Friedberg and Webb (2009) quote J.K. Lasser’s Your Income Tax 1998 guide, and 
articles in Money and Los Angeles Times that describe the earnings test but do not 
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mention the DRC actuarial adjustments, as evidence that most sources of information 
regarding Social Security benefits do not advise older individuals about future 
adjustments to their benefits. As a result, the DRC adjustments are likely to be widely 
misunderstood or overlooked by older beneficiaries. Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2007) 
argue that the full incentives provided by the earnings test and the actuarial adjustments 
for both individuals below and above the NRA are widely misunderstood by beneficiaries 
because of the complexity of the rules and the lack of information provided by Social 
Security officials. They note the interaction between the earnings test rules and the 
actuarial adjustments is neither well documented in Social Security publications, nor is 
there any reference to these adjustments in the online benefit calculator provided by the 
Social Security officials. They highlight the discrepancy in Social Security 
Administration’s (SSA) dissemination of information by noting the ease with which older 
individuals can learn about the earnings test exempt amount, and contrasting it to the 
difficulty in learning about adjustments to future benefits if current benefits are lost to the 
earnings test. According to them, it is because of the lack of clear and accessible 
information provided by the SSA that many beneficiaries may view the earnings test as a 
tax and make their labor supply decisions accordingly.  
Liebman and Luttmer (2012) administered an online survey to a nationally 
representative sample of individuals ages 50 -70 to learn about the extent to which older 
individuals in the U.S. understand the different incentives provided by the Social Security 
system. In support of the “bunching” literature that provides visual evidence of 
beneficiaries raising their earnings as the earnings test exempt amount moves, Liebman 
and Luttmer report that older workers are well informed of the exempt amount. They also 
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find evidence that older workers understand that delayed claiming between ages 62-69 
raises future benefits through actuarial adjustments. Most beneficiaries, however, are 
unaware of the distinction in the size of the actuarial adjustments before and after the 
NRA. Interestingly, although older individuals are aware that delayed claiming raises 
future benefits, survey responses to further questions that enquire about whether future 
benefits would increase if current benefits were reduced as a result of the earnings test 
indicate that most older individuals are unware of the delayed receipt of benefits withheld 
due to the earnings test. The general consensus that emerges from the previous studies is 
that older workers view the earnings test as a tax because they are either unaware or 
misunderstand the future adjustments associated with benefits that are lost to the earnings 
test.  
Actuarial Fairness of Adjustments: Whether older workers perceive the earnings test as a 
tax depends not only on their awareness of the future adjustments to benefits but also on 
the extent to which these adjustments adequately compensate individuals for the loss of 
current benefits. Older beneficiaries who are aware of and understand the complicated 
rules governing the earnings test may still perceive it as a tax if the adjustments are 
individually viewed as actuarially unfair. The degree to which increments to future 
benefits compensate for the loss of current benefits depends on the size of the actuarial 
adjustments (or DRC). Previous researchers have debated the actuarial fairness of the 
adjustments; the leading arguments are put forth in three papers that are summarized 
below.  
 Blinder et al. (1980) cast doubt on the prevalent view that the earnings test 
provides a disincentive to work by taxing the earnings of working beneficiaries above the 
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exempt amount. In their work they showed that the annual actuarial adjustment of 6.67 
percent applied to future benefits of workers below the NRA fully compensates them for 
the loss of current benefits. They further go on to say that at low enough real interest rates 
the Social Security system may in fact be providing individuals below the NRA a subsidy 
to work. Their analysis, however, rests on the assumption that many older individuals are 
fully aware and understand the provisions of the Social Security program. For older 
individuals above the NRA with a DRC of 1-3 percent, they find that the actuarial 
adjustments to future benefits do not fully compensate for the loss of current benefits, and 
thus, conclude that the earnings test is a tax on earnings of working beneficiaries in this 
age range. They further note that even for workers above the NRA the earnings test may 
not be a tax if they account for the automatic benefit recomputation feature of the Social 
Security system, which replaces lower years of earnings with higher earnings in the 
computation of Social Security benefits. Blinder et al. stress that their conclusions are 
valid only if the intricate rules of the Social Security program are understood by older 
people, but as noted above there is sparse evidence to shed light on the degree to which 
older workers are aware of the rules.  
 Two subsequent papers by Burkhauser and Turner (1981) and Kahn (1989) 
challenged Blinder et al.’s claims. Burkhauser and Turner note that Blinder et al.’s 
computations show the earnings test is not a tax on individuals above the NRA because 
they fail to frame the individual’s decision problem from a life-cycle perspective; in a 
life-cycle context older individuals can substitute labor supply across periods by 
comparing the Social Security tax rate at different ages. They stress that because Blinder 
et al. consider the decision problem from a single period perspective, they find that 
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working beyond age 65 yields a higher marginal returns to work as higher earnings at 
those ages may replace lower earnings from earlier years in the social security benefits 
calculation formula, thus potentially negating the tax penalty imposed by the earnings 
test. Burkhauser and Turner argue that from a life-cycle perspective, however, the dollar 
increase in earnings from extra work yields a much higher return at younger ages, 
specifically at ages which are not subject to the earnings test, creating an incentive for 
individuals to work more at younger ages. When viewed from the life-cycle perspective 
the earnings test is, thus, still a tax for individuals above the NRA. They also show that 
Blinder et al. do not use the appropriate interest rate for computing the present value of 
lifetime social security wealth, they use the real interest rate instead of the nominal 
interest rate. They find that when they recalculate the present value of social security 
wealth using nominal interest rate for individuals between ages 62-NRA, the social 
security wealth declines as the future adjustments to benefits do not fully compensate for 
the lost benefits. Based on these findings they conclude that adjustments are actuarially 
unfair and the earnings test is a tax for younger individuals below the NRA as well.  
Contributing to the debate, Kahn (1989) casts further doubt on Blinder et al.’s 
claim that if older workers are fully aware of the provisions of the Social Security 
program the earnings test is not a tax. He identifies two problems with the Blinder et al.’s 
approach: first, in their analysis they assume perfect capital markets that permit 
individuals to freely borrow and lend at the market determined interest rate, and second 
their calculations only include a subsample of older individuals who continue to work. In 
his work, Kahn focuses on individuals between ages 62-NRA and shows that for these 
individuals the Social Security system does not provide a subsidy to continued work. 
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Earlier work by Diamond and Hausman (1984) found a sizeable fraction of older 
individuals possessed low levels of financial wealth that may constrain them from 
behaving as lifetime utility maximizers. Kahn emphasizes that for older individuals 
Social Security benefits are non-marketable assets, and liquidity constrained individuals 
will, therefore, not discount future social security benefits at the same rate as a market-
determined interest rate. Due to the presence of imperfections in the credit markets that 
limit borrowing against future Social Security benefits, liquidity constrained older 
individuals will have a discount rate that is much higher than the one used by Blinder et 
al. Kahn shows that on average for low wealth individuals, the actuarial adjustments do 
not fully compensate for foregone benefits, and the system provides a clear disincentive 
to continued work at ages below the NRA.  
 To summarize, past evidence indicates that the earnings test is a tax for 
individuals below the NRA under three possible scenarios: first, if the nominal interest 
rate is high; second, if older workers are unaware of the Social Security rules, and third, 
if older workers are liquidity constrained. For individuals above the NRA, the earnings 
test is a tax even if individuals are aware of the Social Security rules and are not liquidity 
constrained if the DRC adjustments do not fully compensate for the loss of current 
benefits.  
2.3.2. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS  
 If older individuals above the NRA face no borrowing constraints and are fully 
aware of the actuarially fair DRC adjustments, the earnings test is not a tax in the life-
cycle model and the 2000 repeal will leave the far-sighted older worker’s lifetime budget 
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constraint unchanged. In this case, the earnings test repeal will not affect lifetime labor 
supply decision of older individuals above or below the NRA. If, however, older workers 
are myopic in their behavior and perceive the earnings test as a tax either due to liquidity 
constraints, or unawareness/misunderstanding of future adjustments that are applied to 
foregone benefits, then the repeal will affect their lifetime labor supply decisions. Prior to 
the repeal myopic individuals will reduce their labor supply at ages where the earnings 
test applies and raise labor supply at ages where the net reward for work is higher.  
In the life-cycle model for individuals who are myopic in their outlook or are 
constrained to behave myopically, the earnings test repeal of 2000 increases the net wage 
workers expect to earn above their NRA. This increase in the net wage changes the 
relative net wage an individual expects to earn during different periods of his life. 
Realizing these changes, individuals below the NRA may wish to increase their work 
effort more at ages above the NRA while reducing work below the NRA due to increases 
in the reward for working at older ages. The direct effect of the earnings test repeal on 
individuals below the NRA will be an intertemporal substitution effect that tends to 
reduce labor supply. Younger individuals who planned to work above the NRA also 
experience an income effect. Both the substitution and income effect work in the same 
direction to reduce labor supply at younger ages. These individuals may reduce current 
labor supply, with the expectation to work more at older ages above the NRA when they 
can earn a higher return on their work.18 These predictions are summarized in Table 2.3.  
                                                          
18 If, however, there are large labor force entry and exit costs then I expect spillover effects to 
arise among those below the NRA. Friedberg and Webb (2009) view these spillovers costs as 
constraints on labor supply transitions that can arise because workers might lose their skill over 
time, or their skills might become outdated; there may be large search costs. These spillover 
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For older individuals above the NRA and below age 70, the repeal of the earnings 
test generates two predictions. Older beneficiaries who work and earn above the exempt 
amount experience both a substitution effect and an income effect when the earnings test 
is repealed. The substitution effect arises because the repeal increases the cost of leisure 
and encourages the affected workers to increase their hours of work. But the increase in 
the net wage also exerts an income effect as workers now earn more in real terms than 
before the repeal, so the higher real income encourages the affected workers to reduce 
their hours of work. The net effect of the earnings test repeal on hours of work of 
working beneficiaries above NRA and below age 70 is therefore ambiguous. There is, 
however, a clear prediction regarding the effect of the earnings test repeal on the labor 
force participation of this age group. The earnings test repeal raises the net wage and in 
the presence of minimum hours constraints or fixed costs of work (that may inhibit 
flexible adjustment of hours to below the exempt amount) the substitution effect may 
lead affected older nonparticipants to respond by reentering the labor force and increasing 
their labor force participation rate.19  
A third group that may potentially respond to the earnings test repeal is older 
individuals between ages 70-74. Unlike people below the NRA, older people ages 70-74 
are exempt from the earnings test, so they do not experience a change in relative net wage 
when the earnings test is repealed. It is possible, however, that workers between the 
                                                          
effects may lead younger workers to stay at work, so they can avail themselves of the higher net 
wage at older ages.  
19 Past research by Cogan (1981), Altonji and Paxson (1988), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985), 
Hurd (1996) and Haider and Loughran (2008) have emphasized the presence of fixed costs and 
minimum hours constraints which restrict the wage offer curve of employers to a limited number 
of hours wage bundles that restrict the available opportunity set, and provided evidence for the 
existence of such constraints in limiting the labor supply behavior of older individuals. 
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NRA-age 69 who had planned to continue working in their seventies may after the repeal 
experience an increase in their social security wealth. These individuals will respond to 
the income effect at ages 70-74 by reducing their labor supply.  
In the presence of the earnings test, increases in the DRC also change the net 
wage workers expect to earn above their NRA. Earnings above the earning test threshold 
amount are taxed and returned later by increasing future benefits through the DRC 
adjustments. Increases in the DRC adjustments, thus, raise the net wage an individual 
expects to earn over different periods of his life. If older beneficiaries are aware and 
understand the DRC adjustments, they will respond to the DRC increases in a manner 
similar to the earnings test repeal. After the earnings test repeal further changes in the 
DRC are not directly tied to earnings. These increases in the DRC only exert an income 
effect on workers at all ages, thus reducing labor supply at all ages.  
2.4. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND METHOD OF ESTIMATION  
In my work, I aim to use high frequency data from the Survey of Income Program 
and Participation (SIPP) to empirically assess the short-run intertemporal labor supply 
response to the recent rise in the reward for work among individuals above the NRA. I 
examine both the response in labor force participation and hours of work decisions.  
Labor Force Participation: Leonesio (1990) predicts that if older workers face 
considerable minimum hours or fixed cost constrains then in the short run they will 
respond to the earnings test repeal by changing their labor force participation. He notes 
that the change in the labor force participation rate of older workers above the NRA will 
occur through the re-entry of workers who had already left the labor force. In their work 
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Reimers and Honig (1993) studied the reentry behavior of men below the NRA and found 
that men respond to the loosening of the earnings test exempt amount by reentering the 
labor force. Based on their findings, they conclude that men are myopic in their behavior, 
ignore actuarial adjustments to future benefits, and face substantial constraints that limit 
them from flexibly adjusting their labor supply below the exempt amount. 
One previous study by Tran (2002) has attempted to identify whether an observed 
change in labor force participation rate of older men above the NRA in response to the 
2000 repeal of the earnings test arises due to re-entry or workers continuing to stay longer 
in the labor force. Tran creates a panel of older white men using the CPS which allows 
him to observe re-entry behavior over a one-year gap. He does not find evidence of a rise 
in labor force participation due to reentry. He does find, however, some suggestive 
evidence of a rise in labor force participation arising from workers continuing to stay in 
the labor force longer. Relying on Canadian data, Baker and Benjamin (1999) do not find 
any evidence of the effect of the earnings test reforms on employment when assessed 
using a measure of weeks worked for the full sample, but find an increase in weeks 
worked conditional on work that is stimulated by the flow of workers from part year full 
time work to full year full time work. They attempt to decompose this finding by 
narrowing the range of the piecewise-linear budget constraint along which individuals 
exhibit this response. To their surprise, they find the rise in full year full time work is 
observed among individuals who work part year full time and who would have left the 
labor force had the earnings test not been repealed. Baker and Benjamin’s findings lend 
support to the idea that in the presence of the earnings test, limited opportunities for part 
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time work lead many older workers to leave the labor force. Their findings imply that the 
response to the earnings test repeal will be concentrated at the extensive margin.  
Hours Changes: A common finding in previous studies is that of strong 
suggestive evidence of the presence of minimum hours constraints or limited 
opportunities for part time work that may constrain the adjustment of hours among older 
workers to discrete changes. Haider and Loughran (2008) use administrative data to 
analyze the bunching behavior of individuals, and observe the presence of labor market 
rigidities that keep workers from locating precisely at the exempt amount. Both 
Engelhardt and Kumar (2009) and Disney and Smith (2002) also explore the source 
behind their finding of an increase in hours of work, and observe that it is driven by an 
increase in full time work, suggesting that older workers adjust their labor supply in 
discrete jumps and not continuous increments as implied by the traditional labor supply 
model. 
 Previous studies, however, have modeled the hours response to earnings test 
repeal as a binary variable defined on a sample that includes both workers and non-
workers. This form of specifying the dependent variable imposes a restriction on 
behavior: part time workers are assumed to respond or be affected by explanatory 
variables in a manner similar to workers who are unemployed or not in the labor force, a 
restriction that may be too strong.20 Ham (1982) notes that if older workers are truly 
constrained in their labor supply choices then the above mentioned modeling approaches 
                                                          
20 In his work Ham (1982) draws a distinction between the labor supply decision process of 
unemployed and underemployed workers, noting that he finds evidence at least for prime age 
workers that the factors affecting the probability of unemployment are different from factors 
affecting the probability of underemployment.  
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are inappropriate; he shows that in such a scenario least squares estimates will be biased 
because they provide the combined effect of a variable (say, earnings test repeal) on the 
desired hours of work, and on the probability of being constrained.  
Keeping in mind the substantial evidence provided by previous studies regarding 
labor market constraints that hinder flexible adjustment of hours among older workers, I 
choose a modeling framework for hours of work that accommodates the discrete nature 
of the labor supply adjustment process. In my empirical analysis, I model the dependent 
variable as: full time; part time; and not in the labor force.21 Zabalza et al. (1980) use a 
structural model to study the impact of the earnings test in United Kingdom. Citing the 
strong restrictions older workers face in adjusting their hours of work, they also model 
the hours decision as a discrete choice between full-time, part-time, and not in the labor 
force.  
Specification: I estimate panel data fixed-effects models to assess the short-run labor 
supply response of older individuals to the earnings test. I use the following linear model 
specification which allows me to implicitly control for the increases in future benefits lost 
to the earnings test: 
                                                          
21 The multinomial logit framework has been frequently employed in past studies related to the 
labor supply decision of married women, who also were observed to adjust their labor supply in 
discrete jumps; see Lehrer (1992) for an example. Due to the small number of observations of 
unemployed workers, I remove them from the sample instead of constraining the response of 
unemployed workers to be the same as those not in the labor force.  
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜃𝜃2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊ℎ𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑦 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜃𝜃3 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 62 − 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃4  𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜃𝜃6 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑊𝑊𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐸𝐸 + 𝜂𝜂𝑎𝑎  +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where i indexes individual and t indexes time; Y is a dichotomous measure of labor 
supply (labor force participation or discrete measure of hours of work) 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents 
individual effects, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is a set of time dummies (quarters), and 𝜂𝜂𝑎𝑎 is a set of age dummies. 
 The main variable of interest is the earnings test dummy, which takes a value of 
one when an individual is within an age range covered by the earnings test and zero 
otherwise. The DRC variable is defined in percentage form based on the birth cohort of 
the individual, while the dummy variable within age range directly affected by the DRC 
is one for individuals between NRA and age 69 who are directly affected by the DRC and 
zero for older individuals between age 62-NRA and ages 70-74. To account for 
observable differences in labor supply of otherwise similar individuals I include controls 
for marital status, region, home ownership, number of household members, whether the 
individual is a guardian of children under age 18, and the state unemployment rate. 
Since my aim is to estimate the labor supply response to the earnings test while 
controlling for the possible influence of the DRC, I rely on fixed-effects models. Within a 
fixed-effects framework, the variation in the earnings test dummy arises as an individual 
ages. In the empirical analysis I consider individuals between ages 62-74, which can be 
subdivided into three groups: 62-NRA, NRA-69, 70-74.  For years prior to 2000, the 
earnings test in place variable is set to one for all individuals ages 62-69 and zero for 
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individuals ages 70-74, while for the year 2000 and later the earnings test in place 
dummy is set to one for individuals ages 62-64 only and zero for all ages above the NRA. 
The earnings test dummy variable, thus, captures the change in labor supply when an 
individual transitions from an age range covered by the earnings test to an age range for 
which the earnings test is not in place. To account for the differences in labor supply that 
may arise due to the effect of being below the NRA, I also add a dummy variable for age 
62-NRA. This variable controls for differences in labor supply for those below the NRA 
that do not change over time. These differences could exist due to rules that apply for 
those below the NRA and that have not changed over time, such as the 50 percent tax at 
age 62-NRA and the actuarial adjustment of 6.67 percent applied to future benefits. 
I described earlier that in the life-cycle model with no constraints on borrowing, 
the earnings test is a tax on labor supply if people either ignore the actuarial adjustments 
or consider them actuarially unfair. In the empirical analysis I account for these 
adjustments to future benefits. The main effect of the DRC controls for a common effect 
of the DRC at all ages. Since, it is a time constant variable it is implicitly controlled in the 
fixed-effect model. The DRC interaction term captures the differential effect of changes 
in the DRC on individuals when they are in an age range directly affected by the DRC 
changes relative to an age range in which the DRC is not directly applicable.  
I chose to employ panel data fixed-effects estimation method because it provides 
me with three advantages. First, it allows me to estimate the earnings test effect by 
exploiting variation in the earnings test that arises due to the natural aging of people 
while accounting for the effect of the DRC. Second, I am able to control for cohort 
effects that may confound the analysis, as the DRC changes are assigned by birth cohort. 
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Pingle (2006) and Blau and Goodstein (2010) find that their estimates of the effect of the 
DRC adjustments on labor supply of older individuals are sensitive to the manner in 
which they specify the effect of birth cohort. The fixed-effects model controls for birth 
cohort effects in a flexible way. Third, it allows me to control for a time invariant 
unobserved individual specific taste for work that may be correlated with other 
explanatory variables. In the fixed effects models, I am unable to report estimates for the 
main effect of the DRC and the NRA variables (or any other time constant variables like 
education) because it is not possible to distinguish the effect of time constant variables 
from time constant unobserved tastes for work.  
To check the sensitivity of the findings to the functional form specifying the 
relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables, I estimate a linear 
probability as well as a binomial logit model, using linear fixed-effects and 
Chamberlain’s conditional logit models respectively to handle individual effects. An 
advantage of the linear fixed-effects model relative to the conditional logit is that it 
provides estimates of the average partial effects, as Wooldridge (2010) notes that we 
cannot estimate the average partial effects in the conditional logit model without 
specifying a distribution for the unobserved tastes.22 The response probabilities 
associated with multinomial logit model for the discrete choice hours of work are: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 𝑗𝑗 | 𝑥𝑥) =  𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗)[ 1 +  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽ℎ)] 3ℎ=1   ,          𝑗𝑗 = 1,2,3              
                                                          
22 I use robust standard errors for the linear fixed effects and the conditional logit model. 
Wooldridge (2010) observes that for the linear fixed effects model we need to make inference 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
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where j=1, 2, 3 represents the three states full-time, part-time work, and non-
participation. Wooldridge (2010) notes that a useful fact about the multinomial logit 
model is that since  
𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 1 𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸 𝑦𝑦 = 2 | 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑝𝑝1(𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽) + 𝑝𝑝2(𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽)  ,                
it can be expressed as    𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 1 | 𝑦𝑦 = 1 𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸 𝑦𝑦 = 2, 𝑥𝑥) =  𝑝𝑝1( 𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽)
𝑝𝑝1(𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽)+𝑝𝑝2(𝑥𝑥,𝛽𝛽)  = 𝛬𝛬[𝑥𝑥(𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2)]  
where 𝛬𝛬(.) is the logistic function. That is, conditional on the choice being either full-time 
or part-time work, the probability that the outcome is full-time work follows a standard 
logit model with parameter vector 𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽2. The multinomial logit model can thus be 
estimated as a series of bivariate logit models. This property is useful because I assess the 
hours-worked response using a multinomial logit model with fixed effects, which I 
estimate using the Chamberlain conditional logit estimator (1980).23 I also report the 
estimates of partial effects from a linear fixed-effects model.  
2.5. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS  
To perform the empirical analysis, I use data from the Survey of Income Program 
and Participation (SIPP). The data are from the four most recent panels 1996-2008 which 
cover years 1996 to 2013. Each panel interviews a set of new households who are 
followed for a period of 3 to 5 years. The longitudinal nature of the SIPP panels allows 
me to observe the same individuals over multiple years.24 The SIPP has a rotating panel 
                                                          
23 Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) use a similar approach. 
24 I can follow an individual as long as he stays within the age range of the sample and does not 
leave the sample due to attrition.   
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design in which panel members are randomly assigned to one of four rotation groups, 
where each month members of one of the rotating groups are interviewed. The survey 
oversamples households from areas with a high concentration of poverty.  
An attractive feature of the SIPP is that individuals are interviewed every four 
months and are asked detailed questions regarding their labor force activity in each of the 
previous four months. A possible alternative is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
The HRS is a longitudinal survey that is specifically designed to study older individuals, 
and it follows them for a longer duration than the SIPP, but the interviews are held every 
two years. The greater frequency of the interviews in the SIPP is valuable in accurately 
observing reentry behavior and transitions from full-time to part-time work; the SIPP also 
has a larger sample size of older individuals relative to the HRS.25 Most previous 
researchers have relied on the Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyze the impact of 
the earnings test repeal, as the CPS provides a very large sample size. Tran (2002) creates 
one year panels using the monthly CPS data to study transitions into and out of 
employment. Friedberg and Webb (2009) note that these one year panels from the CPS 
data may not provide reliable estimates of the response in labor supply transitions to the 
earnings test repeal due to attrition bias. Unlike the SIPP, which follows individuals when 
they move, the CPS does not follow individuals, and may understate labor supply 
transitions if employment transitions are correlated with moving. 
                                                          
25  In the main empirical analysis, I use data from the fourth reference month (the month directly 
preceding the interview month) as it is likely to have the least recall bias. I also check the 
sensitivity of my findings by performing the same analysis using monthly data with the additional 
inclusion of an interview month dummy. 
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2.5.1. GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE 
For the empirical analysis I focus on older men and women aged 62-74. The 
descriptive findings for general trends in the labor force participation and hours of work 
for older men are summarized in Table 2.4. The rows highlighted in bold indicate the 
average labor force participation rate or rate of full-time work for each of the three age 
groups during the years 1996 to 2013, while subsequent rows indicate the average labor 
force participation rate and full-time work percentage observed in each of the SIPP 
panels. The general pattern is that of an increase over time in labor force participation and 
full-time work (relative to nonparticipation) for each age-group, while individuals below 
the NRA experienced a rise in their likelihood of working part-time relative to full-time 
in later panels.  
In Figures 2.1-2.3, I provide graphical analysis of the pattern in labor force 
participation and hours of work for men, and in Figures 2.4-2.6 for women. In the 
discussion below, I focus on the trends in labor supply observed for men. Figure 2.1 show 
the evolution of labor force participation rate of older men during the time period 1996-
2013. There are three things to note in Fig. 2.1. First, there is an upward trend in the labor 
force participation rate of older men in each of the three age ranges. Second, unlike the 
common trends assumption adopted in studies that employ the difference-in-differences 
approach, the upward trend in labor force participation rate does not appear to be parallel 
for the different age ranges. Third, in the year immediately following the repeal, for older 
men below the NRA there appears to be a clear decline in the labor force participation 
rate, while the labor force participation rate for those above the NRA-age 69 shows a 
steep rise, and the behavior of individuals aged 70-74 remains roughly the same. This 
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pattern seems to suggest that the spike in the labor force participation rate of men 
between NRA-age 69 is driven by reentrants. In her graphical analysis of the survival 
rates in retirement using the HRS, Maestas (2010) finds that individuals between ages 62-
64 have a higher likelihood of reentering in the first three years after retirement. She 
notes that one reason for observing this higher likelihood of unretirement among younger 
workers is the earnings test repeal of 2000. Friedberg and Webb provide a visual 
description of reentry rates of older individuals in the CPS; they find a temporary spike in 
the reentry rate of individuals between NRA and age 70 in the year immediately 
following the earnings test repeal.  
A look at Figure 2.2 suggests that the immediate changes in the labor force 
participation of men between ages 62-69 following the earnings test repeal are led by 
changes in full-time work.  Men below the NRA are less likely to remain at full-time 
work, while men above the NRA are more likely to work full-time after the repeal 
relative to not working. This preliminary descriptive finding of an increase in full-time 
work among older men directly affected by the repeal lends support to the presence of 
hours or fixed costs constraints that may inhibit the labor supply of older workers by 
limiting their ability to restrict their hours of work below the exempt amount. By raising 
the net wage of men above NRA and below age 70, the earnings test repeal encourages 
constrained workers to reenter the labor force and work full-time. The upward trends in 
full-time work relative to not working mirror the upwards trends in the labor force 
participation discussed earlier, suggesting that in years prior to and following the repeal 
the movement into and out of labor force among older men is from older workers leaving 
or joining full-time work. 
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Previous researchers have studied the influence of loosening the earnings test on 
full-time work of older individuals. In their analysis, most previous researchers study the 
response of full-time work relative to not working or working part-time. It is possible that 
individuals who leave the labor force face different constraints than those who work part-
time, so, the responsiveness to loosening of the earnings test (either due to the repeal or 
increases in the DRC adjustments) may differ based on whether individuals are currently 
working part-time or not in labor force. Figure 2.3 highlights two main differences in the 
response of full-time work when compared to part-time work as opposed to being in the 
labor force. First, the trends in full-time work relative to part-time work for each age 
group are not similar to the trends in full-time work relative to nonparticipation; this is 
particularly the case for individuals below the NRA. Second, individuals below the NRA 
and those between ages 70-74 experience a rise in the likelihood of working full-time 
relative to working part-time in the period immediately following the repeal. The 
direction of change in full-time work and the magnitude of the change differ depending 
on whether the comparison is made relative to nonparticipants or part-time workers. 
These differences suggest that combining nonparticipants with part-time works may not 
accurately reflect the response in full-time work of older individuals to either the 
loosening of the earnings test or changes in the DRC.  
2.6.  REGRESSION FINDINGS  
I now present the findings from the estimation of labor supply models for older 
men and women. In presenting these findings, I begin by describing the results from the 
basic labor supply models for the full sample of individuals between ages 62-74, and then 
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perform robustness checks. Later I attempt to identify the effect for subgroups of the 
population.   
2.6.1. FINDINGS FOR OLDER MEN 
Labor Force Participation: Table 2.5 reports the findings from the estimation of 
the empirical labor force participation model specified earlier. The dependent variable is 
a simple binary measure indicating labor force participation. I provide the estimates from 
both a linear and logit fixed-effects model. The first specification does not control for the 
differential effect of the DRC adjustments on the labor supply of older individuals ages 
62-74. In panel data fixed-effect models, the earnings test in place dummy captures the 
effect on labor force participation of being in an age group where the earnings test applies 
relative to an age group for which the earnings test was repealed. I estimate that the 
earnings test reduces labor force participation among older individuals age NRA-69, but 
the effect is not statistically significant.  
Although the fixed-effects specification implicitly controls for the common effect 
of the DRC at all ages, the DRC directly applies only to individuals between ages NRA-
69. When individuals between NRA-69 postpone receipt of their benefits (explicitly or 
due to the earnings test) their future benefits increase by the amount of the DRC. It is 
possible, therefore, that changes in the DRC adjustments may affect individuals between 
ages NRA-69 who are directly affected by the adjustments, in a manner different from 
older individuals who are not directly affected. The second specification includes a DRC 
interaction term to control for any differential effect. With the inclusion of the DRC 
interaction term, the earnings test effect is now marginally significant indicating that the 
earnings test reduces labor force participation between ages NRA-69 by 2.3 percentage 
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points, which is about 7 percent of the average labor participation rate of older 
individuals between ages NRA-69. I find that the DRC interaction has an unexpected 
negative sign indicating older individuals directly affected by the DRC are less likely to 
be in the labor force than individuals not directly affected, the estimated response is 
statistically insignificant. The estimates from the conditional logit models in the last two 
columns of Table 2.5 are consistent in sign with those from the linear fixed-effects 
models; the DRC interaction term is marginally significant.  
Gruber and Orszag (2003) document strong age-group specific trends in labor 
supply of older individuals. I address this concern in Table 2.6 where I check the 
robustness of my findings to the inclusion of age-group specific time trends.26 I observe 
that in the second specification in which I control for the differential effect of the DRC 
changes the earnings test exerts a negative statistically significant effect on the labor 
force participation of individuals age NRA-69. I find the earnings test reduces labor force 
participation of individuals age NRA-69 by 2.9 percentage points, about a 9 percent 
decline relative to the average labor force participation rate of this age group. After the 
inclusion of the age-specific trends the DRC interaction term increases in magnitude and 
is marginally statistically significant suggesting that excluding age-specific trends biases 
the coefficient upwards. The sign of the DRC interaction term is still negative with the 
implication that individuals directly affected by the changes are less responsive to them 
than those not directly affected. 
                                                          
26 These age-specific trends are obtained by interacting age dummies (age in years) with a linear 
trend in time. The coefficient on the age-specific trend for age 62 for instance, captures the 
change in labor force participation of individuals of age 62 as a linear function of time.  
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I make two simplifying assumptions in specifying the labor force participation 
models that I estimate. First I estimate the earnings test effect by using the within age-
group variation in the earnings test, but in doing so I am restricted to estimating a 
common earnings test response for ages NRA-69, 62-64 and 70-74. I would like to assess 
separate age effects in the earnings test response because the behavior of ages 62-64 may 
differ from those of 70-74. The main difference between these two possible control 
groups is that individuals between ages 62 and 64 face a stronger earnings test penalty 
relative to individuals NRA-69, while individuals between ages 70-74 are exempt from 
the earnings test. Second, while estimating the differential effect of the DRC changes, I 
also assume that the response to the DRC changes will be the same for age groups 62-
NRA and ages 70-74. This may not be the case, because as described above unlike the 
other age-groups, individuals between 70 and 74 are exempt from the earnings test 
penalty and the DRC does not apply to them, so they respond to the DRC changes only 
through an income effect. I relax these assumptions in Table 2.7, where I provide three 
sets of estimates: the first set includes estimates from the entire sample of older 
individuals between ages 62-74 (these estimates were earlier reported in Table 2.6), the 
second set focuses on behavior of individuals ages 62-69, and the third set focuses on 
behavior of individuals ages NRA-74. The estimates are from my preferred specification 
that includes both the DRC interaction and age-specific trends. Here, I find the magnitude 
of the estimated earnings test effect for the sample of 62-69-year-olds is fairly close to 
that observed in the full sample; the earnings test effect is, however, more imprecisely 
estimated as indicated by the relatively higher standard errors. Surprisingly, the 
magnitude of the DRC interaction term for older individuals does not vary when I 
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consider the response of individuals directly affected by the DRC change relative to 
either ages 62-69 or ages 70-74, suggesting that as the DRC increases individuals 
between NRA and age 69 are less likely to be in the labor force than either those aged 62-
64 or those aged 70-74. It is not clear how to interpret this finding.  
Hours of Work: I now present the results from the estimation of models for hours 
of work. The top part of Table 2.8 shows the findings from the basic specification which 
does not include age-specific trends, while the bottom part does include these trends. I 
observe that the earnings test reduces both full-time and part-time work relative to 
nonparticipation among older individuals ages NRA-69. The suggestion is that older 
workers employed in both full-time and part-time jobs are penalized by the earnings test, 
and respond to its presence by leaving the labor force. I find no evidence that the earnings 
test affected the hours of work decisions among individuals who continued working. 
Among working individuals, I observe that increases in the DRC exert a positive 
influence on hours of work for individuals directly affected by them, but with the 
inclusion of age-specific trends the effect is statistically insignificant.  
In Table 2.9, I report similar models estimated for different age-groups. The top 
part shows the estimates for full-time work relative to nonparticipation and the bottom 
part shows the estimates for full-time work relative to part-time work. I observe a 
reduction in full-time and part-time work relative to nonparticipation in response to the 
earnings test; the details provided in Table 2.9 allow me to see that the earnings test 
effect observed for both full-time and part-time work relative to nonparticipation is 
stronger in the middle column in which the control group consists of younger individuals 
62-NRA. In particular, the earnings test effect on part-time work is not discernible when 
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older individuals 70-74 serve as the control group. These findings suggest that older 
individuals 70-74 (although exempt from the earnings test) may also be influenced by the 
earnings test that was in place for individuals 65-69. I find no effect of the earnings test 
on hours of work among working individuals, for the linear models the estimated 
coefficients reported in columns 2 and 3 are equal in magnitude but opposite in sign.27 
Evidence for Subgroups: The above findings imply that even after controlling for 
the influence of the DRC changes, older individuals perceive the earnings test as a tax 
and respond to it by reducing their labor force participation and not hours of work. As 
discussed earlier, older individuals may perceive the earnings test as a tax if they are 
unaware of the adjustments or face liquidity constraints. I probe whether the response to 
the earnings test repeal and changes in the DRC adjustment is concentrated among 
subgroups of individuals who are more likely to face borrowing constraints and/or be less 
aware. In particular, I define subgroups of individuals based on their education level: 
those with a high school education or less and those who studied beyond high school. I 
expect to find a stronger response to the earnings test among the less educated. 
The estimates for the full sample of older men ages 62 to 74 are reported in Table 
2.10; the top part shows the findings for labor force participation while the bottom part 
shows the response in hours of work. The evidence suggests that the earnings test reduces 
labor force participation of men ages NRA-69 in a similar manner regardless of their 
                                                          
27 In Appendix Table B.2, I explore the possibility that the influence of changes in the DRC on 
labor supply may differ based on whether the earnings test is in place or not by including a three-
way interaction of the earnings test in place, changes in the DRC relative to the mean (6.2 
percent), and whether an individual is within an age range directly affect by the DRC changes. I 
find some evidence that in the absence of the earnings test, changes in the DRC raise full-time 
relative to part-time work by working men who are directly affected by the policy changes 
relative to those not directly affected.  
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education, as the magnitude of the earnings test effect for both groups is similar to that 
reported in Tables 2.6 and 2.8 (though the standard errors have increased). I also find that 
the DRC exerts a greater influence on working men ages NRA-69, who are more 
educated, the effect is marginally significant. There is some evidence that less educated 
men who are directly affected by the DRC changes are more likely to work part-time 
relative to not being in the labor force, but the effect is statistically insignificant.28  
2.6.2. FINDINGS FOR OLDER WOMEN 
Most studies evaluating the influence of changes in social security policies on 
labor supply have empirically assessed the labor supply response among older men. 
Reimers and Honig (1996) note that the response to changes in the earnings test and the 
DRC may vary between men and women for two reasons. First, they note that even 
though both men and women face the same exempt amount for the earnings test, women 
may have more flexibility in adjusting their hours of work relative to men. They suggest 
this could be due to the greater availability of part time jobs in occupations which employ 
more females. They hypothesize that loosening of the earnings test may affect hours of 
work among women, but will not affect their labor force participation; while the 
participation decision of men will be affected because of the relatively fewer 
                                                          
28 It is also possible to assess the response of liquidity constrained individuals by separating them 
into subgroups based on net-worth, I do not rely on this categorization in the main analysis 
because net-worth of an individual is endogenous. Information on net-worth is available in the 
SIPP topical files (Assets and Liabilities); SIPP administers the topical Assets and Liabilities 
questionnaire at an annual frequency. I have used the topical modules to assign individuals into 
subgroups by net-worth, those who are at and above the median, and those who fall below the 
median; the estimates from the labor supply models by net-worth are reported in Appendix Tables 
B.3 and B.4 for men and women respectively. For older men, I find some support that as the DRC 
increases it reduces the labor force participation of wealthy men with above median net-worth 
who are directly affected by the policy relative to individuals who are not affected.  
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opportunities for part time work available to them. Second, the earnings test reduces the 
return to work more for men than women; this difference arises due to the shorter life 
expectancy of men relative to women. If this is the case, men may respond more strongly 
to the earnings test repeal than women. To examine the possibility of differential 
responses in my empirical analysis I estimate separate models for both men and 
women.29 
 The main set of findings for women are reported in Tables 2.11-2.13. There are 
four things to note regarding women’s labor supply response to the earnings test. First, 
unlike Reimers and Honig’s hypothesis, I observe some evidence that the earnings test 
reduces labor force participation of women, the magnitude of the effect is almost 
equivalent to that observed for men; the earnings test reduces the labor force participation 
of women ages NRA-69 by 2.4 percentage points. Unlike men, in columns 2 and 3, of 
Table 2.11, I observe that the earnings test effect on labor force participation is similar in 
magnitude when assessed by age-group.30 Second, in line with predictions I observe that 
when I restrict the sample to older individuals between NRA-age 74, women directly 
affected by the DRC changes are more likely to be in the labor force than women aged 
70-74, the effect is marginally significant and sensitive to the choice of specification. 
Third, I find some evidence suggesting that the earnings test affects women by lowering 
their likelihood of working at full-time and part-time jobs relative to nonparticipation. 
                                                          
29 Figinski (2013) estimates separate models for men and women, and further separates women 
into primary and spousal beneficiaries to assess whether the response to the earnings test repeal is 
similar between primary beneficiaries (men and women).  
30 This finding suggests that either both control groups are adequate or both of them responded to 
the earnings test in a similar manner, so no difference can be detected. The first suggestion seems 
more plausible. 
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The third column of Table 2.12 indicates that unlike men, working women respond to the 
earnings test by reducing their hours of work, the effect is statistically significant. This 
finding suggests that I observe a response in hours of work by women possibly because 
of the greater flexibility in the choice of hours of work that is available to them relative to 
men. Fourth, Table 2.13, which reports the findings from the analysis by educational 
subgroups, indicates that the labor force participation and hours of work response to the 
earnings test is concentrated among more educated women. Interestingly, I observe some 
evidence that less educated women who are directly affected by the DRC are more likely 
to be in the labor force. I observe stronger evidence of the DRC effect for educated 
women, but it is difficult to interpret. I find that more educated women who are directly 
affected by the DRC are less likely to be in the labor force than similar women who are 
not directly affected by the DRC changes.  
 To summarize, the evidence for women suggests that women do not differ from 
men in their response to the earnings test on the extensive margin. Like men, they 
perceive the earnings test as a tax and reduce their labor force participation in response to 
this penalty on work. Unlike men, however, working women also respond to the earnings 
test tax by lowering their hours of work. The reduction in hours of work observed among 
working women in response to the earnings test possibly indicates the greater flexibility 
in hours of work available to women. This finding highlights the constrained nature of 
the labor supply adjustments available to men, which might be missed in models which 
only focus on either full-time work relative to nonparticipation or use continuous 
measures of hours. Finally, the labor supply response of women is driven by more 
educated women. This finding can potentially be attributed to the lower average earnings 
 148 
of women than men, such that higher educated women are more likely to have earnings 
near the earnings test threshold.  
2.7. SUMMARY 
Since the inception of the Social Security System, the earnings test has been an 
unpopular feature of the program because of the view that it penalizes older individuals 
who continue to work while receiving their Social Security benefits. Over the years, 
numerous amendments and new features to the existing rules have been introduced. One 
such feature is the DRC adjustments which compensate older individuals above the NRA 
whose benefits were withheld due to the earnings tax. This feature complicates the 
analysis of the earnings test. In the presence of perfect capital markets, if people are 
aware of the DRC adjustments and if these adjustments fully compensate older 
individuals for their forgone benefits, the earnings test is not a tax and should not affect 
the labor supply decisions of older workers. Most previous researchers have ignored the 
DRC adjustments, however, claiming that either older workers are unaware of or 
misunderstand these adjustments, and have thus analyzed older workers’ response to the 
earnings test using static labor supply models. In recent years, however, there has been a 
substantial increase in the size of these adjustments. It is possible that as the DRC 
adjustments rise the penalty imposed by the earnings test is reduced, and older 
individuals may be less likely to view the earnings test as a tax. As previous researchers 
have stressed, whether older individuals perceive the earnings test as a tax or not is, thus, 
an empirical question. 
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 Unlike previous researchers, I address this question using a life-cycle model that 
accounts for the potential influence of the DRC changes. Moreover, I use fixed-effects 
analysis which allows me to implicitly control for birth cohort effects in a flexible 
manner, thus accounting for the strong trends in labor supply of older individuals that 
may differ by cohort. Unlike most previous researchers, I also control for age specific 
trends in labor supply. Previous studies have assessed the labor supply response using 
either a continuous measure of hours or a dichotomous measures of full-time work 
relative to nonparticipation, which do not full capture the constrained nature of hours 
choices available to older workers. In the empirical analysis I use a modeling framework 
which allows me to account for the discrete and constrained nature of the labor supply 
choices that exist for older workers. Finally, I assess whether the labor supply response to 
the earnings test is concentrated among subgroups of individuals who are more or less 
likely to be liquidity constrained or unaware of features of the earnings test rules.  
Even after accounting for the DRC changes, I find evidence in support of the view 
that both men and women perceive the earnings test as a tax. I find evidence that older 
men and women above the NRA and below age 70 respond to the earnings test by 
reducing their labor force participation. For men, I am unable to find a differential 
response to the earnings test by educational subgroups. For working women, I observe a 
reduction in the hours of work in response to the earning test, which indicates the greater 
flexibility in the choice of hours of work that may be available to women relative to men. 
I also find that the labor supply response of women is concentrated among those who are 
better educated, suggesting their relatively higher earnings make them more vulnerable to 
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the earnings test penalty than less educated women whose earnings may be much lower 
than the annual threshold amount beyond which the earnings test applies. 
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Table 2.1 Features of Earnings Test and Actuarial Adjustments 
 
Year
Threshold 
Amount                 
($)
Tax Rate      
(%)
Actuarial 
Reduction Factor 
(ARF)                 
(%)
Threshold 
Amount                 
($)
Tax Rate      
(%)
Delayed Retirement 
Credit (DRC) for 
those reaching NRA 
(approximate)                   
(%) 
Threshold 
Amount              
($)
Tax Rate        
(%)
Delayed 
Retirement Credit 
(DRC)                
(%) 
1996 8,280 50 6.67 12,500 33.33 5.0
1997 8,640 50 6.67 13,500 33.33 5.0
1998 9,120 50 6.67 14,500 33.33 5.5
1999 9,600 50 6.67 15,500 33.33 5.5
2000 10,080 50 6.67 6.0
2001 10,680 50 6.67 6.0
2002 11,280 50 6.67 6.5
2003 11,520 50 6.67 6.5
2004 11,640 50 6.67 7.0
2005 12,000 50 6.67 7.0
2006 12,480 50 6.67 7.5
2007 12,960 50 6.67 7.5
2008 13,560 50 6.67 7.5
2009 14,160 50 6.67 8.0
2010 14,160 50 6.67 8.0
2011 14,160 50 6.67 8.0
2012 14,640 50 6.67 8.0
2013 15,120 50 6.67 8.0
 Note: Source -- U.S. Social Security Administration.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The threshold amount is in nominal dollars. As the normal retirement age for a  specific birth cohort changes, the above rules extend to the new higher normal 
retirement age.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Since 2000, a looser earnings test applies in the year that an individual attains his normal retirement age. The looser earnings test applies only in months before 
the normal retirement age; during these months the individual faces a higher exempt amount and a lower tax rate of 33 percent.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
2 This set of rules applies to an individual beginning from the month he attains normal retirement age.                                                                                                                                                      
Earnings Test does not apply for individuals 
above age seventy.                                                                                                                                                                                          
Delayed retirement creadit adjustments for 
postponed benefits also do not apply for 
individuals above age seventy. 
Ages 70 - 74
Earnings test eliminated in 
2000 for those at and 
above normal retirement 
Ages 62 - NRA1 Ages NRA2 - 69
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Year of birth  NRA  DRC  per year 
1921-24 65 3.00%
1925-26 65 3.50%
1927-28 65 4.00%
1929-30 65 4.50%
1931-32 65 5.00%
1933-34 65 5.50%
1935-36 65 6.00%
1937 65 6.50%
1938 65 and 2 months 6.50%
1939 65 and 4 months 7.00%
1940 65 and 6 months 7.00%
1941 65 and 8 months 7.50%
1942 65 and 10 months 7.50%
1943-54 66 8.00%
Note: Source --  U.S. Social Security Administration.
Table 2.2 Normal Retirement Age  and  Delayed Retirement Credit 
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Labor Force 
Participation (LFP) Hours of Work
                 ↓      (S.E.) ↓      (S.E.)
               ↓       (I.E.)   ↓       (I.E.)                            
Overall Effect ↓          ↓  
↑      (S.E.)
↓       (I.E.)                            
Overall Effect       ↑  Ambiguous  
Ages 70 - 74                  ↓   (I.E.)   ↓     (I.E.)                            
Overall Effect     ↓            ↓  
Note: The above predictions regarding earnings test repeal or DRC changes in presence of 
earnings test apply only if the earnings test is perceived as a tax. S.E. denotes substitution effect, 
and I.E. denotes income effect. 
Table 2.3 Impact on Labor supply due to changes in the Earnings Test and DRC
Below normal 
retirement age          
(ages 62-NRA)
Above normal 
retirement age          
(ages NRA-69)
                ↑     (S.E.)                                            
(re-entry)
Effect of Earnings Test Repeal (Short-Run effect) or Changes in DRC in presence of Earnings 
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics for Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age in years 67.71 (4.02) 63.62  (0.98) 67.56  (1.38) 72.3  (1.49)
Labor Force Participation Rate 0.35 0.50 0.33 0.21
1996 panel      (Dec. 1995 - Feb. 2000) 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.20
2001 panel      (Oct. 2000 - Dec. 2003) 0.34 0.49 0.32 0.20
2004 panel      (Oct. 2003 - Dec. 2007) 0.35 0.49 0.33 0.22
2008 panel      (May 2008 - Jul. 2013) 0.39 0.52 0.35 0.23
Full-Time Work relative to not in Labor Force 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.13
1996 panel      (Dec. 1995 - Feb. 2000) 0.24 0.40 0.20 0.11
2001 panel      (Oct. 2000 - Dec. 2003) 0.27 0.45 0.23 0.12
2004 panel      (Oct. 2003 - Dec. 2007) 0.29 0.44 0.26 0.14
2008 panel      (May 2008 - Jul. 2013) 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.15
Full-Time Work relative to Part-Time work 0.59 0.71 0.52 0.40
1996 panel      (Dec. 1995 - Feb. 2000) 0.52 0.69 0.42 0.34
2001 panel      (Oct. 2000 - Dec. 2003) 0.58 0.75 0.52 0.37
2004 panel      (Oct. 2003 - Dec. 2007) 0.60 0.71 0.56 0.42
2008 panel      (May 2008 - Jul. 2013) 0.63 0.71 0.57 0.44
All ages                            
(62-74)
Ages          
62 - NRA  NRA - 69 Ages 70 - 74
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Table 2.5 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Force Participation: Age 62-74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.005 -0.023* -0.077 -0.554*
(0.008) (0.013) (0.189) (0.311)
-0.008 -0.211*
(0.005) (0.117)
Age 62 to normal retirement age dummy 0.004 -0.036 0.010 -1.087*
(0.009) (0.027) (0.196) (0.645)
At normal retirement age dummy -0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.167) (0.167)
Linear age trends no no no no
Number of observations 146,572 146,572 31,668 31,668
Number of individuals 21,066 21,066 3395 3395
All models include controls for marital status, state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household 
members, children under age 18,  region, age, and quarter dummies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Model Linear (Fixed-effects) Conditional Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 2.6 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Force Participation: Age 62 - 74 
with Age-Specific Trends 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.019 -0.029** -0.370 -0.696**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.283) (0.329)
-0.019* -0.550**
(0.010) (0.230)
Age 62 to normal retirement age dummy 0.027* -0.098 0.368 -3.253**
(0.014) (0.067) (0.330) (1.500)
At normal retirement age dummy -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.032
(0.008) (0.008) (0.166) (0.167)
Linear age trends yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 146,572 146,572 31,668 31,668
Number of individuals 21,066 21,066 3395 3395
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for marital status, state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household 
members, children under age 18,  region, age, and quarter dummies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Model Linear (Fixed-effects) Conditional Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 2.7 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Force Participation: By Age-Group 
 
 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.029** -0.696** -0.034 -0.684 -0.012 -0.478
(0.013) (0.329) (0.025) (0.495) (0.017) (0.481)
-0.019* -0.550** -0.020 -0.505* -0.019 -0.599
(0.010) (0.230) (0.014) (0.292) (0.015) (0.435)
Linear age trends yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 146,572 31,668 98,960 23,157 99,382 17,774
Number of individuals 21,066 3395 15,639 2624 15,122 2008
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, state unemployment rate, home 
ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, age, and quarter dummies. Age 62-NRA dummy is not 
included in models estimated for individuals between ages NRA-74.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
62 - 74  62 - 69 NRA - 74 
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Age-range
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
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Table 2.8 Estimates of Models for Hours of Work for Older Men Age 62-74 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.022** -0.975** -0.017 -0.641 -0.007 0.004
(0.011) (0.495) (0.011) (0.407) (0.027) (0.299)
-0.007* -0.240 -0.007* -0.259* 0.018* 0.190*
(0.004) (0.187) (0.004) (0.155) (0.010) (0.109)
Linear age trends no no no no no no
Earnings test in place dummy -0.029*** -1.430*** -0.022* -0.757* -0.004 0.031
(0.011) (0.530) (0.012) (0.428) (0.028) (0.313)
-0.012 -0.787** -0.003 -0.133 0.029 0.264
(0.008) (0.374) (0.009) (0.303) (0.019) (0.217)
Linear age trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 122,760 13,015 111,866 15,384 49,664 20,653
Number of individuals 19,746 1729 17,887 2060 8992 2694
Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, state unemployment rate, home 
ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, age, and quarter dummies.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Model Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
A: No age-specific trends
B: With age-specific trends
Full-time work relative to 
Nonparticipation
 Part-time work relative 
to Nonparticipation
Full-time relative to         
Part-time work
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Table 2.9 Estimates of Models for Hours of Work for Older Men: By Age-Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.029*** -1.430*** -0.030 -0.734 -0.017 -1.552*
(0.011) (0.530) (0.022) (0.743) (0.011) (0.852)
-0.012 -0.787** -0.016 -0.479 -0.007 -1.290
(0.008) (0.374) (0.013) (0.463) (0.011) (0.801)
Number of observations 122,760 13,015 81,964 10,238 83,411 6,029
Number of individuals 19,746 1729 14,547 1385 14,027 882
Earnings test in place dummy -0.022* -0.757* -0.031*** -0.800** -0.006 -0.335
(0.012) (0.428) (0.011) (0.376) (0.015) (0.610)
-0.003 -0.133 -0.002 -0.067 -0.018 -0.440
(0.009) (0.303) (0.002) (0.053) (0.014) (0.538)
Number of observations 111,866 15,384 123,881 18,027 83,797 10,052
Number of individuals 17,887 2060 19,870 2432 13,742 1359
Earnings test in place dummy -0.004 0.031 0.026 0.449 -0.026 -0.348
(0.028) (0.313) (0.045) (0.484) (0.040) (0.475)
0.029 0.264 0.034 0.348 0.038 0.370
(0.019) (0.217) (0.024) (0.270) (0.041) (0.444)
Number of observations 49,664 20,653 39,457 15,556 26,702 11,464
Number of individuals 8992 2694 7600 2150 5150 1562
C: Full-time relative to Part-time work
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, state unemployment rate, 
home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, age-specific trends, age, and quarter dummies. 
Age 62-NRA dummy is not included in models estimated for individuals between ages NRA-74.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Conditional 
LogitModel Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Linear-FE 
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
A: Full-time work relative to Nonparticipation
B: Part-time work relative to Nonparticipation
Age-range 62 - 74  62 - 69 NRA - 74 
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Table 2.10 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Supply by Education: Age 62-74 
A: Labor Force Participation 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.031 -0.600 -0.025 -0.771
(0.020) (0.460) (0.019) (0.476)
-0.021 -0.624** -0.016 -0.437
(0.014) (0.313) (0.015) (0.342)
Number of observations 76,509 17,114 70,063 14,540
Number of individuals 10,772 1801 10,351 1593
Earnings test in place dummy -0.027 -0.800 -0.027* -2.049***
(0.017) (0.799) (0.014) (0.760)
-0.007 -0.490 -0.018 -1.242**
(0.012) (0.519) (0.011) (0.558)
Number of observations 62,488 7,257 60,272 5,750
Number of individuals 9990 924 9806 805
Earnings test in place dummy -0.027 -0.772 -0.019 -0.893
(0.019) (0.599) (0.016) (0.617)
-0.012 -0.500 0.004 0.186
(0.012) (0.409) (0.012) (0.454)
Number of observations 54,780 7,994 57,086 7,383
Number of individuals 8780 1079 9153 980
D: Full-time relative to Part-time work 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.004 0.190 -0.011 -0.129
(0.037) (0.430) (0.044) (0.467)
0.047* 0.545* 0.005 -0.153
(0.025) (0.279) (0.030) (0.363)
Number of observations 30,600 12,766 19,064 7,869
Number of individuals 5323 1618 3680 1074
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
B: Full-time relative to Nonparticipation 
C: Part-time relative to Nonparticipation 
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, age, 
state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, 
age, and quarter dummies, and age-specific trends.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
More than high school High school or less
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
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Table 2.11 Estimates of Models for Older Women's Labor Force Participation 
 
 
 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.024** -0.513 -0.020 0.076 -0.024* -0.979*
(0.012) (0.350) (0.021) (0.505) (0.014) (0.518)
-0.005 -0.391* -0.014 -0.243 0.023* 0.096
(0.009) (0.231) (0.012) (0.285) (0.013) (0.463)
Number of observations 177,790 31,618 117,346 23,913 123,128 16,659
Number of individuals 25,514 3323 18,433 2665 18,617 1831
Age-range 62 - 74  62 - 69
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, age, state unemployment rate, home 
ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, age, and quarter dummies and age-specific trends. Age 62-NRA 
dummy is not included in models estimated for individuals between ages NRA-74.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                                                                       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
NRA - 74 
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
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Table 2.12 Estimates of Models for Older Women: Ages 62-74 
 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.013 -0.131 -0.017* -0.553 -0.074** -0.733*
(0.009) (0.708) (0.010) (0.424) (0.030) (0.391)
-0.003 -0.757* -0.010 -0.613** -0.017 -0.167
(0.007) (0.428) (0.007) (0.301) (0.022) (0.270)
Number of observations 151,632 10,891 152,123 17,157 42,681 16,337
Number of individuals 23,710 1423 23,285 2150 8059 2153
Refer to notes for Table 11                      
Full-time relative to         
Part-time work
Model Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
Full-time work relative to 
Nonparticipation
 Part-time work relative 
to Nonparticipation
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
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Table 2.13 Estimates of Models for Women's Labor Supply by Education: Age 62-74 
Earnings test in place dummy -0.052*** -1.378*** -0.0002 0.401
(0.020) (0.506) (0.014) (0.483)
-0.031** -1.063*** 0.019* 0.353
(0.014) (0.326) (0.011) (0.327)
Number of observations 78,407 16,786 99,383 14,810
Number of individuals 10,998 1734 14,575 1590
Earnings test in place dummy -0.034** -1.043 0.004 0.657
(0.017) (1.039) (0.010) (0.960)
-0.018* -1.354** 0.009 -0.262
(0.011) (0.630) (0.008) (0.596)
Number of observations 64,121 5,848 87,511 5,030
Number of individuals 10,037 727 13,727 695
Earnings test in place dummy -0.037** -1.391** -0.003 0.339
(0.018) (0.625) (0.012) (0.590)
-0.035*** -1.459*** 0.011 0.426
(0.013) (0.423) (0.009) (0.428)
Number of observations 63,348 8,949 88,775 8,201
Number of individuals 9653 1121 13,681 1030
Earnings test in place dummy -0.157*** -1.736*** 0.002 0.185
(0.044) (0.561) (0.042) (0.559)
-0.064** -0.743** 0.035 0.429
(0.029) (0.360) (0.035) (0.427)
Number of observations 24,265 9,317 18,416 7,008
Number of individuals 4482 1196 3592 955
A: Labor Force Participation
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age 
range directly affected by delayed retirement 
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age 
range directly affected by delayed retirement 
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, age, 
state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, 
age, and quarter dummies, and age-specific trends .                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age 
range  directly affected by delayed retirement 
D: Full-time relative to Part-time work 
B: Full-time relative to Nonparticipation 
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age 
range directly affected by delayed retirement 
C: Part-time relative to Nonparticipation 
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Figure 2.1 Trends in Labor Force Participation of Older Men by age group 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in Full-time work relative to Nonparticipation of Older Men by age group 
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Figure 2.3 Trends in Full-time work relative to Part-time work of Older Men by age group 
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Figure 2.4 Trends in Labor Force Participation of Older Women by age group 
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Figure 2.5 Trends in Full-time work relative to Nonparticipation of Older Women by age group 
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Figure 2.6 Trends in Full-time work relative to Part-time work of Older Women by age group 
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CHAPTER 3 
LOCAL LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In a study that predates the 2007-2009 recession, Card and Lemieux (2000) 
document the declining economic condition of youth in the U.S. (particularly the less 
educated). They show that youth adapt in diverse ways to adverse economic conditions, 
changing their living arrangements, employment, and school enrollment behavior. A Pew 
Research Center (2013) report covering the period 2007 to 2012 echoes the findings of 
Card and Lemieux. The report shows that between the years 2007 and 2010 the young 
adult unemployment rate rose from 6.2 to 12.4 percent. Between the same time period the 
fraction of young adults (18 to34-year-olds) living with their parents rose from 22 to 24 
percent.1  The surge in the fraction of young adults living with their parents during the 
recent recession has motivated three recent studies to analyze the extent to which young 
people respond to a period of prolonged economic distress by living with their parents. 
Similar to Card and Lemieux, each of these studies (Kaplan (2012), Matsudaira (2015), 
and Lee and Painter (2013)) find that poor economic conditions—as assessed by the local
                                                          
1 These numbers are taken from the updated report by Pew Research Center (2015). These 
numbers exclude 18 to 24-year-old college students who are enrolled full-time. The report also 
notes the decline in the marriage rate among young adults (18-31) from 30 % in 2007 to 25 % in 
2012.  
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labor market conditions, and personal unemployment status—exert a significant positive 
impact on the likelihood of an adult child residing with a parent.  
Early research carried out in the 1980s and 1990s by demographers, sociologists, 
and economists identified personal and family background characteristics of young adults 
as important determinants of their living arrangements. Haurin et al. (1993) expanded the 
demographic model used in the previous studies by including economic factors such as 
the cost of housing and the potential wage of young adults as other possible determinants 
of their living arrangements. The early literature, however, relied mostly on cross-
sectional data; studies using longitudinal data relied on a few cohorts and included small 
sample sizes.2 Influence of economic determinants of living arrangements was often 
identified through the use of personal unemployment status, which is potentially jointly 
determined with living arrangements.  
Card and Lemieux (2000) emphasized exogenous variation in young people’s 
local labor market conditions as a key source of identification of the influence exerted by 
labor markets on living arrangements. One limitation of their work is their inability to 
separately control for the influence of business cycles on young adults and their parents.3 
Moreover, their analysis is based on repeated cross-sectional group-level data; this 
framework poses some additional limitations. First, within the group-level framework 
they were unable to account for persistent unobserved preferences of young people living 
with their parents. Second, within their framework, they are unable to study the influence 
                                                          
2 Goldscheider and DaVanzo (1989) and (1990), and Aquilino (1990). 
3 The work of Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) and Ermisch (1999) stresses the importance of 
parental resources on young people’s living arrangements. 
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of economic conditions on young people’s movements into and out of the parental home. 
In the fifteen-year period following Card and Lemieux’s work, researchers have 
attempted to address these two concerns by using individual-level analysis that controls 
for personal characteristics of young adults, and by using longitudinal data to examine 
how changes in local labor markets affect the transitions in living arrangements. A 
valuable insight from Kaplan (2012) is the importance of unobserved individual specific 
preferences in accounting for the majority of variation in living arrangements. Kaplan’s 
work underscores the need for high frequency longitudinal data in isolating the influence 
of labor market conditions on living arrangements of young people. 
Drawing on the insights from the earlier research I use longitudinal data from the 
Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP) for years 1996 to 2013 to study how 
changes in young people’s labor markets affect their living arrangements, and whether 
this influence is stronger during the period of the recent recession. In my work I identify 
the effect of labor market conditions by using age-group, education, and gender specific 
variation in unemployment rate and employment-population ratio of young people. This 
measure of local labor market conditions faced by young people offers two advantages 
relative to that of Card and Lemieux. One, it allows greater variation, and, two, it allows 
me to separately account for the influence of business cycles on young adults and their 
parents. I also assess the ability of labor market conditions to explain the living 
arrangements of young adults at a point in time relative to transitions in living 
arrangements over time. I find no robust evidence that poor labor markets conditions 
affect the living arrangements of young adults.  
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3.2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Most previous researchers interested in understanding the economic determinants 
of parent-child coresidence decisions proposed their analysis within a utility comparison 
framework without explicitly developing the underlying theory. Following in a similar 
vein, I study the influence of economic factors on coresidence behavior by relying on a 
reduced form approach. However, I specify the empirical model by drawing insights from 
the theory developed in McElroy (1989), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), and Ermisch 
(1999). In particular, I utilize the theoretical framework and predictions derived in 
Ermisch (1999) to motivate my empirical work and to interpret my findings. To facilitate 
the discussion in later sections, I summarize key features of the theoretical models in the 
parent-child coresidence literature that have guided my work.  
3.2.1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK 
McElroy (1989) builds a theory of parent-child coresidence in which the young 
adult’s labor supply and coresidence decisions are jointly determined.4 In her model a 
young person compares the utility received while living apart to that while living with 
parents and chooses that combination of labor supply, consumption, and living 
arrangements that yields the highest level of utility. Parents’ resources affect the young 
adult only while living at home as McElroy does not model the potential for financial 
transfers from parents to children. She uses a Nash bargaining model to jointly derive the 
young adult’s indirect utility function, labor supply, and reservation wage in each living 
                                                          
4 McElroy also notes the joint determination of the schooling and marriage decisions along with 
living arrangement decision. In addition, Haurin et al. (1993) emphasize the joint determination 
of living arrangements and a young adult’s decision to have children. 
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arrangement. In specifying the empirical model, I draw on McElroy’s work that 
emphasizes the simultaneous determination of coresidence and labor supply decisions of 
young people. 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) extend the analysis of McElroy by incorporating 
the possibility of financial transfers from altruistic parents to children. In their work 
parents provide transfers to children within an intergenerational support framework. They 
model these financial transfers from parents as a form of support distinct from transfers 
provided by parents through shared residence with child. They note two distinguishing 
features of transfers provided via coresidence. First, such transfers are cheaper for parents 
than equivalent financial transfers because of the public good characteristic of shared 
housing. Second, unlike financial transfers, coresidence imposes a privacy cost on 
parents. Thus, Rosenzweig and Wolpin’s model allows for offsetting effects of parental 
income on the likelihood of transfers provided via coresidence. Unlike McElroy’s work, 
in their theoretical model parents, through their influence on the level of financial 
transfers, make the coresidence decision by comparing their utility in the two living 
arrangement scenarios, while children only choose the level of human capital investment 
(taking as given the level of parental transfers). I describe the Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
model to show how the possibility for making financial transfers influences the 
coresidence decision through the effect on parents’ utility.  
I motivate my empirical model by utilizing the theoretical framework proposed by 
Ermisch (1999), who built on the theory developed by McElroy and Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin to explicitly derive the effect of housing costs on the parent-child coresidence 
decision. Parents are assumed to be altruistic; their utility depends on the utility of their 
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child as well as their own consumption of housing and other goods. Following Ermisch’s 
notation, parents’ utility can be written as:5  
𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝,ℎ𝑃𝑃,𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,ℎ𝑐𝑐, 𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖�        𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟,𝑎𝑎 
where UP, UC represent the parent and child’s utility respectively, i allows utility of 
parents and child to differ based on their preference for coresidence (r) and living apart 
(a), and xj and hj are the parents’ and child’s respective consumption of housing and 
other goods.  
Ermisch allows for the possibility of financial transfers from parents to children 
while living apart and together, but total transfers from parents to children are cheaper 
when coresiding due to joint consumption of housing.6 In each living arrangement 
parents make financial transfers to their child based on a comparison of their income 
relative to the child’s. The model has a two stage game structure, in the second stage of 
which the child chooses that combination of living arrangement, housing, and other 
consumption which yields the highest utility, taking as given transfers chosen by parents 
in the first stage.7  
3.2.2. THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
Based on his theoretical model Ermisch makes three predictions regarding the 
effect of changes in economic factors such as housing prices, child’s income, and 
                                                          
5 In his analysis Ermisch derives the theoretical model and its predictions for a single child 
family.  
6 Unlike Rosenzweig and Wolpin, Ermisch does not explicitly model the privacy cost that parents 
may experience when coresiding with a child. 
7 The theoretical model, however, does not account for the joint determination of labor supply 
and coresidence decisions of young people.  
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parents’ income on the likelihood of parent-child coresidence. First, a higher cost of 
housing raises the probability of a child residing with parents, as the child’s consumption 
of housing increases at the parental home relative to living apart.8 Second, higher income 
of the child reduces the probability of a child residing with parents, as it raises the child’s 
utility in the living apart situation. Third, a higher income for parents raises the 
probability of the child residing with parents regardless of whether parents make financial 
transfers (if privacy costs are ignored).9  
3.2.3. FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Ermisch (1999) notes that an implication of the theoretical model is that separate 
measures of parents’ and child’s income along with the cost of housing need to be 
included in any empirical model analyzing the effects of economic conditions on parent-
child coresidence. Based on the theory outlined above, he derives the indirect utility 
function for a young adult i while living with and apart from parents at time t, as follows: 
              𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃:   𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  � 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃:   𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 
                                                          
8 This prediction holds only if parents’ do not respond to the higher cost of housing by changing 
their own demand for housing. Ermisch (1996) estimates that the demand for housing by older 
individuals in Britain is inelastic, and so based on this evidence he believes that higher price of 
housing will reduce the probability that young adults live apart from their parents’.  
9 In the scenario in which parents make no financial transfers, higher parental income raises the 
child’s joint consumption of housing at the parents’ home, thus inducing the child to live at home. 
If parents make financial transfers to the child when living apart, higher parental income may 
motivate parents to make more transfers and as transfers via coresidence are cheaper, parents will 
choose to make more transfers by coresiding with their child. 
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where UR and UA are the indirect utility functions for the young adult while coresiding 
and while living apart. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐  and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃  are measures of child’s and parents’ income 
respectively, and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ  is a measure of rental costs. These three variables indicate the 
economic determinants of a young adult’s living arrangements, while 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  
represent the child’s preferences for living with and apart from parents, respectively.  
 At any given point in time (a static model) we observe the parent and child 
coresiding if: 
  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  �    >    𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 
while in Ermisch’s dynamic extension of the static model, we observe a young adult 
returning to parents’ home if:  
  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅  �    >    𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃 , 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴  � 
  𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑅𝑅  �   ≤    𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑐𝑐 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝑃𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1ℎ ,𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝐴𝐴  � 
 
In the above framework business cycles can affect both child’s and parents’ income, 
while changes in attitude towards living apart can affect the young adult’s living 
arrangements through their influence on preferences. The aim of the empirical analysis is 
to assess the degree to which changes in economic determinants affect the probability of 
young child residing at home (and the transitions in and out of the home) over time.   
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3.3. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
 Many previous researchers have empirically analyzed the contribution of labor 
market conditions and housing costs to explaining the long run rise in young adult’s 
living with their parents. In summarizing the previous research in the economic literature, 
I categorize studies into early and recent research based on whether the time period of 
analysis in the study covered the 2007-2009 recession. I make this distinction for two 
reasons. First, the range of analytical methods employed in the earlier studies highlight 
key issues that researchers need to be mindful of when specifying their empirical model. 
Second, the findings in the earlier studies regarding the effect of economic conditions on 
long run trends in living arrangement are mixed, with some finding statistically 
significant but not economically meaningful effects of economic conditions. Recent 
studies, on the other hand, tend to find a significant and economically substantial 
influence of economic conditions on the long run changes in living arrangements of 
young people.10 
3.3.1. EARLY RESEARCH (PRE-2007 DATA) 
The early studies vary along multiple dimensions, as summarized in Tables 3.1 A 
and B. Three key differences among these studies are: one, the extent to which observed 
changes in the labor markets and housing/rental markets are identified through exogenous 
variation; two, the extent to which personal and parental controls are included in the 
                                                          
10 One reason for this divergence is that the time period of analysis in the earlier studies is 
restricted to the mid-1990s or early 2000’s, before the recent sharp decline in independent living 
of young people that began in 2005. In his descriptive work, Matsudaira (2015) illustrates that the 
rise in the tendency for young people to live at home began between 1970 and 1980, after which 
it rose substantially between 1980 and 1990, and fell slightly in the 1990s.  
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model specification; and three, the extent to which the researcher tries to distinguish 
between influences exerted at a point in time (static analysis) relative to transitions in 
living arrangements over time (dynamic analysis). 
Relying on a comparative perspective, Card and Lemieux (2000) contribute to the 
literature by identifying age and gender specific regional labor market conditions as an 
important source of exogenous variation to estimate the degree to which parent-child 
coresidence, employment, and school enrollment rates co-varied within the U.S. and 
Canada over time. 11  They use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from the 
U.S., and the Census and Survey of Consumer Finance data from Canada to concentrate 
on the period 1971-94. They perform reduced form group-level analysis of living 
arrangements using two key region and gender specific exogenous variables: the 
employment-population ratios of 25 to 45-year-olds, and the average wage of 16 to 24-
year-olds.12 A limitation of the employment/ population measure used is that it is unclear 
whether the change in the employment-population rate of 25 to 45-year-olds reflects the 
economic conditions faced by the young person or their parent. This limitation applies to 
all studies using aggregate labor market variables (either for all ages or ages other than 
the age-group directly being studied). For both young men and women, Card and 
Lemieux find a stronger response in parent-child coresidence to improvements in labor 
                                                          
11 Card and Lemieux note that they rely on regional variation in the labor market instead of using 
state variation because the broader classification greatly increases the number of observations for 
young people in each age group. They illustrate that the labor markets in the U.S. and Canada 
differ across regions, and during periods of national or secular shocks, these markets vary in the 
time and strength at which they are affected, as well as in their path of recovery. 
12 They interpret the youth wage as exogenous to supply side factors noting previous research on 
youth labor markets that views youth employment as being determined on the demand side. 
Youth refers to young people below age 25. 
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market conditions for Canada—which had experienced a prolonged recession in the 
1990s—than for the U.S. In results that foreshadow the findings from other studies, they 
are unable to explain differences in living arrangements between the two countries for the 
1971-1991 period, but are able to fully attribute the relatively higher degree of parent-
child coresidence that occurred in Canada between 1991 and 1994 to its relatively poor 
labor market conditions in the 1990s. 
Within their empirical setup, Card and Lemieux are unable to control for changes 
in housing costs or factors indicating young people’s preference for living at home that 
may vary over time. Yelowitz (2007) uses U.S. census individual level data from 1980 to 
2000, and makes two contributions to the literature. First, he emphasizes the influence of 
the cost of housing, and second, he controls for some personal characteristics and 
accounts for other alternative living arrangements available to young adults. Specifically, 
he focuses on the changes in housing and rental costs as a possible explanation for the 
decline in independent living among young people.13 He employs within-MSA variation 
in housing and rental costs to isolate their impact on the probability of a young adult 
living with a parent. He finds that higher housing prices raise the likelihood that young 
people live with their parents or in an economic arrangement where they share their 
living arrangements, while higher rents lower the likelihood of living with parents, but 
raise the likelihood of sharing housing with others.14 But, Yelowitz does not find housing 
                                                          
13 Yelowitz uses two other measures of economic conditions in an MSA: time to commute, and 
the average wage of child care workers. But due to the lack of high quality data on these two 
measures, he places less emphasis on the findings for these two variables. 
14 Yelowitz notes that the effect of rental costs on shared housing would not be apparent in an 
analysis which does not separately consider the differential effect of rental costs on the route out 
of the parental home. 
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costs or labor market conditions (as assessed by the aggregate state level unemployment 
rate) to be economically meaningful in explaining the trend towards living with parents 
between 1980 and 2000. 
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-79 and NLSY-97), Hill 
and Holzer (2007) move the literature forward by probing the extent to which changes in 
the labor market and a rich set of personal and parental characteristics explain the trends 
in young adult’s living arrangements for two cohorts of youth aged 20 to 22 in 1984 and 
2002 respectively. They harness the detailed information provided in the NLSY to assess 
the influence of personal attitudes and behaviors that reflect the youths’ relative level of 
maturity, and expectations about future labor market success. They report two main 
findings. First, the long run decline in labor market opportunities for less-skilled young 
workers cannot explain the trends in living arrangements, which vary little by gender, 
race, or education. They do not address the potential endogeneity of their key labor 
supply measures and caution that these findings are not causal. Second, at a given point 
in time personal attitudes and behaviors that reflect maturity and independence of the 
young individual can explain later living arrangements, but these attitudes cannot explain 
the change in living arrangements over time. This latter finding emphasizes the need to 
appropriately control for underlying attitudes in static models used to analyze living 
arrangements, a point that is supported by Kaplan (2012).  
Kaplan (2012) exploits the high frequency and longitudinal nature of the NLSY97 
data to assert the relative importance of changes in labor market conditions in explaining 
the variance in living arrangements of young people at a point in time (static analysis) 
versus transitions over time (dynamic analysis). He is able to use the NLSY97 data at a 
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monthly frequency because of a special set of retrospective questions about monthly 
coresidence that were asked only between 1998 and 2002. For this time interval, Kaplan 
follows a group of young men age 17 to 23 who do not go to college to estimate reduced 
form and structural models.15 In the reduced form analysis, he relies on both static and 
dynamic methods to study the link between an individual’s potentially endogenous 
contemporaneous earnings, employment status, and living arrangements. To some extent, 
he controls for the correlation between current labor supply measures and unobserved 
preference for living away from parents by using fixed effects (static) model. Kaplan’s 
structural model estimates yield two main insights. First, he finds that preference shocks 
explain the majority of differences in living arrangements at a point in time. Second, 
labor market shocks experienced by the individual influence the timing of when they 
leave or return to the parental home; labor market shocks end up explaining the majority 
of the transitions in living arrangements. These two findings stress the importance of a 
dynamic model in examining the association between labor market changes and 
transitions in living arrangements.  
3.3.2. RECENT RESEARCH (INCLUDING POST-2007 DATA)  
Recent research, summarized in Tables 3.2 A and B, encompasses three studies 
that add data from the recent recession in their consideration of the significance of labor 
market changes in accounting for the long run rise in young adult’s residing at home. 
                                                          
15 Kaplan does not study the coresidence behavior of young women, citing their eligibility for 
benefits as possibly influencing their decision regarding living with or apart from parents. 
Because the monthly coresidence questions which Kaplan uses to construct his high frequency 
dataset were discontinued in 2002, the data restrict his ability to study individuals outside the age 
range 17-23. Specifically, Kaplan is unable to study the coresidence changes for young people 
who attend college.  
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Kaplan (2012) is part of both the earlier and recent research because he performs two 
separate sets of analysis. The first set of estimates is based on NLSY-97 data from 1998 
to 2002, while the second set of estimates is based on CPS data from 1979 to 2010. His 
estimates from the CPS data allow him to observe changes in living arrangements that 
took place in the 2000s, particularly during the recent recession, so I include these 
findings in this section. Kaplan uses the CPS data to perform a group-level analysis using 
within state variation in age-group specific employment-population ratios and hours of 
work to assess the impact on young adults living arrangements. This analysis allows him 
to address the endogeneity problem posed by his use of young adults’ personal 
employment status in the NLSY data, and to extend his findings to a broader age range. 
Unlike previous researchers, Kaplan’s key labor market variables directly pertain to 
young people, but he does not separately control for the effect of labor market conditions 
for parents. Moreover, because of the nature of his analysis, he does not assess the effect 
of preferences on living arrangements. He finds significant and meaningful effects of 
labor market conditions on parent-child coresidence rates.  
Matsudaira (2015) applies Card and Lemieux (2000)’s identification strategy to 
individual level data from the U.S. Census and ACS, covering a lengthy time period from 
1960 to 2011. The two key variables capturing labor market conditions are the state level 
employment-population ratios of 35 to 44-year-olds and the state level average wages for 
19 to 34-year-olds. Matsudaira finds that economic conditions exert a strong influence on 
young peoples’ living arrangements, and they alone can explain 70 to 80 percent of the 
rise in coresidence experienced by young men. For women, however, he finds that 
economic conditions explain a smaller proportion of the changes, as living arrangements 
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of women are slightly less sensitive to employment rates than those of young men. 
Similar to Hill and Holzer (2007), he confirms the absence of a strong relationship 
between education level and the extent to which economic conditions impact living 
arrangements. As mentioned earlier a limitation of the employment-population ratios of 
35 to 44-year-olds is that it is unclear whether it reflects the labor markets conditions 
faced by the young person or the parents. Another concern with Matsudaira’s analysis, is 
that he is unable to adequately address the problem posed by the joint determination of 
living arrangements, school enrollment, and marital status.16  
Addressing the problem from the perspective of changes in household formation, 
Lee and Painter (2013) employ PSID data to study the effect of economic and housing 
market conditions on household formation and housing tenure during the period 1975-
2009. A key variable in Lee and Painter’s analysis is a categorical measure of whether a 
particular year is a recession year. This measure allows them to focus on the additional 
effect of recessionary periods due to uncertainty regarding future job opportunities as 
distinct from that implied by the current unemployment rate.17 They also estimate 
dynamic models that study the effect of changes in economic conditions on the decision 
to leave or return home. The findings from their static and dynamic analysis reveal that 
the effect of economic conditions on young peoples’ household formation during the 
recent 2007-2009 recession is much stronger than that observed during previous 
                                                          
16 Matsudaira resolves this problem by assessing the sensitivity of his findings to different 
specifications of the model with and without controls for school enrollment and marital status. 
17 They classify a year as recession year, based on the dates released by National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER).  
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recessions.18 Further exploratory analysis through simulations suggests that recessions 
affect independent living of young people primarily by influencing their demand for 
rental housing. 
As Lee and Painter’s (2013) analysis is closest to my work, I summarize four 
main concerns with their analysis which I attempt to address in my work. First, because 
of their focus on housing markets Lee and Painter do not closely model labor market 
conditions of young people. They do approximate these by including an aggregate 
measure of unemployment rate and a potentially endogenous employment status variable. 
Second, like Matsudaira (2015), they include controls for potentially endogenous school 
enrollment status. In their work Lee and Painter do not address the endogeneity problem 
posed by either the personal employment or school enrollment decisions. Third, the static 
analysis controls for a large set of observed personal and parental characteristics, but does 
not control for unobserved persistent attitudes or tastes. Fourth, the dynamic models rely 
on data that is measured at infrequent annual or biennial intervals, which possibly clouds 
the true relationship between economic conditions and living arrangements of young 
people.  
I limit my empirical analysis to changes observed in living arrangements of young 
people ages 20 to 29 during 1996-2013. I also focus on whether the relatively poor labor 
market conditions of 2008-13 provide stronger evidence of their influence on young 
peoples’ living arrangements (after accounting for factors affecting individual 
                                                          
18 Lee and Painter define household formation as a young individual’s decision to form a 
household independent of their parents. In their static model, they further consider whether the 
young individual forms a separate household via owning or renting. 
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preferences). This time window allows me to examine changes in living arrangements 
during two recessions, and in particular observe changes that took place during the recent 
recession and the subsequent slow recovery. I perform the analysis with high frequency 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).   
Unlike previous researchers, my key variable for assessing the effect of labor 
market conditions on living arrangements is the age-group, education, and gender 
specific unemployment rate (or alternatively the employment-population ratio) in the 
young person’s state of residence. Given the disparity in the labor market opportunities 
faced by young workers based on their educational attainment, I incorporate this 
additional source of variation in the unemployment rate measure. Importantly by focusing 
on the unemployment rate that specifically applies to the age-group of the affected young 
person, I am also able to separately control for the effect of labor market conditions for 
their parents. To relate back to earlier research, I also consider the effect that the level of 
aggregation has on the findings. Finally, I use dynamic models in an attempt to 
disentangle how changing economic conditions affect the rate of leaving relative to 
returning home. In both the static and dynamic models I address the problem of joint 
determination of schooling and marital status by conditioning on the young person’s 
enrollment and marital status at the time they are first observed in the sample.19 
                                                          
19 Matsudaira (2015) notes the bias that may arise in estimates of economics determinants of 
living arrangements when conditioning on marital or school enrollment status, if economic 
conditions affect the likelihood of marriage and enrollment differently for different types of 
individuals. This may be an important concern for his analysis, as he considers the effect of 
economic conditions on living arrangements over a period of fifty years, during which marriage 
and enrollment rates changed substantially.  
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3.4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS  
3.4.1. DATA  
I perform the empirical analysis by using data from the Survey of Income 
Program and Participation (SIPP).20 The data are from the four most recent panels, which 
cover years 1996 to 2013. Details are summarized in Table 3.3. Each panel interviews a 
set of new households who are followed for a period of 3 to 5 years; the longitudinal 
nature of the SIPP panels allows me to observe the same individuals over multiple 
years.21 The SIPP has a rotating panel design in which panel members are randomly 
assigned to one of the four rotation groups. Each month members of one of the rotating 
groups are interviewed. The survey oversamples households from areas with a high 
concentration of poverty.22 Previous researchers have relied on CPS and Census data to 
analyze changes in living arrangements as they allow researchers to examine changes 
over long periods of time and include very large sample sizes. Because of its longitudinal 
nature, however, the SIPP is better suited for my analysis. The panel dataset enables me 
                                                          
20 Other researchers have used the SIPP in the past to study changes in living arrangements. 
Avery et al. (1992) use the SIPP 1984 panel to study the influence of parental and young adults’ 
income on the route taken out of the parents’ home. Recently Wiemers (2014) analyzed the 
change in living arrangements of young people in response to personal unemployment with SIPP 
data. Her work, however, examines changes in living arrangements of young people through 
doubling up with others, a much broader group than my work which studies changes in living 
arrangements of young people that occur primarily through coresidence with parents.  
21 I can follow an individual as long as he stays within the age range of the sample and does not 
leave the sample due to attrition.   
22 Due to Census budget cuts the sample for the 2004 panel was cut in half at the end of the eighth 
wave (reference period June 2006-December 2007). After the eighth wave fifty percent of the 
sample was dropped and not interviewed in subsequent months. The data for waves 1 through 8 
were collected for the full sample. Moreover, due to the government shutdown in October 2013 
members of rotation group 2 in the SIPP panel 2008 were not interviewed in wave 16.  
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to control for unobserved preferences of individuals in the static analysis, and pursue my 
aim to understand the effect of economic conditions on transitions in living arrangements.  
Three datasets - the Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP), Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY) - are longitudinal surveys that can be used to study transitions in young peoples’ 
living arrangements over time. In comparison to the PSID and NLSY, the SIPP has both 
strengths and weaknesses. The main advantage in using the SIPP data is its high 
frequency data collection process. Individuals in the SIPP are interviewed every four 
months; they are asked detailed questions regarding their demographic information, labor 
force activity, and living arrangements in each of the previous four months. Since the 
mid-1980s, however, there has been evidence documenting the presence of “seam bias” 
in  SIPP.23 This refers to the tendency for transitions or reported changes in status to be 
higher “between reference periods” than “within a reference period.”24 Lemaître (1992) 
notes that seam bias appears to be a general problem of longitudinal surveys, regardless 
of differences in design and in length of the reference period. 25 I address the seam bias 
present in the SIPP by adopting an approach used by Grogger (2004) and Ham and 
                                                          
23 Burkhead and Coder (1985). 
24 Moore (2008) reports that changes measured across the “seam” between two successive 
reference periods can exceed changes estimated with a single reference period by a factor of 10 or 
more. He also notes that beginning with the 2004 SIPP panel the Census Bureau in an attempt to 
significantly reduce the amount of seam bias adopted a more focused and extensive use of 
dependent interviewing (DI) procedures which use substantial answers from previous interviews 
to tailor the wording and routing of questions. He observes the use of such procedures 
substantially lowered the seam bias in 2004 panel relative to previous panels, but that it still 
continues to be a problem for the SIPP. 
25 Ham et al. (2014) note that seam effects have been documented for various surveys in many 
North American and European countries such as: the SIPP, the CPS, the National Longitudinal 
Survey, the PSID, the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, and the British 
Household Panel Survey.  
 189 
Shore-Sheppard (2005). I use data from the fourth reference month (the month directly 
preceding the interview month) as it is likely to have the least seam bias, and drop the 
observations from all other months. As Kaplan (2012) highlights, these high frequency 
data are valuable in closely linking changes in economic conditions to young peoples’ 
movement in and out of the parental home.26  In contrast, individuals in the NLSY and 
the PSID were initially interviewed annually, but in recent years are being interviewed 
biannually.27 
The main weaknesses in using the SIPP relative to the PSID and the NLSY are its 
inability to incorporate parental characteristics of individuals who are away from home, 
its shorter panel length, and the unavailability of detailed personal background and 
parental wealth information.28 Both PSID and NLSY contain family information for the 
young person’s parents regardless of their current living arrangement. In the SIPP, 
however, I can obtain parental information only when a young person is observed living 
with either parent. I attempt to address this issue to some extent in the static analysis 
through the use of fixed effects which control for unobserved persistent influence of 
                                                          
26  In the empirical analysis, I use data from the fourth reference month (the month directly 
preceding the interview month) as it is likely to have the least recall bias.  
27 The NLSY-79 consists of young adults born between 1957-64 (ages 14-22 in 1979). During the 
period that most of these youth are between ages 20 and 29 the NLSY-79 interviews were 
conducted annually (they became biennial in 1994). While the NLSY-97 consists of young adults 
born between 1980 and 1984 (ages 12-17 in 1997). During the period that most of these youth are 
between ages 20 and 29 the NLSY-97 interviews were also conducted annually (beginning in the 
year 2013 the NLSY-97 interviews became biennial). The monthly coresidence questions used by 
Kaplan (2012) were only asked in NLSY97 between 1998 and 2002. The PSID, on the other 
hand, conducted annual interviews between 1975 and 1997 and biennial interviews from 1999 
onwards. 
28 The SIPP contains detailed information on assets for parents who live with their children in its 
topical wave modules which are administered at annual intervals in a panel. The data on assets 
are available in the following topical modules of the SIPP: Assets, Liabilities, and Eligibility. I do 
not include these variables because of the infrequency of the topical modules and the associated 
decrease in sample size. 
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parental characteristics on the young adult’s living arrangements, but am unable to 
control for any parental characteristics in the analysis of young adults’ transition to 
returning home. Another difference is the treatment of young adults enrolled in college 
and living in dormitories; SIPP and NLSY treat such young adults as members of their 
parents’ household, while they are classified as living apart from parents in the PSID. 
I primarily restrict my analysis to SIPP panels 1996-2008, as with the 1996 panel 
the SIPP underwent a major redesign that introduced important changes to improve the 
quality of the estimates. First, the redesign substantially increased the sample size and the 
length of the SIPP panels. Second, the overlapping panel structure of earlier SIPP panels 
was abandoned. Third, a computer assisted interviewing procedure was introduced which 
permitted automatic checks. As a result, the imputation procedure was adapted to rely on 
historical information reported in prior waves. Fourth, specifically for my purpose, 
beginning with the 1996 panel the SIPP data provided two sets of variables that allow me 
to separately identify the young adult’s mother and father, while the earlier panels 
included a single identifier for primary parent. Moreover, after the redesign I can also 
identify the type of parent-child relationship (biological, adopted, or stepchild). The 
advantage of these new sets of variables is that for each young adult I can identify the 
living arrangement status by linking him or her to either or both parents and use detailed 
information on family structure in the dynamic model for leaving home.29 Using data 
                                                          
29 There are two other advantages for using data from panels 1996 onwards. First, the earlier 
panels did not provide separate information for nine U.S. states, where following the redesign 
data was unavailable for only five U.S. states. Moreover, I use CPS data to estimate the labor 
market measures, and a major redesign of the CPS was also implemented in 1994 to improve the 
precision of labor force estimates.  
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from SIPP panels following the redesign will allow for compatibility among the post 
1996 panels. 
3.4.2. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS  
To better understand the long run trends in living arrangements and appreciate the 
recent pronounced changes in these trends, I present some descriptive results using the 
SIPP panels from 1985 to 2008, covering the extended period 1984 to 2013. For the 
graphical analysis I include only young people ages 20 to 29 who are not enrolled in 
school at the time they are first observed in the sample.30 I classify young people as 
living away from their parents’ home if they reside in a household which does not include 
either parent (or in-laws), and living with a parent if they reside with at least one parent 
(or in-law) in a household that is not headed by them or their spouse.31  
I begin with Figure 3.1, which describes the evolution in living arrangements of 
young men and women respectively over the SIPP panels.32 The graphical analysis 
supports trends in living arrangements observed by other researchers. First, similar to 
                                                          
30 I exclude individuals who serve in the armed forces. In the SIPP, only individuals who are 
primary sample members (those present at the time of the first interview of a household) are 
followed, so the sample for this analysis is restricted to primary sample members. Sample 
members can enroll in school at a later date.  
31 Parents are defined as biological/natural, step, or adoptive. A relatively small percentage of 
parents reside with their child in a household where the head of the household is the child, I 
exclude such individuals from the analysis. In the empirical analysis I consider individuals 
regardless of their marital status, but I restrict the sample for the regression analysis to individuals 
who are single at the time they are first observed in the sample. Because of the presence of 
married individuals in the sample, for the graphical analysis I add the possibility of a young 
person living at the in-laws’ home (this accounts for about 6 percent of young people living at 
home and does not vary much over time).                                                                                                                       
32 I summarize the changes in living arrangements by SIPP panel and not calendar year because 
over time the percentage of young adults living with and away from parents may vary for two 
reasons: the natural ageing of the young individuals in the panel and the underlying trends in 
living arrangements.    
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most researchers I find throughout the span of my analysis women are more likely to live 
away from home than men. Second, both men and women display similar trends in their 
living arrangements; the percentage of young adults living away from home declines 
smoothly at a relatively slow pace between the 1985 and 1996 panels, after which it 
declines sharply between the 2004 and 2008 panels. This finding concurs with that of 
Bitler and Hoynes (2015) who using the CPS document a decline in independent living 
among young adults that began in 2005. 
To illuminate these findings, I consider the changes in the flows to and from home. 
In Figure 3.2, I categorize the movements into those returning home and those leaving 
home. Here, I observe important differences in the return and leave behavior of young 
adults. Throughout the analysis women are more likely to leave home than men, but the 
trends in leaving home are similar for both men and women, suggesting that similar 
factors are affecting their leaving home behavior. There was a sharp decline in the 
percentage of men and women leaving home between the 1996 and 2001 panels which 
stabilized in later panels. I observe a much smaller percentage of young adults returning 
home, moreover, there is no discernable difference in return behavior of men and women. 
There is a slight decline in the percentage of young adults returning home between the 
2001 and 2004 panels but it levels off in later panels. A surprising aspect of these 
findings is the lack of change in the pattern of young adults returning home during the 
recent recession. In Figure 3.1 I observe a greater proportion of young adults living with 
their parents during the 2008 panel relative to the 2004 panel, but I do not observe any 
noticeable change in the rate of returning or leaving parental home between the two 
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panels. The suggestion is that much of the increase in the proportion of young individuals 
living with their parents occurred prior to the beginning of the 2008 SIPP panel. 
For individuals at risk of leaving home, I also consider the changes in the route 
taken out of the parental home. Women are more likely to leave home via marriage than 
men; between the 1985 and 1996 panels I observe a decline in the percentage of young 
adults who leave home for marriage. In the regression analysis, however, I do not 
separately analyze the route taken out of the parental home, because in the last four SIPP 
panels I do not detect much change in the patterns for the route taken out of the home. 
Among both sets of individuals, those returning and those leaving home, I notice a 
majority of individuals make such moves within the same state, with only a small fraction 
of the moves involving a state change. Therefore, in the regression analysis I examine the 
behavior of individuals who do not change their state of residence when they make the 
move to or from home. 
Card and Lemieux (2000) find that young people adapt to changing economic 
circumstances by modifying their labor supply, living arrangements, and schooling 
decisions. In the SIPP, young people residing with a parent are considered to be a 
member of their household even if they leave home to live in a college dormitory. A 
change in the young person’s enrollment status may, thus, prolong his or her stay at 
home. In Table 3.4, I probe how the enrollment status of young people in the SIPP 
changes with time in the four most recent panels; I separate the analysis for young adults 
at risk of leaving home and returning home. Unlike the sample for the graphical analysis, 
I study the trends in school enrollment by restricting the sample to young adults 20 to 29 
who are single at the time they are first observed in the sample. The first row indicates 
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the percentage of young adults who are enrolled in school at the time they are initially 
observed in the sample (in the regression analysis I exclude these individuals). The 
second row indicates the percentage of young adults who were initially unenrolled, but 
changed their enrollment status at a later date. I observe that a higher percentage of young 
adults living at home are enrolled in school relative to those away from home. In both the 
sample at risk of leaving and returning home, women are more likely to be enrolled in 
school than men. Between the 2004 and 2008 panels I notice a slight increase in the 
percentage of young adults enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in the 
sample. The increase in enrollment is more pronounced among both men and women 
who were initially unenrolled.33 This finding provides suggestive evidence that young 
people adapt to poor economic conditions by changing their enrollment behavior. 
3.5. EMPIRICAL METHODS 
3.5.1. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.5.1.1. STATIC MODEL SPECIFICATION  
My aim is to estimate the effect of changing labor market conditions and cost of 
housing on living arrangements of young people while controlling for the effect of 
various factors that may influence young peoples’ preference for living at home. The 
regression estimates are estimated for individuals aged 20 to 29, who are not enrolled in 
school and are single at the time they first enter the sample.34 I estimate static models at 
                                                          
33 Among young adults previously unenrolled in school, I observe a fall in the percentage who re-
enroll between 1996 and 2001 panels.  
34 The sample includes only those young individuals who are primary SIPP sample members, that 
is they were present at the time of the first interview wave in the SIPP panel, because only 
primary sample members are followed.  
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different levels of aggregation. To consider the importance of this choice to the results, in 
reporting the findings from regression models the initial set of estimates pertain to the 
aggregated analysis. My preferred specification, however, makes use of the large 
individual level data available in the SIPP to estimate disaggregated models. My 
preferred specification includes an individual specific effect; the linear fixed-effect 
specification can be written: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜃𝜃1 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝜃𝜃2 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜃𝜃3 ln (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)+  𝜃𝜃4 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜃𝜃5 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜂𝜂𝑎𝑎 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 +  𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 +  𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where i indexes individual and t indexes time. Yist is a dummy variable equal to one for a 
young person living with their parents’, and zero otherwise, and Xist is the state level 
average per capita personal income. 
The theoretical framework outlined earlier signifies the role of three factors in 
determining the effect of economic conditions on a young adult’s living arrangements: 
young adult’s income, parents’ income, and cost of housing. Previous studies have 
approximated labor market conditions of young adults using state or region level 
employment-population ratios for older age groups (as in Matsudaira (2015) and Card 
and Lemieux (2000)), or the employment-population ratios of directly affected young 
adults whose living arrangement behavior is being studied (as in Kaplan (2012)). Both 
these approaches are unable to separately account for the influence of business cycles on 
parents’ resources. I attempt to address this concern by utilizing two variables to 
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separately identify the effect of exogenous changes in labor market conditions on young 
adults and their parents.35  
Card and Lemieux (2000) document the varying trends in labor market 
opportunities faced by young adults based on their gender and age, and the increasing 
economic hardship faced by less-skilled young adults. Their work emphasizes the 
different dimensions along which economic opportunities of young people vary. Unlike 
previous researchers, I attempt to incorporate these different sources of variations into my 
key measure of labor market conditions faced by young adults. Using CPS data, I 
estimate average age-group, education, and gender specific employment-population ratio 
and unemployment rate for young adults in each state over time. Such rich sources of 
variation allow me to more closely approximate local labor market conditions 
experienced by subgroups of individuals within the same state. I also estimate state 
specific average unemployment rates for prime-age adults (35 to 60-year-olds) which I 
interpret as representing labor market conditions for parents of young adults. Details 
regarding the estimation of the labor market measures for young adults and their parents 
are described in Appendix C.1. With these two variables I am able to separately account 
for the effect of business cycles on the contemporaneous resources of both young adults 
and their parents. In the state panel analysis, I use aggregated versions of these two 
variables; details are described in Appendix C.2.  
                                                          
35 Another possible way to address this concern is to use variation in industry-specific 
unemployment rates that may result from a recession as suggested by Bartik (2013), but this 
approach can be applied only for college educated young adults. 
 197 
Previous researchers assessed the effect of housing costs by using median house 
prices and/or rental data. Yelowitz (2007) and Lee and Painter (2013) include both 
measures, while Matsudaira (2015), Haurin et al. (1993), and Whittington and Peters 
(1996) include only a measure for rental costs. Lee and Painter (2013) note the absence of 
any guidance in the previous literature regarding whether economic conditions primarily 
affect young adults’ demand for owner occupied or rental housing. They reason that as 
younger households are more likely to rent before owning their house, they expect a 
stronger effect on living arrangements from the cost of rental housing. Based on the same 
reasoning, I control for the effect of the cost of housing by including a measure of rental 
costs faced by young adults. In particular, I use the annual state level fair market rent for 
a two-bedroom apartment as my measure for rental costs.36 The annual fair market rents 
are published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); 
details are provided in Appendix C.3.  
Card and Lemieux (2000) also note the possibility of utilizing minimum wages to 
instrument for young peoples’ average wage across states, though they do not pursue this 
strategy themselves. A higher minimum wage can lead to disemployment effects among 
young adults, and may thus induce them to live with their parents.37 It is also possible, 
however, that higher minimum wages increase the resources available to young adults, 
(especially if the disemployment effect is negligible), and these individuals will be less 
                                                          
36 Other researchers have also relied on the fair market rents as a measure of cost of housing. For 
instance, in his empirical analysis Yelowitz (2007) approximates rental costs by using MSA level 
fair market rents, and Lee and Painter (2013) use two sources of rental data, that derived from 
census and annual ACS data and MSA level fair market rents.  
37 There is a voluminous literature assessing the disemployment effects of minimum wages; see 
Brown et al. (1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a review.  
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likely to reside with parents. In my work I control for the possible effect of minimum 
wages on living arrangements, as no other researchers have used this measure before.38 A 
concern in using minimum wages is the inclusion of young adults between ages 25 and 
29; minimum wages may be more relevant for 20 to 24-year-olds than for those above 25. 
I address this concern by estimating separate models by age group.  
I also include a few additional controls. It is possible that state level rental costs 
are correlated with state level average income, so I include a measure for state level 
average per capita personal income provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). Also, I control for the effect of age of young adults by including age dummies. 
The main advantage of using individual level data is my ability to control for unobserved 
time persistent attributes and preferences specific to young people and their parents so as 
to effectively account for the influence these factors exert on young peoples’ living 
arrangements. I also include time dummies to capture the effect of unobserved changes in 
business cycle, rental market conditions or societal attitudes that are common to all states. 
I allow for the possibility of heterogeneous trends across states in living arrangements of 
young people that are not correlated with changes in labor market, rental costs, and 
minimum wages by using state specific linear trends.39 Angrist and Pischke (2015) 
                                                          
38 The state level minimum wages are taken from the data compiled by the Urban Institute and 
Brookings Institution’s Tax Policy Center and available at 
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-minimum-wage-rates-1983-2014). At any given 
point in time the minimum wage in the state refers to the effective minimum wage in the state on 
January 1st of that year.  
39 Researchers studying the employment effects of minimum wages have debated the 
specification of controls for spatial heterogeneity. Neumark et al. (2014) question the inclusion of 
linear state specific trends in analyzing sample periods with a recession at endpoints; they find 
linear state specific trends to be too restrictive in capturing the variation in employment across 
states that is brought about by recessions and suggest the inclusion of higher order polynomial 
trends. Addressing concerns raised by Neumark et al., Addison et al. (2015) evaluate the 
sensitivity of their own prior work to allowing for higher order polynomial time trends and 
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observe that after controlling for state specific linear trends in employment and/or living 
arrangements the identification of the effect of economic conditions comes from stark 
changes in living arrangements relative to the smoothly evolving trends that differ by 
states. 
3.5.1.2. DYNAMIC MODEL SPECIFICATION  
As described earlier I also separately analyze young adults’ decisions to return 
and leave home. I carry out both these analyses using a hazard model framework. Here, I 
focus on describing the specification for the hazard of leaving home because I am able to 
include parent specific demographic and socioeconomic characteristics only for 
individuals who are observed living at their parents’ home. The specification of the return 
hazard model is analogous to that of the leaving home hazard without parent specific 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Any young person of age 20 to 29 who 
is residing in parents’ household at the time when he or she first enters the sample is at 
risk of leaving home. The discrete-time home leaving hazard at any age is the probability 
of leaving at that age conditional on not having already left.40 The hazard of leaving 
                                                          
extending their sample period. They find small employment effects of minimum wages, and 
considerable sensitivity of estimated minimum wage effects in response to the specification of 
polynomial trends and the sample period used for analysis. Since, my sample period does not 
include recessions at the end points, I present my initial set of regression estimates with linear 
state specific trends.  
40 An individual either continues living with parents or leaves through any of the possible routes 
out of the home. Different destinations considered in the previous literature: leaving home to – 
live in small or large groups, marriage, independent living alone or with a cohabiting partner or 
roommates, independent living as a homeowner, independent living as a renter. I have performed 
descriptive analysis of the various routes out of the parental home (in results that I do not show) I 
find that the majority of moves out of the home are not through marriage but through the “other” 
route for which I do not have enough information in my data to categorize further. Moreover, 
there is not much change in the pattern for these two routes over the two decades I examine, so I 
do not distinguish between the various paths taken out of the home. 
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home at a particular age depends on various explanatory variables that make living at 
home more or less appealing than staying away from home, I discuss these variables in 
detail below. The discrete-time hazard of leaving home hit for an individual i at any age t 
(in the interval (t-1, t]) 
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = Pr(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 | 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 = 0  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = Pr(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∈ (𝑤𝑤 − 1, 𝑤𝑤] |  𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 > 𝑤𝑤 − 1, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) 
where T is the random variable denoting the age at which an individual leaves home, and 
xit,  yi are a set of time varying and time constant explanatory variables respectively that 
affect the hazard rate. Following Allison (1982), I use a logit model to specify the 
dependence between the leaving home hazard and the explanatory variables. 
log � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾′𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  
αt  is a set of constants (age dummies) denoting the non-parametric baseline hazard; this 
specification allows the hazard to vary by age while holding other explanatory variables 
constant.  The initial specification is: 
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 log � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)�=  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃1 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝜃𝜃2 𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝜃𝜃3 ln (𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈 𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜃𝜃4 ln(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +  𝜃𝜃5 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝜃𝜃6 𝑌𝑌𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤′𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃+  𝜃𝜃7 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃′𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃                                             +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 +  𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where Xist controls for the effect of average per capital personal income. I also include 
variables that control for the effect of young person’s gender, race, and educational 
attainment on the hazard of leaving home, but am unable to control for unobserved tastes 
and preferences of the young person that may be correlated with other variables and 
which may make him or her more likely to live with parents.  
In the sample of individuals initially observed to be living at their parents’ home, I 
am able to control for some parent specific attributes that may affect the young person’s 
hazard of leaving home. Previous research by sociologists and demographers indicates 
the importance of many parent level characteristics that can affect young peoples’ home 
leaving behavior. From that list I am able to control for the following: parents’ level of 
education41, whether both natural parents are still married and at home, parents’ age, 
                                                          
41 I use years of education completed by a parent if one parent is present, and average years of 
education if both parents are present. The SIPP data, like the CPS, provides categorical 
information on highest degree received or grade completed and not the actual years of education 
completed. Jaegar (1997) proposes three different ways to linearize responses from the 
categorical measure of education provided in the CPS. I use the average years of education 
imputed values provided in his third “assigned” measure which addresses the overestimation of 
average imputed values relative to observed values in his two other proposed measures.  
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whether parents own their home, and number of household members in the parental 
home. Parents’ education can be used to control for permanent components of parental 
income, or quality of education received by the young adult. Aquilino (1990) emphasizes 
the importance of family structure, so I include a categorical variables indicating the 
presence of both natural parents at home. This may capture the level of stability at home, 
or the amount of supervision in a two parent household. Since, parents are less likely to 
face borrowing constraints they may be less responsive to changes in their current 
income; following Ermisch (1999) I control for parents’ housing tenure as a rough 
measure of their wealth. Moreover, the benefit of living at home may depend on the 
amount of available space, which may in turn be affected by the number of household 
members, so, I include a control for the number of household members as well. However, 
Haurin et al. (1993) note that interpretation of some of these variables is not clear, as they 
can pick up other unobserved effects that are correlated with the variable and the young 
adult’s decision to live at the parents’ home. 
3.5.2. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Table 3.5 presents, summary statistics from the data used. In the sample to which I 
apply static models, forty percent of young adults are observed living with parents during 
1996-2013. A larger fraction of sample members are men, white, and those with a high 
school degree or less.42 The age-group, education, and gender specific unemployment 
rate of young adults is twice as high as their parents and displays a much broader range 
over which it varies. I also summarize the aggregated version of the unemployment rates 
                                                          
42 The estimation sample includes individuals who are not currently enrolled in school and single 
at the time they first enter the SIPP sample. 
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for young adults and their parents that is used in the aggregate level analysis; these 
aggregated measures display considerably less variation. For the dynamic model of 
leaving home, I show summary information for parental characteristics. Average 
education of both parents is about eleven years, young adults living with parents are 
equally likely to be at home if both biological parents are married or not, and about 
seventy-five percent of parents own their home. The hazard of leaving home is about four 
times as high as that of returning home; the lower likelihood of young adults returning 
home was also evident in the descriptive analysis. 
3.5.3. METHOD OF ESTIMATION  
3.5.3.1. STATIC MODEL  
I estimate the static model using panel data fixed-effects estimation method 
because it allows me to control for time invariant unobserved individual specific tastes 
for work that may be correlated with other explanatory variables. To check the sensitivity 
of the findings to the functional form specifying the relationship between the dependent 
and the explanatory variables, I also estimate conditional logit model of Chamberlain 
(1980). An advantage of the linear fixed-effects model relative to the conditional logit is 
that it provides reasonable estimates of the average partial effects. Wooldridge (2010) 
notes that we cannot estimate the average partial effects in the conditional logit model 
without specifying a distribution for unobserved tastes.43  
                                                          
43 Wooldridge (2010) observes that for the linear fixed effects model we need to make inference 
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Therefore, I cluster the standard errors by state. 
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3.5.3.2. DYNAMIC MODEL  
I estimate the discrete-time hazard model for leaving home using maximum 
likelihood. Following Jenkins (1995) I arrange the data for all individuals initially 
observed to be living at home and at risk of leaving home into person wave observations 
representing the time at risk. I assume a flexible non-parametric specification for the 
baseline hazard, and treat the time varying variables as constant within each discrete-time 
interval. 
 Suppressing the conditioning on covariates, the log likelihood function as derived 
by Jenkins for a stock sample of n individuals is as follows: 
log 𝐿𝐿 =  ��𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . log  � ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)� +  �� log( 1 − ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝜏𝜏+𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=𝜏𝜏
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
𝜏𝜏+𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=𝜏𝜏
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
where τ represents the age at which an individual i  was selected into the sample for 
leaving home and first became at risk of leaving.44 si represents number of waves in the 
sample for each individual. For individuals who are observed leaving the parental home 
in the survey (uncensored), τ + si represents the SIPP wave at the time the individual is 
first observed living apart from parents. Those individuals who have not left home at the 
time of the last interview wave of the SIPP survey, or who have not left home at the time 
they attrit from the survey are viewed as censored, because their age at the time of 
leaving home is not known. For censored individuals, τ + si  represents their last wave of 
                                                          
44 τ may differ by individuals for two reasons. First, only individuals who are 20 to 29 years of 
age are included in the estimation sample, so we will observe a different τ for younger individuals 
as they attain age 20 at different points and enter the sample. Second, individuals falling in this 
age range may enter the actual SIPP survey sample at different waves. 
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observation in the survey. yit represents the living at home status of the individual; the 
last observation of an individual who has left the parental home in the sample 
(uncensored) is set to yit = 1 (if t = τ + si). All other observations (other than the last 
observation) of uncensored individuals have yit = 0, and it is also set to zero for all 
observations of censored individuals.    
3.6. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
With my regression analysis, I aim to explore four main concerns raised by 
previous studies. First, unlike previous researchers I assess the influence of business 
cycles on young adults and their parents by including two separate measures of local 
labor market conditions faced by each of them. Second, Hill and Holzer (2007) and 
Kaplan (2012) emphasize the need to control for underlying behaviors and attributes 
specific to young adults that influence their decision regarding whether to live with their 
parents; this concern is particularly important in static models where a great deal of the 
variation in living arrangements originates from cross sectional differences in 
preferences. To address this concern, in the static analysis I estimate separate models at 
varying levels of aggregation. This allows me to examine the sensitivity of the findings to 
different degrees of variation in labor market conditions and inclusion of personal 
characteristics.45 Third, as stressed by Kaplan (2012) changes in labor market conditions 
are more likely to affect movement of young adults into and out of the parental home, 
hence, a dynamic analysis may yield stronger evidence for the effect of economic 
                                                          
45 A similar approach was taken by Navratil and Doyle (1977). Their analysis, however, was 
performed in the context of assessing the relative importance of observable personal 
characteristics in understanding migration behavior.  
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conditions on living arrangements. So, I estimate hazard models for young adults’ 
likelihood of leaving or returning home. Finally, given the mixed evidence in previous 
studies regarding the influence of economic conditions on living arrangements, in both 
the static and dynamic models I examine whether local labor market conditions of young 
adults exerted a stronger influence on living arrangements during the period 2008-13, 
when the economy experienced a severe recession and a slow subsequent recovery.  
3.6.1. STATIC MODELS  
3.6.1.1. STATE PANEL ANALYSIS  
I begin by describing the findings from the aggregate state panel analysis presented in 
Table 3.6; this set of estimates pertain to the aggregated analysis. I report these estimates 
to relate my work to earlier research, particularly that of Card and Lemieux (2000) and 
Kaplan (2012) and to consider the effect that the level of aggregation has on the 
findings.46 The reported coefficients are estimates from linear probability models. The 
dependent variable is the fraction of young adults observed staying at their parents’ home 
in each state over time. 47 Like Card and Lemieux (2000), the first column includes a 
control for the prime-age adults unemployment rate as a proxy for local labor market 
conditions, like Kaplan (2012) the second column controls for the aggregate state level 
unemployment rate for young adults aged 20-29, the next two columns contain findings 
from models which use both the aggregate state level unemployment rates for young 
adults aged 20-29 and prime-age adults. The last three columns use the employment-
                                                          
46 Here I am referring to Kaplan’s work with the CPS data. 
47 I am unable to use data for all 50 U.S. states in the regression analysis, because in panels 1996 
and 2001 of the SIPP five smaller states are not separately identified due to confidentiality 
reasons.  
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population ratio of young adults aged 20-29 instead. The second and the third 
specifications allow me to assess the importance of controlling separately for young and 
prime-age adults labor market conditions. I include an interaction term in the fourth 
specification which allows the effect of the unemployment rate of young adults to vary 
during the recent recession. In all seven specifications of the model, I find an 
insignificant effect of local labor market conditions of young adults on their living 
arrangements. I also fail to find any evidence regarding the influence of local labor 
market conditions faced by parents, rental costs, or minimum wages on living 
arrangements.  
The signs of the coefficients for young adults’ local labor market measures are in 
line with predictions of the theoretical model, but the magnitude of the effect is quite 
small. I find young adults are more likely to live with their parents in states where they 
experience an increase in the unemployment rate or a decrease in the employment-
population ratio. At a given point in time 40 percent of young adults are observed living 
at home across different states, so the estimate from the third column indicates a one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate of young adults would increase their 
probability of living with parents by .11 percentage points. The point estimates, however, 
are consistent with unemployment rates exerting a weaker influence on living 
arrangements during the recent recession relative to the earlier years. Although small in 
magnitude, the point estimates suggest that parents’ unemployment rates exert a 
relatively stronger influence in raising the probability of young adults’ living at home. 
Contrary to theoretical predictions, I estimate that a 10 percent increase in fair market 
 208 
rent reduces the likelihood of staying home by 0.3 percentage points, a small effect.48 
The magnitude of the estimate for minimum wages is stronger than that of any other 
economic factor, a 10 percent increase in minimum wages raises the probability of living 
with parents by 1.66 percentage points. But as noted above, these effects are statistically 
insignificant.  
3.6.1.2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS  
 Table 3.7 reports the findings from using individual level data; in this set of 
findings I do not control for individual effects. There are two differences between Tables 
3.6 and 3.7; first, is the use of individual-level data, and, second, is the use of group-
specific unemployment rate and employment-population ratio.49 I find that the group-
specific unemployment rate measure of young adults now is statistically significant, but 
in an unexpected direction. An increase in the unemployment rate for young adults 
lowers their probability of living with parents, but the magnitude of the effect is 
                                                          
48 Ermisch (1999) notes that the effect of housing costs on young adults is sensitive to the price 
elasticity of demand for housing by parents. As I show in the descriptive statistics, in the sample 
for leaving home, approximately 75 percent of parents are homeowners, they are less likely to 
respond toc changes in rental markets.  
49 The estimates presented in Table 3.7 differ from those of Table 3.6 in two ways, one they are 
based on individual level data and two, the group-specific unemployment rate and employment-
population ratio incorporate greater variation than the aggregated unemployment and employment 
measures used in Table 3.6. To compare my results to earlier studies that do not make use of the 
greater variation in unemployment and employment measures, I estimate an intermediate set of 
individual-level models in which I use the aggregate unemployment rate and employment -
population ratio for young adults age 20 to 29 (the same as used in Table 3.6). These results are 
presented in Appendix Table C.1, I observe that relative to Table 3.6 the estimate for the 
unemployment rate measure for young adults 20 to 29 declines in magnitude, it now has a 
negative sign indicating a higher unemployment rate reduces young adults’ probability of living 
with their parents’. I observe the same effect in Table 3.7, but now the estimate for group-specific 
unemployment rate is statistically significant. Taken together the findings from Table 3.7 and 
Appendix Table C.1 suggest that the lack of evidence of a response of living arrangements to 
changes in the labor market conditions of young people is not being driven by my use of 
individual data or greater variation in the measures for local labor market conditions. 
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negligible.  The findings suggest that the higher group-specific unemployment rate 
reduce the likelihood of young adults living with their parents even during the recent 
recession, but the effect is not statistically significant.50 All the other estimated effects are 
statistically insignificant. In the individual level analysis, I also observe that the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients declines such that none of the estimates exerts a 
meaningful effect on living arrangements.  
 I now make use of the longitudinal nature of the SIPP to control for persistent 
unobserved individual and parent specific variables that may affect young adults’ 
preference for living with their parents. The findings are reported in Tables 3.8 A and B; 
Table 3.8 A shows the estimates from the linear probability model with individual fixed 
effects, and Table 3.8 B shows the estimates from the conditional logit model. I find no 
evidence that changes in the group-specific employment-population ratio or the 
unemployment rate influence young adults’ living arrangements. These findings are not 
sensitive to the choice of specification. I do find that poor labor market conditions faced 
by parents have a positive impact on young adults living arrangements, but the strength 
of this evidence is sensitive to the functional form as it is only strong in the conditional 
logit models. I also find a higher probability that young people live with their parents in 
states with higher minimum wages. The effect is statistically significant, but small in 
                                                          
50 I also estimated individual-level fixed effect models that separate the recent recession period 
into two subperiods (2007-09 and 2010-13) and found stronger evidence of a negative effect of 
labor market conditions of young people on their living arrangements for the earlier period (faced 
with poor labor market conditions young people are less likely to live with their parents during 
the 2007-09 period).   
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magnitude—a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage would increase the probability 
of living with parents by only 0.4 percentage points. 
Unlike the earlier study by Card and Lemieux (2000) and recent studies by 
Kaplan (2012), Lee and Painter (2013), and Matsudaira (2015), I find a negligible 
influence of young people’s labor market conditions on their living arrangements. This 
may be due to three reasons. First, I differ from these studies in controlling for persistent 
unobserved individual specific effects, as a result the identification of the effect of 
changes in the labor markets of young adults in my models comes from individuals who 
change their living arrangement status. Second, I differ from previous studies in using 
greater variation in the key measures for local labor market conditions and in controlling 
for the effect of business cycles on parents. Third, I also control for the effect of both the 
state level rents and the minimum wages. The results from Tables 3.6-3.8 and Appendix 
Table C.1, however, indicate that none of these factors are driving the results. I am 
unable to find any effect of local labor market conditions on young adults’ living 
arrangements regardless of the level of aggregation, the degree of variation in the 
unemployment rates or employment-population ratios, the presence of controls for local 
labor market conditions faced by parents, the presence of individual effects, or controls 
for rental market conditions and minimum wages.51 This set of results suggests that the 
findings from the high-frequency SIPP data are not consistent with those of the studies 
                                                          
51 In results that I do not report here, I have estimated models excluding the fair market rents and 
minimum wages. Excluding these variables from the analysis changes the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients for the unemployment rate and employment-population ratio of young 
adults slightly, but the effect is statistically insignificant.  
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listed above.52 The  results from my work instead support the findings of Hill and Holzer 
(2007) who also observe that declining wages and employment opportunities of young 
people over a twenty year period explain very little of their increased tendency to live 
with their parents.  
In Tables 3.9A-B and 3.10A-B , I explore the possibility that subgroups of 
individuals by age or gender may be differently affected.53 The overall evidence from 
these sets of tables is that changes in local labor market conditions of young people do 
not exert a strong influence on their living arrangements. When I analyze the living 
arrangements by age-group and gender separately, I do observe some additional but 
unintuitive results. First, I find weak evidence that an increase in the employment-
population ratio of young adults 20-24 raises their probability of living with their parents 
during the recent recession. Second, there is weak evidence that young adults 25 to 29 
years of age are more responsive to their parents’ measure of the unemployment rate, as it 
exerts a stronger influence on their likelihood of living with their parents than any other 
economic factor. Third, faced with a higher rent, adults aged 25 to 29 with at most a high 
school degree are relatively less likely to live with their parents than those with more than 
a high school degree. The effect is statistically significant. I also find strong evidence that 
higher rents reduce the likelihood of women living with their parents. Fourth, the 
minimum wage effect is larger and statistically significant mostly for men and young 
                                                          
52 To further probe whether the lack of a response in living arrangements to changes in the labor 
market conditions could be due to the oversampling of low income individuals in the SIPP, I 
estimated the individual fixed effects models using weights. The results from the weighted 
analysis are similar to those reported in Table 3.8A (unweighted analysis). 
53 I also, estimated separate models by education where I fail to find any evidence of a differential 
response in living arrangements to labor market conditions. 
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adults 25-29. For men, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage raises the probability 
of living with parents by 1.2 percentage points. The minimum wage literature has 
concentrated on studying the disemployment effects of minimum wages on teenagers and 
adults age 20-24 as a relatively larger fraction of individuals in these groups are likely to 
be affected. My findings, then, are puzzling in that respect. 
To focus on the influence of labor markets on living arrangements during the 
most recent recession and recovery in Table 3.11, I restrict my sample to the years 2008-
13. The data for these years come from the SIPP panel 2008, which started out with a 
much larger sample size relative to the previous panels and covered an extended period of 
five years (the largest and the longest SIPP panel, since the inception of the survey); it 
contains about one third of my entire sample. I find that measures of labor market 
conditions faced by young adults continue to be statistically insignificant, of unexpected 
sign, and quite small in magnitude. I also observe that although the rent variable is 
statistically insignificant, it now has a positive sign. 
In Tables 3.12 A and B, I check the robustness of my findings to two concerns 
that may possibly influence the previous estimates. First, as I explain in Appendix C.3 the 
fair market rent data provided by the HUD contains estimates for annual median rent 
beginning from the year 2001; for the years 1996-2000 only rent estimates at the fortieth 
percentile are provided which I converted to the fiftieth percentile. It is possible that these 
rent adjustments do not accurately measure the same rents in the 1996-2000 period as 
those provided in the rest of the series. Second, it is also possible that the welfare reform 
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of 1996 may have affected the living arrangements of young unmarried women.54 To 
assess the sensitivity of my findings to these two concerns, I exclude data from the 1996 
panel and restrict the data to years 2001 to 2013. As seen from Tables 3.12 A and B, I 
find no evidence that changes in local labor markets for young adults affect their living 
arrangements, even when the sample is restricted to cover the period after 2001.55  
3.6.2. DYNAMIC MODELS  
3.6.2.1. LEAVING HOME  
In my static models I was unable to uncover a response in the living arrangements 
of young people to changes in their labor market conditions. I now rely on the high 
frequency and longitudinal nature of the SIPP data to estimate dynamic models of leaving 
from and returning to parental home to examine whether changes in young peoples’ labor 
market conditions around the time of their move shed more light on the determinants of 
their living arrangements. Tables 3.13 A-B report the findings from the estimation of 
discrete time hazard models for leaving home; the top part of the table contains the 
coefficient estimates, and the bottom contains the marginal effects.56 The smaller number 
                                                          
54 In her analysis of doubling up behavior of young adults during the recent recession, Wiemers 
(2014) uses SIPP data covering a period after 1998 when the welfare reform had been fully 
implemented. 
55 Interestingly, the fair market rents now exert a negligible influence in the linear model 
specifications, and a positive influence in the estimates from the conditional logit models. These 
finding together with those from Tables 3.9-3.11, provide some suggestive evidence that can 
explain the unintuitive results for the effect of higher rental costs on women and less educated 25 
to 29-year-olds. The suggestion is that the negative effect of fair market rents may be driven by 
the effect of welfare reforms on women, particularly women age 25 to 29 with at most a high 
school degree. The direction of the effect is not from rents to living arrangements, but from a 
decline in demand for rental housing driven by young women that may have led to lower rents in 
states where more women chose to live at home. For more details regarding the 1996 welfare 
reform see Appendix C.4.  
56 I estimate the marginal effects using the Stata software package; the marginal effects of 
continuous variable are estimated using the Margins Dydx option. The marginal effect for the 
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of observations relative to the static analysis are for two reasons: one, they reflect that the 
estimation sample consists of only individuals who are residing with parents at the time 
they are first observed and are at risk of leaving home, and two, unlike the static analysis, 
all observations for an individuals after he or she has left home are excluded. The 
dependent variable is a categorical variable that is set to zero in periods in which the 
young adult has not left home, and one in the first wave when a person has left home. I 
find no effect of changes in young adults’ labor market conditions on their hazard for 
leaving home, even during the years 2008-13. I test for the effect of employment-
population ratio in 2008-2013 and find that it is statistically insignificant. The marginal 
effects for the influence of the young adult unemployment rate and employment-
population ratio are almost identical in magnitude, they both represent a negligible 
influence of labor market conditions relative to the mean hazard of leaving home, which 
is 2 percent.57 I do not find any evidence of an effect of the other economic determinants 
on the hazard for leaving home.  
                                                          
group-specific unemployment rate gives the average effect of a unit increase in the 
unemployment rate for young adults on their hazard of leaving home while holding all other 
variables constant. The marginal effect of the 2008-13 dummy interaction term gives the average 
effect of a one-unit increase in the group-specific unemployment rate of young adults on their 
living arrangements in the 2008-13 period relative to that in previous periods. 
57 Two related concerns cloud the interpretation of the findings from the estimation of the home 
leaving hazard. First, the pool of individuals at risk of leaving home includes those who have 
never left home, and those who have some experience living away from home (for reasons other 
than attending college), but returned home prior to their first interview at their time of entry in the 
SIPP sample. I am unable to distinguish between these two types of individuals. As a result, the 
findings from the home leaving hazard only conveys information regarding the change in the rate 
at which young people, who are observed residing with their parents for some length of time 
(regardless of their past experience of independent living), leave home as economic conditions 
change; they do not imply a change in the timing of first exit from parents’ home to independent 
living. Second, Greenwood (1997) notes that studies of migration distinguish between primary 
(those migrating/moving for the first time) and repeat migrants, because the two kinds of 
migrants may differ in their propensity to move, and may, thus, be affected differently by changes 
in their circumstances. I am unable to account for such differences. 
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I further explore how the effect of labor market conditions on the hazard of 
leaving home varies by gender and age-group; the findings are reported in Tables 3.14 
and 3.15. Here, the basic finding is that of a lack of evidence regarding the influence of 
labor market conditions of young adults on their hazard of leaving home. There is also an 
unintuitive result in one specification for the effect of the employment-population ratio 
for both 20 to 24-year-olds and men.58 In the disaggregated analysis by age, I find 
evidence that accords with intuition in that higher rents lower the home leaving hazard 
for 20 to 24-year-olds.  
3.6.2.2. RETURNING HOME  
To illuminate the findings from the dynamic models of home leaving, I 
supplement them with an analysis of the effect of labor market conditions on the hazard 
of returning home, while keeping in mind the relatively fewer returns observed in my 
sample. Tables 3.16 A and B report the findings from estimation of hazard models for 
returning home. Here again, I am unable to uncover any evidence linking changes in the 
labor markets for young people to their hazard of returning home. All the estimated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. 
In Tables 3.17 and 3.18, I consider the hazard for returning home by subgroups. 
In an unexpected finding I observe that higher rents raise the likelihood of more educated 
20 to 24-year-olds and women to returning home relative to those less educated; the 
effect is marginally significant. I also find some evidence that higher minimum wages 
                                                          
58 For men, I also test for the effect of employment-population ratio in 2008-2013 and find that it 
is statistically insignificant.  
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lower the hazard of returning home for 20 to 24-year-olds. The stronger effect of 
minimum wages on 20 to 24-year-olds is in line with the fact that the younger age-group 
is more likely to be directly affected by the minimum wages.  
3.6.3. MIGRATION  
In the analysis thus far, I have restricted my attention to individuals who do not 
change their state of residence; it is possible that I am unable to uncover a response in 
living arrangements of young people to changes in their labor market conditions because 
poor labor markets influence a young person’s decision to migrate across states in search 
of better opportunities. To explore this possibility, I estimate whether a young person’s 
likelihood of changing their state of residence since the last interview is responsive to 
changes in the labor markets in their previous state; the estimates are presented in Table 
3.19. I do not find any effect of local labor market conditions on a young person’s 
likelihood of changing their state of residence. I also re-estimate the likelihood of a 
young adult to leave and return home since last interview while including young people 
who change their state of residence in the sample at risk, the results are reported in Tables 
3.20 and 3.21. Similar to the estimates presented in Table 3.13 and 3.16 where the sample 
at risk does not include young people who change their state of residence, I find that poor 
labor market conditions do not affect the likelihood of leaving or returning home. I 
observe that higher rents raise the likelihood of young people to return home, the effect is 
statistically significant. I also re-estimated static models of living arrangements; the 
estimates are similar to those reported in Table 3.8 (for the linear fixed effects model). To 
summarize, in both the dynamic and static models of living arrangements the estimated 
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influence of labor markets on living arrangements is not affected by the inclusion of 
individuals who change their state of residence.  
3.7. SUMMARY  
Recent studies assessing the importance of labor market changes in determining 
the living arrangements of young adults have found strong evidence indicating young 
adults in depressed labor markets are more likely to live with their parents. These studies 
have employed a variety of methods to uncover the link between labor markets and living 
arrangements. Studies which used pooled cross-sectional data relied on exogenous 
variation in local labor market conditions to identify their effect on living arrangements, 
but these studies could not control for the effect of personal or parental characteristics 
and could not disentangle the effect of changes in the labor markets on the return or leave 
behavior of young adults. Studies which used longitudinal data, on the other hand, used 
endogenous measures such as personal employment status to assess the effect of the labor 
markets on the hazard of returning or leaving home. I use the high-frequency longitudinal 
Survey of Income Program and Participation data to study changes in young adults living 
arrangements in response to changes in their labor market conditions.  
There are three main differences between my work and that of previous 
researchers. First, my key measure for local labor market conditions faced by young 
adults are the age-group, education, and gender specific unemployment rate or the 
employment-population ratio of young adults. This measure encompasses much greater 
variation than those used by other researchers, thus allowing me to more accurately 
capture labor market conditions experiences of young people. Second, unlike previous 
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researchers I am able to separately control for the effect of business cycles on both young 
adults and their parents as living arrangements can be influenced because of a change in 
resources of either young adults or their parents. Third, I complement the work of 
previous researchers by exploring the extent to which findings from static models are 
sensitive to the level of aggregation and the inclusion of controls for unobserved 
individual specific tastes or preferences of young adults for living with their parents. I 
supplement the findings from the static models by considering the influence of changes in 
labor market conditions on the rate of leaving and returning home. But, I find that none of 
these differences are really important to the results. There is no robust influence of 
changes in the labor markets of young individuals on their living arrangements. My 
results indicate that the findings from the high-frequency SIPP data are not consistent 
with those provided by other studies. There is some evidence that higher minimum wages 
lower the hazard of returning home among young adults ages 20 to 24, and that higher 
rents lower the hazard of leaving home among young adults ages 20 to 24.  
As noted by Hill and Holzer (2007), one possible reason for the inability to 
uncover an effect for labor market conditions of young adults on their living 
arrangements is that the measures employed (in my study and theirs’s59) might be 
capturing the effect of transitory changes in labor market opportunities of young adults, 
while it is the more permanent changes that might be affecting living arrangements of 
young adults. Danziger and Ratner (2010) document how changes since the mid-1970s 
have affected the extent to which young adults achieve financial independence. In 
particular, they note the decline in the labor market prospects of less-educated young men 
                                                          
59 Although their measures for labor market conditions are potentially endogenous. 
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who now find it more difficult to earn enough to support a family than they did during the 
mid-1970s. They note a series of labor market changes—computerization and other kinds 
of labor-saving technology that lowered demand for less-educated workers, decline in the 
real minimum wage, decline in importance of unions, and increased globalization—that 
created hardships for workers, particularly men with no more than a high school degree. 
These changes have resulted in young men with no more than a high school degree 
having lower employment rates, lower real wages, and less access to employer-provided 
health insurance and pensions than did similar workers in the mid-1970s. Based on these 
changes in labor markets for young people, Danziger and Ratner argue that without a 
sufficient and steady income, a young adult today might be less likely to live 
independently than in earlier years. But, Hill and Holzer (2007) contend that the 
observance of similar trends over time in living arrangements for young adults across 
education and gender groups casts some doubt on the hypothesis that these trends are 
primarily driven by changes in labor market opportunities, which as Danziger and Ratner 
document have diverged greatly across education and gender groups in the past three 
decades. 
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Table 3.1A Early Research (pre-2007 data) 
 
 
Data
Time-period 
covered 
(frequency)
Main outcome of interest Method Economic variables
Card and 
Lemieux 
(2000)
U.S.                      
March Current 
Population 
Survey (CPS)                                
aaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaa                                                                                                    
Canada                 
Census and 
Survey of 
C  
Data for years 
1971,1981,1991, 
1994
Proportion of youth in a 
given age group who are:                                             
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaa) employed                             
aaab) living with parents1                     
aaaaac) enrolled in school
Grouped linear 
probability model 
with region and 
time fixed effects
1) Region and gender specific 
aaemployment population ratio 
aaof 25-45 year olds                                  
2) Region and gender specific 
aaindex of wages for 16-24 
aayear olds
Yelowitz 
(2007)
Census Descriptive 
analysis           
1970 - 2000                 
Regression 
analysis                    
1980 - 2000
Whether the young adult 
lives in one of the following 
arrangements:                               
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa                     
aaaaa) non-independent                              
aaaab) economic   
aaaaaaarrangement           
aaaac) independent
Separate probit 
model for each 
living arrangement 
with MSA and 
time fixed effects 
1)  MSA level Housing Market 
aaaConditions:                                 
aaaa) Median housing prices aa                                                
aaab) Monthly housing payments                                           
aaac) Median rent (FMR)                                                              
2)  State level unemployment        
a a rate                                             
Hill and 
Holzer 
(2007)
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 
(NLSY79 and 
97) 
1979 and 1997 
cohorts of 
NLSY observed 
in years:                                  
1984 and 2002
Whether the young adult 
lives in one of the following 
arrangements:                                          
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa  
aaaaa) at home with 
aaaaaaparents             
aaaab) married                                            
aaaac) cohabiting with a 
aaaaaapartner
Linear probability 
model with cohort 
fixed effects
1) Current hours worked by               
aaindividual                                           
2) Hourly wage of the individual  
3) Hours worked by individual in 
hi high school.
Findings
In areas with depressed local 
demand conditions, young men 
are more likely to live with  
parents and also, more likely to 
attend school.
Long term declines in labor 
market opportunities for less 
educated young wrokers 
cannot account for much of 
the growing tendency of young 
adults to live at home.           
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
Suggestive evidence that 
personal attitudes and 
behaviors that reflect 
independence and maturity are 
associated with later living 
arrangements, but not with 
changes over time.
Higher housing costs reduce 
independent living, but they 
explain little of the aggregate 
change in young people's living 
arrangements over time.                                         
aaaaaaa                                          
Higher housing costs can 
explain about 15 percent of the 
total change in independent 
living arrangements between 
1980 and 2000. 
1 Card and Lemieux's definition of living with parents is broader than that used in most of the parent-child coresidence literature. For the U.S. data they define 
young adults' to be living with a parent if they live with one or both parents or a related family member (uncle, aunt, or grandparents).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Table 3.1B Early Research (pre-2007 data) 
 
 
Data
Time-period 
covered 
(frequency)
Main outcome of 
interest Method Economic variables
Kaplan 
(2012)
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of 
Youth 
(NLSY97) 
1998 - 2002               
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaa 
Monthly data          
created from 
annual 
interviews
Whether individual lives 
away from either 
parent 
1) Logit                                
2) Conditional-
logit 
1) Monthly employment 
status ofaindividual                                    
2) Monthly earnings of the 
aaindividual
Kaplan 
(2012)
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey of 
Youth 
(NLSY97) 
1998 - 2002               
aaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaaa 
Monthly data          
created from 
annual 
interviews
1) moving back with 
aaaeither parent             
aaa(Return home)      
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa                                
2)  moving out again                                                 
aaa(Leave home  
aaaconditional on a  a a    
aaahaving returned)
Discrete-time 
proportional 
hazard model 
with random 
effects
1) Monthly employment 
status of aaindividual                                     
2) Monthly earnings of 
individual                              
3) Whether individual 
recently stopped working
Findings
A youth who has recently 
stopped working (transition 
from employment to 
nonemployment in 
previous three months) is 
more likely to return home 
than a similar youth who 
has not undergone such a 
transition.                                          
aaa            aaaaaa                              
For employed youth, 
reductions in earnings also 
raise the probability of 
returning home.
Employed young adults are 
more likely to live away 
from parents, and among 
employed youth, those 
with higher earnings are 
more likely to live away.                                      
aaaaaaaaaaa                                
The fixed-effects 
estimates are not 
statistically significant, but 
Dynamic Analysis
Static Analysis
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Table 3.2A Recent Research (including post 2007-data) 
 
 
 
 
Data
Time-period 
covered (frequency)
Age-range                   
(sample 
included)
Main outcome of 
interest Method Economic variables
Curent 
Population 
Survey (CPS)
1979 - 2010                     
(monthly and 
quarterly)
Men and 
women pooled 
analysis by age 
groups:                   
16 - 24                              
16 - 34
Parent-child 
coresidence rate in each 
state
State-panel                  
fixed-effects
1) Age-group specific state 
aaEmployment rate                                                                         
2) Age-group specific state level 
aaaverage hours worked1                  
3) State level housing price index
Matsudaira           
(2015)
Census and 
American 
Community 
Survey (ACS)
1960 - 2011                
(Decennial Census: 
1960-2000 and 
annual ACS 2001-
11)
3 age groups 
separate for 
men and 
women:                            
19 - 24                                       
25 - 29                                         
30 - 34 
Whether individual lives 
with either parent
Linear probability 
model with state 
and time fixed-
effects
1) State level employment 
aapopulation ratio of 35-44 year 
aaolds                                                 
2) Estimate of state levelawages 
aafor 19-34 year olds                                       
3) State level average rental costs 
1 Kaplan also controls for a set of two year lagged labor market variables to allow for the possibility of lagged effects on living arrangements. 
Findings
A one percentage point increase in 
employment rate increases the 
coresidence rate by 0.15 to 0.18 of a 
percentage point. 
Areas with lower employment rates, 
lower wage rates, and higher housing 
costs are associated with larger 
increases in the fraction of young 
adults living at home.           aa 
aaaaaaaaaa                                    
For men, economic factors alone can 
explain 70 to 80 percent of the total 
change in living arrangements from 
1970 to 2011, and for women 
economic conditions can explain 50 to 
60 percent of the total changes. 
Kaplan            
(2012)
Static Analysis
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Table 3.2B Recent Research (including post 2007-data) 
 
 
Data
Time-period 
covered (frequency)
Age-range                   
(sample 
included)
Main outcome of 
interest Method Economic variables
Multinomial Logit       
(MNL)           
Lee and 
Painter    
(2013)
Panel Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
(PSID)
1975 - 2009                      
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
annual interviews 
1975-97                   
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
abiennial interviews 
1999-2009
Men and 
women pooled 
and separate 
analysis as well:                                       
18 - 34
Decision to                                               
a) form an independent 
aahousehold                                 
b) retun to parent's
home
Proportional
hazard model
1) Employment status of individual     
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa                            
2) Economic Conditions:                 
a) Dummy for NBER recession 
aayear                                            
b) State unemployment rate                
c) State average real wages  
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa                 
3) Housing Market Conditions:        
a) State median gross rent                 
b) State median house value            
Higher real wages increase the 
likelihood of independent living. 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
Recessions, and higher state level 
unemployment rate lower the 
likelihood of independent living.           
Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
Higher rents delay household 
formation while housing prices have 
an insginificant effect.
Findings
Find that recessions lowered 
household formation rates, which in 
turn, depressed housing demand, 
particularly in the rental sector.                               
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
Household formation rates are 
reduced by up to 22 percentage points 
when young adults are not employed, 
and by up to 19 percentage points 
during a recession.
Panel Study of 
Income 
Dynamics 
(PSID)
Lee and 
Painter    
(2013)
1975 - 2009                      
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aannual interviews 
1975-97                   
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
abiennial interviews 
1999-2009
Men and 
women pooled 
and separate 
analysis as well:                                       
18 - 34
1) Employment status of individual              
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa     aaaaaa      
2) Economic Conditions:                 
a) Dummy for NBER recession 
aayear                                               
b) State unemployment rate            
c) State average real wages         
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa            
3) Housing Market Conditions:        
a) State median gross rent                       
b) State median house value            
a) individual continues 
to live aawith parent                                        
b) individual forms a 
separate aahousehold as
a renter                                            
c) individual forms a 
separate aahousehold as 
a homeowner
Dynamic Analysis
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Panel Date of First 
Interview
Date of Last 
Interview Data Available for Reference Period
Number of 
Waves
Length of Panel 
(years)
1996 Apr. 1996 Mar. 2000 Dec. 1995  -  Feb. 2000 12 4
2001 Feb. 2001 Jan. 2004 Oct. 2000  -  Dec. 2003 9 3
2004 Feb. 2004 Jan. 2008 Oct. 2003  -  Dec. 2007 12 4
2008 Sep. 2008 Aug. 2013 May 2008  -  Nov. 2013 16 5
Table 3.3 Survey of Income Program and Participation (SIPP) Panel Details
Note: Date of first interview refers to the date of interview for rotation group 1 which was the first group to be interviewed, while 
the date of last interview refers to the date of interview for rotation group 4 which was the last group to be interviewed. The data is 
available for four months preceding the date of each interview. Length of the panel refers to the number of years that members of a 
specific rotation group were interviewed.
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Table 3.4 Young Men and Women's School Enrollment 
 
 
 
1996              
Dec 95 - Feb 00
2001                    
Oct 00 - Dec 03
2004                            
Oct 03 - Dec 07
2008                              
May 08 - Nov 13 
Men  (%)
Enrolled in school at the time when first 
interviewed in sampleb                                                
37.96                             
( 1135 / 2990 )
38.47                            
( 896 / 2329 )
39                     
( 1126 / 2887 )
41.1                         
( 1468 / 3572 )
Enrolled in school after first interviewc               
(among those previously unenrolled)
25.55                             
( 474 / 1855 )
20.45                            
( 293 / 1433 )
19.31                    
( 340 / 1761 )
27.38                          
( 576 / 2104 )
Women  (%)
Enrolled in school at the time when first 
interviewed in sample                                               
49.44                         
( 1198 / 2423 )
49.87                    
( 966 / 1937 )
49.61                        
( 1201 / 2421 )
52.61                         
( 1607 / 3081 )
Enrolled in school after first interview               
(among those previously unenrolled)
34.04                 
( 417 / 1225 )
29.35                   
( 285 / 971 ) 
25.9                        
( 316 / 1220 )
33.51                        
( 494 / 1474 )
Enrolled in school at the time when first 
interviewed in sample                                                
16.71                       
( 372 / 2226 )
20.67                          
( 491 / 2375 )
18.46                       
( 458 / 2481 )
19.67                      
( 512 / 2603 )
Enrolled in school after first interview               
(among those previously unenrolled)
13.75                      
( 255 / 1854 )
8.97                          
(169 / 1884 )
8.5                      
( 172 / 2023 )
12.29                      
( 257 /2091 )
Women  (%)
Enrolled in school at the time when first 
interviewed in sample                                               
20.81                         
( 521 / 2504)
24.5                    
( 618 / 2522 )
24.09                        
( 693 / 2877 )
25.03                        
( 696 / 2781 )
Enrolled in school after first interview               
(among those previously unenrolled)
18.20                        
( 361 / 1983 )
14.23                  
( 271 / 1904 )
13.92                         
( 304 / 2184 )
17.94                        
( 374 / 2085 )
Sample of Young Adults Living Away from Parents and at Risk of Returning Home                                                                      
Men  (%)
Sample of Young Adults Living with Parents and at Risk of Leaving Homea   
Note: For each category listed in a row, I provide the percentage of individuals who satisfy that category, and list the number of individuals who 
satisfy the condition relative to the total in the parentheses.                                                                                                                                                
The initial sample consists of all individuals ages 20 to 29 who are single at the time when they first enter the SIPP sample. I exclude individuals 
who serve in the armed forces. In the SIPP, only individuals who are primary sample members (those present at the time of the first interview of 
a household) are followed, so the sample for this analysis is restricted to primary sample members.                                                                                                                                  
I declare a person as living away from his parent's home in any four-month interval during which he does not live with either parent, and as living 
at his parents home if he is observed to live with either of his parents' in a household not headed by him.                                                                                                                                         
a  The sample at risk of leaving home consists of all single young adults living with parents at the time of their first interview in sample and the 
sample at risk of returning home consists of all single adults living away from parents at the time of their first interview in sample.                                                         
b Indicates the percentage of young adults enrolled in school at the time of their first interview.                                                                                        
c Indicates the percentage of young  adults who enrolled anytime after they are first observed in sample (given that they were unenrolled at the 
time of first interview).                                                                                                                                                                                         
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Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Fraction living with parents 0.4
Hazard of leaving home at any given wave 0.02                              (0.15)
Hazard of returning home at any given wave 0.005                                      (0.76)
Static Model
Personal characteristics                   
of young adults Age of young person (years)
24.09                          
(3.08) 20 29.92
Women 0.45 0 1
High school or less 0.58 0 1
Black 0.17 0 1
American Indian or Asian 0.07 0 1
Economic variables Individual Level Analysis
Group-specific unemployment rate for young adults 0.1 0 0.56
Group-specific employment-population ratio for young 
adults 0.72 0.19 1
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.05 0.01 0.14
State Panel Analysis
Unemployment rate for ages 20 to 29 0.09 0.01 0.22
Employment population-ratio for ages 20 to 29 0.72 0.52 0.86
Minimum wagea ($)
7.19                               
(0.78) 5.79 9.28
Monthly median rent ($) 944.77                          (225.93) 582.46 1758.41
Number of individuals 37,318
Number of observations 193,996
Dynamic Model
Age of parent (years)b
50.71                         
(6.8) 35.08 85.33
Education (years) 11.96                               (3.06) 0 18
Both natural parents married to each other 0.5 0 1
Ownership of home 0.75 0 1
Number of members in household 4.23                              (1.7) 1.22 22
Number of individuals 10,757
a  All dollar values are are adjusted for inflation using CPI-U and expressed in 2013 dollars.                                                                                                                              
b The mean and standard deviation for time varying variables are calculated by first averaging over all the observations 
available for each individual (person wave information).                                                                                                                         
Mean             
(Standard 
deviation)
Minimum Maximum
Parental characteristics 
affecting hazard of           
leaving home
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Table 3.6 Estimates from State Panel Analysis of Living Arrangements 
 
 
 
Linear Probability Model 
Unemployment rate for ages 20 to 29 0.160 0.113 0.184
(0.256) (0.235) (0.296)
2008-2013 dummy * unemployment rate for ages 20 to 29 -0.145
(0.393)
Employment-population ratio for ages 20 to 29 -0.237 -0.221 -0.220
(0.142) (0.144) (0.191)
2008-2013 dummy * employment-population ratio for ages 20 to 29 -0.005
(0.310)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.469 0.416 0.426 0.396 0.395
(0.585) (0.553) (0.547) (0.593) (0.587)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.026 -0.014 -0.030 -0.033 -0.017 -0.034 -0.034
(0.073) (0.068) (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.072) (0.072)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.166 0.161 0.166 0.164 0.162 0.166 0.166
(0.147) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147) (0.144) (0.146) (0.147)
Observations 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254 2,254
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Young Adults Living with Parents 
Note: All specifications inlude controls for average per capita income by state, average age of young adults in state, state and SIPP wave dummies, and 
linear state trends. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus 
on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Covariates (3) (4) (6) (7)(2) (5)(1)
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Table 3.7 Estimates from Individual-Level Analysis of Living Arrangements (Without Individual Fixed Effects) 
 
Linear Probability Model 
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.076** -0.076** -0.134**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.056)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 0.093
(0.077)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.022 0.022 0.039
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.053
(0.039)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults -0.067 0.001 -0.046 -0.049 0.102
(0.215) (0.217) (0.205) (0.224) (0.285)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.022 0.025 0.027
(0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.056 0.059 0.059 0.065
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
p-Value: joint test for no effect of state-specific trend terms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
(6) (7)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, race, gender, educational attainment, age-year, quarter, and state 
dummies, and linear state trends.  The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in 
sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(3) (4)(2) (5)
 
Covariates (1)
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Table 3.8A Estimates from Individual Level Analysis of Living Arrangements (With Individual Fixed Effects) Linear FE 
 
Dependent Variable:  Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.016 -0.018 -0.015 -0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.006
(0.031)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.020
(0.022)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.120 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.122 0.122 0.122
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.100) (0.100)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.075 -0.070 -0.075 -0.080 -0.075 -0.071 -0.075 -0.080 -0.075
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.044* 0.043* 0.044* 0.062** 0.044* 0.043* 0.044* 0.062** 0.044*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.036 -0.036
(0.028) (0.028)
p-Value: joint test for no effect of state-specific trend terms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 
who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their 
living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(2) (6)Covariates
Linear Fixed Effects
(3) (5) (7) (9)(4) (8)
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
(1)
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Table 3.8B Estimates from Individual Level Analysis of Living Arrangements (With Individual Fixed Effects) Conditional Logit 
 
Dependent Variable:  Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.290 -0.349 -0.218 -0.291
(0.436) (0.438) (0.451) (0.545)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.115
(1.030)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.066 0.091 0.007 -0.140
(0.421) (0.420) (0.414) (0.401)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.552
(0.744)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 6.588* 6.746** 6.644* 6.742** 6.622* 6.546* 6.646**
(3.415) (3.411) (3.400) (3.404) (3.380) (3.369) (3.376)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -1.981 -1.741 -1.974 -2.266 -1.972 -1.752 -1.983 -2.271 -1.976
(1.505) (1.483) (1.500) (1.559) (1.502) (1.489) (1.506) (1.564) (1.508)
0.405* 0.405*
(0.231) (0.230)
Minimum wage (in logs) 1.970** 1.929* 1.968** 2.702*** 1.967** 1.933* 1.971** 2.706*** 1.967**
(0.991) (1.002) (0.990) (0.993) (0.990) (0.998) (0.987) (0.993) (0.988)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -1.433* -1.440*
(0.799) (0.791)
p-Value: joint test for no effect of state-specific trend terms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586 25,586
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
(7) (8) (9)(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 
who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their 
living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conditional Logit
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Covariates (1)
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Table 3.9A Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements: Ages 20-24 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.014 -0.011 -0.402 -0.402
(0.022) (0.028) (0.589) (0.595)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.012 -0.222
(0.036) (1.019)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.005 -0.016 0.017 -0.494
(0.019) (0.024) (0.477) (0.556)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.057* 1.564*
(0.029) (0.811)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.091 0.091 0.086 0.085 3.301 3.502 3.064 3.221
(0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (5.054) (5.007) (5.038) (4.998)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.062 -0.047 -0.063 -0.047 -2.324 -1.710 -2.345 -1.649
(0.075) -0.07 (0.075) (0.070) (1.919) (1.753) (1.930) (1.764)
0.022 0.022 0.698* 0.701**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.359) (0.356)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.051 0.002 0.052 0.001 1.934* 0.437 1.955* 0.407
(0.041) (0.034) (0.041) (0.034) (1.118) (1.131) (1.116) (1.135)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.077* -0.078* -2.411** -2.437**
(0.045) (0.045) (1.229) (1.223)
Observations 94,553 94,553 94,553 94,553 13,154 13,154 13,154 13,154
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
Model
Covariates
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Linear Fixed Effects Conditional Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ages 20-24
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year dummies, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes young 
adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when 
they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9B Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements: Ages 25-29 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate 0.008 0.007 1.209 0.941
(0.015) (0.026) (0.814) (1.273)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.009 -0.370
(0.043) (2.075)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.017 0.018 0.253 0.290
(0.013) (0.017) (0.653) (0.818)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.010 0.911
(0.031) (1.749)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.145 0.148 0.154 0.157 6.512 6.765 6.872 7.296
(0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (5.641) (5.680) (5.635) (5.741)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.093 -0.105 -0.093 -0.104 -4.790* -5.229** -4.770* -5.255**
(0.062) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) (2.485) (2.533) (2.486) (2.531)
-0.028** -0.028** -0.993** -0.991**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.458) (0.454)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.029 0.067** 0.029 0.068** 4.660*** 5.751*** 4.667*** 5.787***
(0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (1.524) (1.362) (1.509) (1.361)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) 0.089** 0.090** 2.856* 2.897*
(0.041) (0.041) (1.627) (1.610)
Observations 99,443 99,443 99,443 99,443 8,606 8,606 8,606 8,606
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 45 45 45 45
Model Linear Fixed Effects Conditional Logit
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year dummies, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes 
young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of 
residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Ages 25-29
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
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Table 3.10A Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements by Gender: Men 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.019 -0.003 -0.522 0.013
(0.024) (0.030) (0.716) (0.741)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.020 -1.015
(0.034) (1.101)
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.001 -0.014 -0.038 -0.517
(0.018) (0.022) (0.534) (0.537)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.031 1.372
(0.032) (1.115)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.038 0.033 0.030 0.028 3.296 3.327 3.109 3.211
(0.117) (0.116) (0.114) (0.113) (3.546) (3.544) (3.473) (3.462)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.034 -0.023 -0.035 -0.023 0.265 0.800 0.247 0.828
(0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.064) (1.914) (1.801) (1.916) (1.812)
0.020 0.020 0.601 0.605
(0.013) (0.013) (0.374) (0.373)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.146*** 0.108** 0.146*** 0.108** 4.761*** 3.596*** 4.770*** 3.581***
(0.051) (0.044) (0.051) (0.044) (1.677) (1.388) (1.676) (1.385)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.065 -0.066 -2.017 -2.047
(0.047) (0.047) (1.299) (1.293)
Observations 105,522 105,522 105,522 105,522 13,339 13,339 13,339 13,339
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 
who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their 
living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
Model Linear Fixed Effects Conditional Logit
Men
(2) (3) (4)Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
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Table 3.10B Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements by Gender: Women 
 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.014 -0.024 -0.568 -0.846
(0.020) (0.024) (0.587) (0.751)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.002 0.020
(0.048) (1.543)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.001 0.003 0.222 0.283
(0.016) (0.018) (0.506) (0.537)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.021 0.418
(0.041) (1.241)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.228 0.233 0.222 0.226 9.421* 9.675* 9.170* 9.456*
(0.162) (0.163) (0.160) (0.161) (5.163) (5.244) (5.087) (5.170)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.137** -0.136** -0.138** -0.137** -5.342*** -5.122** -5.355*** -5.147**
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (2.058) (2.012) (2.067) (2.023)
0.002 0.002 0.328 0.326
(0.013) (0.013) (0.398) (0.401)
Minimum wage (in logs) -0.023 -0.029 -0.023 -0.029 0.781 0.224 0.785 0.228
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (1.272) (1.323) (1.271) (1.326)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.013 -0.013 -1.239 -1.239
(0.046) (0.046) (1.387) (1.385)
Observations 88,474 88,474 88,474 88,474 12,214 12,214 12,214 12,214
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Linear Fixed Effects Conditional Logit
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 
who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their 
living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Women
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
Model
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Table 3.11 Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements: 2008 – 2013 
 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.017 -0.014 -0.356 -0.278
(0.022) (0.020) (0.724) (0.704)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.012 0.010 0.210 0.155
(0.019) (0.017) (0.667) (0.644)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.081 0.082 0.079 0.081 2.481 2.427 2.441 2.394
(0.096) (0.096) (0.095) (0.096) (3.372) (3.384) (3.378) (3.388)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.100 0.086 0.098 0.085 4.633 4.412 4.605 4.387
(0.075) (0.079) (0.075) (0.079) (2.950) (3.023) (2.950) (3.022)
0.025 0.026 0.422 0.427
(0.023) (0.022) (0.815) (0.811)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.043 0.089 0.043 0.090 0.284 1.069 0.303 1.096
(0.061) (0.076) (0.061) (0.076) (3.015) (3.611) (3.007) (3.595)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.086 -0.087 -1.430 -1.449
(0.075) (0.075) (2.690) (2.673)
Observations 65,033 65,033 65,033 65,033 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 45 45 45 45
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent in 
state (in logs)
Linear Fixed Effects Conditional Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year dummies, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The analysis includes 
young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence 
when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Covariates
Model
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents+C4:O31
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Table 3.12A Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements: 2001-2013 (Linear FE) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.013 -0.014 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.022
(0.032)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.006 0.006 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.020
(0.022)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.034 0.034 0.035
(0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.008 -0.015 -0.007 -0.008 -0.015 -0.008
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
0.014 0.015
(0.011) (0.011)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.032 0.056** 0.032 0.032 0.057** 0.032
(0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.048 -0.049
(0.037) (0.037)
Observations 145,994 145,994 145,994 145,994 145,994 145,994
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46
(4) (5) (6)
Linear Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
Covariates
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The 
analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on 
individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12B Estimates from Individual Fixed Effects Analysis of Living Arrangements: 2001-2013 (Conditional Logit) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.089 -0.035 0.269
(0.503) (0.504) (0.661)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.583
(1.032)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.032 -0.011 -0.277
(0.445) (0.433) (0.463)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.582
(0.744)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 2.707 2.660 2.698 2.679 2.642 2.733
(2.764) (2.781) (2.756) (2.757) (2.775) (2.736)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.275 0.025 0.288 0.274 0.025 0.283
(1.428) (1.494) (1.429) (1.433) (1.498) (1.434)
0.356 0.356
(0.289) (0.287)
Minimum wage (in logs) 1.963** 2.561** 1.958** 1.963** 2.563** 1.959**
(0.962) (1.054) (0.962) (0.960) (1.056) (0.963)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -1.225 -1.229
(0.980) (0.967)
Observations 18,564 18,564 18,564 18,564 18,564 18,564
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46
(5) (6)Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. The 
analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample. I focus on 
individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Conditional Logit
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents
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Table 3.13A Dynamic Model:  Discrete Time Hazard for Leaving Home (Coefficient Estimates) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate 0.582 0.615 1.362
(0.820) (0.827) (1.159)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -1.634
(1.423)
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.587 -0.598 -0.986*
(0.542) (0.547) (0.595)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 1.531**
(0.709)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 2.013 1.915 2.068 2.075 1.993 2.391
(5.671) (5.681) (5.683) (5.682) (5.683) (5.703)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -1.498 -1.402 -1.497 -1.483 -1.384 -1.443
(1.140) (1.144) (1.148) (1.144) (1.147) (1.159)
-0.293 -0.300
(0.455) (0.448)
Minimum wage (in logs) -0.211 0.129 -0.170 -0.221 0.113 -0.219
(0.900) (0.873) (0.908) (0.902) (0.870) (0.923)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.688 -0.678
(0.870) (0.860)
Observations 35,774 35,774 35,774 35,774 35,774 35,774
Number of clusters 44 44 44 44 44 44
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimates
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Left Home
Covariates
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year dummies for young adult, quarter, state, and panel 
dummies, and linear state trends. Controls for young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy. I also include the following 
lagged parental controls: average education of parents, average age of parents, whether both biological parents were present, home 
ownership status of parents and number of household members.                                                                                                                                                                                               
The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living with parents at the time they are first observed in 
sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.13B Dynamic Model:  Discrete Time Hazard for Leaving Home (Marginal Effects) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate 0.01 0.01 0.03
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -0.03
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.03
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
-0.006 -0.006
Minimum wage (in logs) -0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.004
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.01 -0.01
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Left Home
Specification
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year dummies for young adult, quarter, state, and panel 
dummies, and linear state trends. Controls for young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy. I also include the following 
lagged parental controls: average education of parents, average age of parents, whether both biological parents were present, home 
ownership status of parents and number of household members.                                                                                                                                                                                               
The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living with parents at the time they are first observed in 
sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Marginal Effects
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
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Table 3.14 Dynamic Model: Estimates of Hazard for Leaving Home: By Age-Group 
 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate 0.449 0.367 0.833 2.012
(1.009) (1.277) (1.812) (2.682)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 0.039 -2.077
(1.561) (3.264)
Group-specific employment-population ratio -1.575** -1.639** -0.097 -0.435
(0.742) (0.827) (1.138) (1.299)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.425 1.373
(0.994) (1.322)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 3.687 3.807 2.803 3.064 -4.742 -4.615 -4.528 -4.068
(7.833) (7.682) (7.844) (7.814) (10.034) (10.151) (9.978) (10.157)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -4.393** -4.256** -4.280** -4.093** 2.105 1.969 2.132 2.029
(1.865) (1.728) (1.868) (1.725) (2.538) (2.468) (2.551) (2.488)
0.227 0.260 -0.897 -0.918
(0.591) (0.581) (0.715) (0.720)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.482 -0.063 0.484 -0.116 -0.041 -0.086 -0.084 -0.116
(1.440) (1.391) (1.409) (1.382) (1.237) (1.251) (1.234) (1.251)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.838 -0.915 -0.295 -0.223
(0.933) (0.932) (1.704) (1.673)
Observations 21,211 21,211 21,211 21,211 13,231 13,231 13,231 13,231
Number of clusters 43 43 43 43 40 40 40 40
Refer to notes for Table 3.13
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Ages 20-24
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Left Home
Covariates
Ages 25-29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 3.15 Dynamic Model: Estimates of Hazard for Leaving Home: By Gender 
 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.215 0.514 1.378 2.191
(1.168) (1.640) (1.364) (1.766)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate -1.479 -1.512
(2.267) (1.650)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.046 -0.447 -0.853 -1.672*
(1.112) (1.168) (0.809) (0.941)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 1.422 2.249**
(1.398) (1.022)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 2.516 2.918 2.395 2.939 2.827 2.778 3.333 3.645
(10.732) (10.782) (10.808) (10.924) (8.273) (8.268) (8.200) (8.209)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) -1.541 -1.666 -1.548 -1.631 -1.388 -1.495 -1.339 -1.346
(1.611) (1.630) (1.607) (1.630) (2.088) (2.076) (2.097) (2.099)
-0.359 -0.354 -0.207 -0.210
(0.557) (0.556) (0.553) (0.545)
Minimum wage (in logs) 1.859 0.896 1.868 0.910 -1.461 -1.070 -1.506 -1.169
(1.431) (1.277) (1.422) (1.261) (1.203) (1.050) (1.216) (1.061)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -2.112 -2.119 0.648 0.684
(1.472) (1.476) (1.306) (1.303)
Observations 13,226 13,226 13,226 13,226 21,992 21,992 21,992 21,992
Number of clusters 42 42 42 42 43 43 43 43
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Refer to notes for Table 3.13
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Left Home
Covariates
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Table 3.16A Dynamic Model: Discrete Time Hazard for Returning Home (Coefficient Estimates) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.141 -0.154 -0.387
(0.926) (0.868) (1.127)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 0.492
(1.785)
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.025 -0.019 -0.122
(0.673) (0.666) (0.643)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.353
(0.878)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 8.649 8.687 8.607 8.555 8.590 8.675
(9.137) (9.125) (9.121) (9.166) (9.171) (9.193)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.591 0.846 0.582 0.587 0.839 0.613
(1.688) (1.677) (1.690) (1.687) (1.676) (1.696)
-0.529 -0.523
(0.515) (0.519)
Minimum wage (in logs) -0.652 -0.339 -0.658 -0.649 -0.330 -0.645
(1.472) (1.551) (1.467) (1.473) (1.560) (1.475)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.560 -0.574
(1.134) (1.155)
Observations 63,674 63,674 63,674 63,674 63,674 63,674
Number of clusters 44 44 44 44 44 44
Specification
(1) (3) (4) (6)(2) (5)
Estimates
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Returned Home
Covariates
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
Note:  All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, quarter, state, and panel dummies, and linear state 
trends. Controls for young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy.                                                                                                                                                      
The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living away from parents at the time they are first observed 
in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                      
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
     
243 
Table 3.16B Dynamic Model: Discrete Time Hazard for Returning Home (Marginal Effects) 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 0.003
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.001
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.002
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 0.06 0.06 0.056 0.06 0.06 0.06
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.004
-0.003 -0.003
Minimum wage (in logs) -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) -0.004 -0.004
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Returned Home
Specification
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal Effects
Note:  All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, quarter, state, and panel dummies, and linear state 
trends. Controls for young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy.                                                                                                                                                      
The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living away from parents at the time they are first observed 
in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                      
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
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Table 3.17 Dynamic Model: Estimates of Hazard for Returning Home: By Age-Group 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -1.502 -1.494 3.735* 3.364
(1.117) (1.591) (1.938) (2.675)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 0.325 0.187
(2.678) (2.948)
Group-specific employment-population ratio 1.100 0.809 -1.398 -1.575
(0.888) (0.958) (1.212) (1.129)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio 0.971 0.776
(1.871) (1.447)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 14.298 14.352 13.800 14.297 7.017 7.019 8.080 8.353
(12.941) (12.916) (12.967) (12.961) (14.526) (14.518) (14.426) (14.418)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 1.222 0.704 1.175 0.764 -0.096 -0.117 0.035 0.017
(1.984) (1.979) (1.997) (1.984) (3.312) (3.339) (3.309) (3.329)
-1.003* -0.986* 0.093 0.003
(0.598) (0.599) (0.794) (0.805)
Minimum wage (in logs) -3.001* -2.562* -2.847* -2.511* 2.238 1.149 2.152 1.216
(1.636) (1.420) (1.633) (1.427) (2.301) (2.373) (2.284) (2.359)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) 0.715 0.585 -2.285 -2.012
(1.281) (1.306) (1.654) (1.676)
Observations 22,060 22,060 22,060 22,060 36,738 36,738 36,738 36,738
Number of clusters 43 43 43 43 40 40 40 40
Refer to notes for table 3.16.
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Returned Home
Covariates
Ages 20-24 Ages 25-29
(1) (2) (4) (5) (1) (2) (4) (5)
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
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Table 3.18 Dynamic Model: Estimates of Hazard for Returning Home: By Gender 
 
Group-specific unemployment rate -1.539 -2.819* 0.950 2.141
(1.114) (1.493) (1.672) (2.188)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate 3.191 -2.456
(2.248) (2.503)
Group-specific employment-population ratio -0.239 0.271 1.972 0.963
(0.839) (0.850) (1.322) (1.453)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio -1.523 2.497*
(1.172) (1.474)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults 9.946 9.390 8.835 8.408 12.510 12.450 13.716 14.081
(13.242) (13.314) (13.305) (13.320) (12.213) (12.175) (11.997) (11.849)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 1.225 0.671 1.152 0.611 1.244 1.218 1.348 1.477
(2.650) (2.687) (2.630) (2.666) (2.394) (2.318) (2.379) (2.291)
-1.098* -1.044* -0.116 -0.220
(0.598) (0.601) (0.773) (0.751)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.091 0.093 0.202 0.202 -0.703 -1.313 -0.810 -1.268
(1.627) (1.625) (1.620) (1.632) (2.243) (1.995) (2.227) (1.991)
High school or less * Minimum wage (in logs) 0.164 0.084 -1.003 -0.674
(1.314) (1.334) (1.568) (1.590)
Observations 31,032 31,032 31,032 31,032 27,924 27,924 27,924 27,924
Number of clusters 42 42 42 42 40 40 40 40
High school or less * Annual median fair market rent                            
in state (in logs)
(4)
Refer to notes for Table 3.16
Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Returned Home
Covariates
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Table 3.19 Dynamic Analysis of Changing State of Residence 
 
Dependent Variable:  Whether Young Adult Changed State of Residence
1.519 1.165 1.545
(1.362) (1.146) (1.809)
-0.646
(1.622)
-1.549 -1.786*
(0.971) (1.041)
0.752
(0.674)
19.631 18.871 18.899 18.768 18.932
(23.614) (23.409) (23.441) (23.494) (23.556)
0.509 -0.382 -0.394 -0.406 -0.465 -0.459
(13.436) (13.399) (13.380) (13.393) (13.366) (13.379)
0.791 0.905 0.899 0.902 0.872 0.873
(4.887) (5.032) (5.023) (5.024) (5.032) (5.033)
Observations 133,498 133,498 133,498 133,498 133,498 133,498
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46
Minimum wage (in logs)                                                                              
(in previous state for state changers)
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, state, SIPP panel, and quarter dummies, and linear state trends. 
The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are first observed in sample.                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group-specific unemployment rate                                                                
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Group-specific employment-population ratio                                         
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio              
(in previous state for state changers)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults                                                     
(in previous state for state changers)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs)                                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 3.20 Discrete Time Hazard for Leaving Home (Includes those who Change State of Residence) 
 
1.076** 1.029** 1.094
(0.535) (0.522) (0.675)
-0.127
(1.004)
-1.035** -1.317***
(0.439) (0.485)
1.037*
(0.542)
3.725 3.008 3.012 3.122 3.369
(6.675) (6.658) (6.658) (6.624) (6.629)
-1.004 -1.132 -1.156 -1.158 -1.162 -1.142
(2.855) (2.827) (2.831) (2.833) (2.826) (2.828)
-1.080 -1.050 -1.045 -1.043 -1.064 -1.064
(0.882) (0.910) (0.909) (0.908) (0.907) (0.915)
Observations 47,492 47,492 47,492 47,492 47,492 47,492
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46
Minimum wage (in logs)                                                                              
(in previous state for state changers)
Note:  All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, quarter, state, and panel dummies, and linear state trends. Controls for 
young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living away 
from parents at the time they are first observed in sample. I also include the following lagged parental controls: average education of parents, average age of 
parents, whether both biological parents were present, home ownership status of parents and number of household members.                                                                                                                                                  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group-specific unemployment rate                                                                
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Group-specific employment-population ratio                                         
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio              
(in previous state for state changers)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults                                                     
(in previous state for state changers)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs)                                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Left Home
Specification
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
     
248 
Table 3.21 Discrete Time Hazard for Returning Home (Includes those who Change State of Residence) 
0.388 0.185 -0.826
(1.422) (1.407) (1.324)
1.854
(1.521)
-0.211 -0.062
(0.981) (0.911)
-0.479
(1.172)
11.211 11.079 10.969 11.100 10.986
(10.490) (10.452) (10.467) (10.509) (10.493)
6.573*** 5.955*** 5.953*** 5.980*** 5.932*** 5.931***
(1.700) (1.794) (1.793) (1.802) (1.777) (1.778)
-0.248 -0.199 -0.199 -0.218 -0.199 -0.205
(1.821) (1.788) (1.788) (1.780) (1.788) (1.786)
Observations 68,832 68,832 68,832 68,832 68,832 68,832
Number of clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45
Minimum wage (in logs)                                                                              
(in previous state for state changers)
Note:  All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, age-year, quarter, state, and panel dummies, and linear state trends. Controls for 
young people include race, high school or less and gender dummy. The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, not enrolled in school and living away 
from parents at the time they are first observed in sample.                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group-specific unemployment rate                                                                
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific unemployment rate                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Group-specific employment-population ratio                                         
(in previous state for state changers)
2008-2013 dummy * Group-specific employment-population ratio              
(in previous state for state changers)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults                                                     
(in previous state for state changers)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs)                                        
(in previous state for state changers)
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Returned Home
Specification
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 249 
 
Figure 3.1 Share of Young Adults Living Away from Home in SIPP Panels 1985-2008 
Note: The initial sample consists of all individuals ages 20 to 29 who are not enrolled in school at 
the time when they first enter the SIPP sample. I declare a person as living away from his parents’ 
home in any four-month interval during which he does not live with either his parents or in-laws, 
and as living at his parents’ home if he is observed living with either his parents or in laws in a 
household not headed by him or his spouse. 
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Figure 3.2 Share of Young Adults Leaving and Returning Home in SIPP Panels        
1985-2008 
Note: Moves observed in sample show the percentage of individuals who return home from 
among those who were at risk of returning home, and the percentage of individuals who leave 
home from among those who were at risk of leaving. A person is described as having left the 
parental home when he no longer lives at his parents’ home (as indicated by a change of address 
and the absence of parents at new address). 
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APPENDIX A – RETIREMENT MODEL 
Model A: Fully Anticipated Changes 
Optimization of utility function (1) with respect to the budget constraint (2) results in the 
following first order conditions: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑:        𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊) = 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑊𝑊(𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊) −  𝜇𝜇 � 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 − 𝐵𝐵𝑊𝑊(𝑑𝑑) +  � 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝑡𝑡) 𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡(𝑑𝑑)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑� 
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶:       𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
=  𝜇𝜇  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑      𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑     𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
=  𝜇𝜇  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑑             
The equilibrium is defined by the following two equations. The first equation is derived 
by simplifying the budget constraint in equation (2). 
 𝐶𝐶 =  1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑊𝑊 +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  𝑅𝑅 [1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)]                         (4) 
        𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶 =  𝑊𝑊 − 𝑅𝑅[1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)] + 𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔 �1
𝑟𝑟
−  1
𝑟𝑟
 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)�                            (5)         
I first analyze the impact of a change in the delayed retirement credit (actuarial 
adjustment factor ‘g’). As the changes in the actuarial adjustments were implemented 
only for individuals above their normal retirement age, in the analysis that follows I will 
focus on the case where z > NRA only.  
Totally differentiating the two equations defining the equilibrium:
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�
1 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 ��1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)�𝑅𝑅 −𝑊𝑊� − 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷
𝜀𝜀 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅�1 +  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)� �   �𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�  
= � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)
−𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑅𝑅(1𝑟𝑟 −  1 𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)) �   𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔 
Simplifying the above expression: 
        𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔
=  𝑅𝑅[(𝜀𝜀(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) + 1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) (𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) − 1𝑟𝑟 �1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)�(1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷)]
∆
  (6) 
where  ∆ = 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅��1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(−𝑊𝑊+𝐷𝐷)�(−1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) + 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊�𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷) − 1��    
− 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊− 𝑅𝑅) 
Given that W > R, the sign of  ∆  depends on the terms �𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷) − 1�.  
If, r > 0, then the term  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷) − 1 < 0, and the sign of ∆ depends only on the 
term  𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁). This term is always negative if z < NRA, which implies ∆ < 0. But if 
z > NRA then  𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) is negative if the date of death D is not close to the age of 
retirement and the interest rate is between (0,10) percent.  
If ∆ < 0 then the sign of  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 depends on the numerator of equation (6). If z > NRA then 
the sign of the numerator is ambiguous because −  1
𝑟𝑟
�1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)�(1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) < 0 for all 
r > 0, while (𝜀𝜀(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) + 1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) (𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) > 0 for all z > NRA.  
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Thus, the sign of    𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
 ><  0   is ambiguous. 
The model predicts that as the actuarial adjustment factor g is increased by one unit the 
impact on the optimal retirement age among individuals above their NRA is ambiguous.  
The impact of an increase in the normal retirement age can be derived by totally 
differentiating equations (4) and (5).  
�
1 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 ��1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)�𝑅𝑅 −𝑊𝑊� − 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷
𝜀𝜀 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅�1 +  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)� �   �𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑�  
= �−𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷
𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅
 �   𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁 
Simplifying the above expression 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁
=  𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅[−𝜀𝜀(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) − 1 +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷]
∆
                      (7)    
The numerator in equation (7) is always negative, so the sign of 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑
 depends on the sign 
of ∆.  
If ∆ < 0 , then  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑
> 0 
Thus, under the conditions specified above which ensure that ∆ < 0, an increase in the 
normal retirement age raises the optimal retirement age.  
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Model B: Unanticipated Changes 
If the changes in social security policy variables are unanticipated, and the worker learns 
about these changes at time z then the decision problem faced by an individual after time 
z can be modified as follows: 
max
𝑊𝑊′,𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡′ 𝑉𝑉(𝑑𝑑) =  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑈𝑈𝑊𝑊(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡′𝑊𝑊′𝑊𝑊 )𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊′ 𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅(𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡′)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑                                (8) 
subject to the budget constraint 
� 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡′𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 =  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 +  � 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐷𝐷
𝑊𝑊′
𝑊𝑊′
0
𝐷𝐷
𝑊𝑊
𝑊𝑊
0
                 (9)       
The following two equations define the equilibrium when the actuarial adjustment factor 
𝑔𝑔 changes to 𝑔𝑔′. The first equation is derived by simplifying the budget constraint in 
equation (9). 
       𝐶𝐶(1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊) + 𝐶𝐶′(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) = � 1 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑅𝑅�𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷�  
[1 + 𝑔𝑔′(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)] 
       𝜀𝜀𝐶𝐶′ =  𝑊𝑊 − 𝑅𝑅[1 + 𝑔𝑔′(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)] + 𝑅𝑅𝑔𝑔′ � 1
𝑟𝑟
−  1
𝑟𝑟
 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟�𝑊𝑊′−𝐷𝐷�� 
To derive how an unanticipated change in the actuarial adjustment factor 𝑔𝑔′ impacts the 
optimal retirement age, I totally differentiate the two equations defining the equilibrium. 
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�1 −𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊 + 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  �1 + 𝑔𝑔′�𝑊𝑊′−𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑�� 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑔𝑔′𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  
𝜀𝜀 𝑔𝑔′𝑅𝑅�1 +  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)� � 
�
𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
�  
=
⎝
⎛
𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊
′
−  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)
−𝑅𝑅(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑅𝑅(1𝑟𝑟 −  1 𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊′−𝐷𝐷)) ⎠⎞   𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔′ 
Simplifying the above expression 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔′
= 𝑅𝑅�(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)�𝜀𝜀�𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷� +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷��
∆′
 
 − 𝑅𝑅 1𝑟𝑟  �1 −  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟�𝑊𝑊′−𝐷𝐷��(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷)
∆′
   (10) 
where  ∆′= 𝑔𝑔′𝑅𝑅 [�1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)��𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′� +  𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ 
�𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟�𝐷𝐷−𝑊𝑊′� − 1)�  −  𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊(𝑊𝑊− 𝑅𝑅) 
Given that W > R, the sign of  ∆′  depends on the terms �𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑑 − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁) + 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝐷𝐷−𝑊𝑊′) − 1�. 
 ∆′< 0  under the same conditions that ensured ∆ < 0 in Model A. 
If ∆′ < 0 then the sign of  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
 depends on the numerator of equation (10). If z’ > NRA 
then the sign of the numerator is ambiguous because −  1
𝑟𝑟
 �1 −  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟�𝑊𝑊′−𝐷𝐷��(𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −
 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷) < 0 for all r > 0, while (𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁)�𝜀𝜀�𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷� +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷� > 0 for 
all z > NRA.  
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Thus, the sign of    𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
 ><  0   is ambiguous. 
To derive how an unanticipated change in the normal retirement age 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁′ impacts the 
optimal retirement age, I again totally differentiate the two equations defining the 
equilibrium. 
�1 −𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑊𝑊 + 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  [1 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑑𝑑′ − 𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁′)] 𝑅𝑅 − 𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷  
𝜀𝜀 𝑔𝑔′𝑅𝑅�1 +  𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑊𝑊−𝐷𝐷)� �  
 �𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
�  
= �−𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷
𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅
 �   𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁′ 
Simplifying the above expression  
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑′
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁′
=  𝑔𝑔𝑅𝑅 [−𝜀𝜀�𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊′ −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷� −  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑊𝑊 +  𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷]
∆′
                   (11) 
The numerator in equation (11) is always negative, so the sign of 𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑′
 depends on the 
sign of ∆′.  
If ∆′ < 0 , then  𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊′
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑′
> 0 
The above models highlight that regardless of whether the social security policy changes 
were anticipated or unanticipated by the individuals, the change in the normal retirement 
age (under certain conditions) raises the optimal retirement age, while the change in the 
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delayed retirement credit for individuals above their normal retirement age has an 
ambiguous effect on the optimal retirement age.   
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APPENDIX B – LABOR SUPPLY MODELS BY SUBGROUPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acronym
NRA
DRC
SIPP
SSA
Table B.1 Table of Acronyms
Normal Retirement Age
Delayed Retirement Credit
Survey of Income and Program Participation 
Social Security Administration
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Earnings test in place dummy -0.097* -1.437 -0.059 -1.898**
(0.053) (0.983) (0.040) (0.913)
Earnings test in palce * (Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) * 
Within age range directly affected by delayed retirement -0.055 -0.608 -0.036 -1.029
(0.044) (0.968) (0.042) (1.051)
Earnings test in place * (Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) -0.015 -0.634 -0.007 -0.300
(0.020) (0.562) (0.023) (0.618)
0.013 0.034 0.014 0.204
(0.025) (0.631) (0.028) (0.690)
Number of observations 76,509 17,114 70,063 14,540
Number of individuals 10772 1801 10351 1593
Earnings test in place dummy -0.169* -1.238 -0.028 -0.513
(0.099) (1.069) (0.096) (1.053)
Earnings test in palce * (Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) * 
Within age range directly affected by delayed retirement -0.198** -1.702* 0.018 -0.093
(0.090) (0.963) (0.096) (1.074)
Earnings test in place * (Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) 0.130** 1.237** -0.019 -0.270
(0.052) (0.567) (0.062) (0.702)
0.111* 0.957 -0.030 -0.145
(0.058) (0.633) (0.067) (0.749)
Number of observations 30,600 12,766 19,064 7,869
Number of individuals 5323 1618 3680 1074
(Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
(Delayed retirement credit - 6.2) * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
B: Full-time relative to Part-time work 
Table B.2 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Supply By Education: Age 62 - 74 
More than high school High school or less
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, age, state 
unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  region, age, and 
quarter dummies, and age-specific trends.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
A: Labor Force Participation
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Earnings test in place dummy -0.018 -0.632 -0.039* -0.996
(0.024) (0.685) (0.021) (0.632)
-0.029* -0.812** -0.008 -0.441
(0.016) (0.405) (0.016) (0.457)
Number of observations 54,361 9,480 54,356 8,992
Number of individuals 9161 1259 9826 1222
Earnings test in place dummy -0.044 -0.130 -0.004 0.203
(0.052) (0.610) (0.048) (0.605)
0.051 0.599 -0.014 -0.144
(0.034) (0.394) (0.035) (0.430)
Number of observations 17,872 6,506 17,870 6,297
Number of individuals 3423 988 3842 1038
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, 
age, state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  
region, age, and quarter dummies, and age-specific trends .                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
B: Full-time relative to Part-time work 
Table B.3 Estimates of Models for Older Men's Labor Supply By Wealth: Age 62 - 74 
Greater than or equal 
to median net wealth
Less than median net 
wealth
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
A: Labor Force Participation
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Earnings test in place dummy -0.035* -0.947 -0.021 -0.750
(0.020) (0.657) (0.019) (0.614)
-0.009 -0.688* -0.015 -0.819**
(0.014) (0.414) (0.014) (0.416)
Number of observations 66,201 10,185 66,193 8,863
Number of individuals 11089 1322 11896 1178
Earnings test in place dummy -0.138** -1.171 0.001 0.013
(0.055) (0.727) (0.046) (0.700)
-0.020 -0.080 0.018 0.176
(0.036) (0.459) (0.039) (0.542)
Number of observations 15,389 5,380 15,386 4,919
Number of individuals 2993 824 3280 781
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
B: Full-time relative to Part-time work 
Delayed retirement credit (%)  * Within age range                   
directly affected by delayed retirement credit
All models include controls for age 62-NRA dummy, at normal retirement age dummy, marital status, 
age, state unemployment rate, home ownership, number of household members, children under age 18,  
region, age, and quarter dummies, and age-specific trends .                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, where the clustering is done by individuals.                                                                            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                       
Table B.4 Estimates of Models for Older Women's Labor Supply By Wealth: Age 62 - 74 
Greater than or equal to 
median net wealth
Less than median net 
wealth
Model Linear-FE Conditional Logit Linear-FE 
Conditional 
Logit
A: Labor Force Participation
271 
APPENDIX C – MEASURES OF LOCAL LABOR AND RENTAL 
MARKETS AND DISCUSSION OF WELFARE REFORM 
 
C.1 Measures of Local Labor Market Conditions  
I estimate these average age-group, education, and gender specific unemployment 
rate for each state over time from the basic monthly CPS data. I first categorized young 
individuals in the CPS into two age groups, those ages 20 to 24 and those ages 25 to 29. I 
also classified individuals into two categories based on education, those who completed 
high school or less and those who completed some level of education beyond high 
school. Based on these groupings I then estimate age-group, education, and gender 
specific employment-population ratio and unemployment rate. Since I include 
observations for only the fourth reference month from the SIPP, I average the group-
specific employment-population ratio and unemployment rate measures created from the 
CPS data over the four-month period directly preceding the fourth reference month of the 
SIPP data. This allows the employment-population ratio and the unemployment rate 
measures to incorporate the average circumstances in the young person’s state of 
residence during the four months prior to the month for which he or she provides 
information about living arrangements. 
I also make use of CPS data to estimate the state level average unemployment 
rates for individuals age 35 to 60 and interpret this measure as potentially the 
unemployment rates for parents. This measure assumes that parents live in the same state 
as the young adult. In the descriptive analysis I see very few young people moving across 
states, which suggests that for individuals at risk of returning or leaving home this 
measure of economic conditions for parents may be adequate. 
C.2 Specification of Static State Panel Analysis 
I perform the aggregate-level analysis with the following specification:
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𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =  𝜃𝜃1 𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+  𝜃𝜃2 𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+  𝜃𝜃3 ln (𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡)+  𝜃𝜃4 ln (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) +  𝜃𝜃5 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜃𝜃6 𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 +  𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑+  𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
where the dependent variable Yst represents the proportion of young individuals in a state 
who live with their parents.  
There are two main differences between the disaggregated individual level 
analysis and the aggregated analysis. First, in the aggregated state panel analysis I am 
unable to make full use of the variation in the average age-group, education, and gender 
specific unemployment rate of young people. Using data from the CPS, I average the 
estimated unemployment rate measure used in the individual data over gender and 
education to obtain an aggregate measure reflecting the average state level 
unemployment rates for young people 20 to 29 years old. I also estimate the aggregate 
unemployment rate for individuals 35 to 60 years old in a similar manner. I control for 
the effect of average age of young adults, as this can vary over time across states. Second, 
I am unable to control for detailed demographic controls for young adults. 
C.3 Fair Market Rents  
I estimate the effect of rental costs by using the median fair market rents provided 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The HUD annually 
estimates fair market rents for 530 metropolitan and 2,045 nonmetropolitan FMR areas. I 
use these rent data for FMR areas to estimate the average annual median fair market rent 
by state.1 The fair market rents are gross rent estimates, that is, they include the shelter 
rent plus the cost of all tenant-paid utilities except telephone, cable or satellite television, 
and internet. In preparing the fair market rent estimates the HUD uses rent data for 
                                                          
1 Yelowitz (2007) also uses the FMR data for his measure of rental costs. His measure differs 
from mine in two ways. First, he uses MSA level rents, and second he uses the 40th percentile 
rents, while I make use of the 50th percentile rents that became available beginning in 2000.  
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typical non-substandard rental units that are occupied by renters who moved to their 
current residence within the last 15 to 22 months.2  
The HUD relies on three sources of survey data to develop the fair market rent 
base year estimates: the decennial Census, the American Community Survey (ACS), and 
Random Digit Dialing (RDD) telephone surveys. Because of lags in processing the 
survey data, most Census and ACS based data are put into effect approximately 3 years 
after they are collected. To account for this lag, the base year estimates are updated using 
CPI (FMR or regional) data and trended forward by applying a national trend factor 
based on forecasts of gross rent changes. The trend factor projects the estimates forward 
to the midpoint of the fiscal year for which the fair market rents are being calculated, but 
there is a lag of fifteen months in the use of most recent CPI and the midpoint of the fair 
market rent. Therefore, in the regression analysis my specifications include a lagged 
measure of fair market rents.  
Fair market rents are expressed as a percentile point within the distribution of 
standard-quality rental units; the current FMR definition uses the 40th percentile rents for 
most areas, but some areas are assigned 50th percentile rent. Fiftieth percentile FMRs 
were introduced by a rule announced in 2000 that also set the eligibility criteria that 
would be used to select and assign 50th percentile rather than the 40th percentile FMRs to 
certain areas. The rule also stated that areas assigned 50th percentile FMRs were to be re-
evaluated after three years, and that the 50th percentile rents would be cancelled if the 
areas did not meet certain requirements. Beginning in 2001, rents at the 50th percentile 
are also calculated and made available for all FMR areas. Because the 40th percentile 
rents are not consistently available for all FMR areas, I make use of the 50th percentile 
rent data.  For the years 2001 to 2013, I use these median rent estimates to create my 
measure of rental costs in each state. The 50th percentile fair market rents, however, are 
not available for years 1996 to 2000. Since for the fiscal year 2001, both the 40th and the 
50th percentile rents are available, I use this information to convert the FMRs from 1996 
to 2000 into the 50th percentile. I make this conversion by multiplying the FMR from 
                                                          
2 The following units are excluded: public housing, rental units built in last two years, rental units 
considered substandard in quality, seasonal rentals, and rental units on ten or more acres.  
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each of these years with the corresponding ratio of rents in the 50th and 40th percentile 
from 2001.  
The next step is to use the 50th percentile FMRs to estimate the state level median 
rents. The fair market rent estimates are made available by FMR area, county, or county 
subarea (New England). I use U.S. census data to estimate population weighted state 
level median rents. With the exception of New England area, I estimate state level medial 
rents by averaging the population weighted median rent across counties in the state. For 
new England, I first calculate the population weighted average median rent across county 
subareas, and then use these estimates to further calculate the population weighted 
median rent across counties in the New England states. Finally, I adjust the annual rents 
for inflation by converting them to constant 2013 dollars using the CPI-U. 
C.4 1996 Welfare Reform   
Until 1996, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was the major 
welfare program serving single women with children; welfare benefits were not available 
to women without children and were unavailable or more difficult to obtain if a woman 
was married.3 Previous researchers have observed that a single mother living with other 
relatives such as parents faced greater difficulty in qualifying for benefits. The 
implication was that by providing a large subsidy for single mothers who headed their 
own households, AFDC benefits exerted an unambiguous increasing effect on household 
headship by single mothers.4 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
                                                          
3 Blau et al. (2004). Moffitt (1994) also notes that although, the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program has provided benefits for married families, 
eligibility is quite restrictive and only about 7 percent of AFDC caseloads consist of such 
families.  
4 In a comprehensive study Ellwood and Bane (1985) explore the effect of welfare benefits on 
family structure and living arrangements employing various datasets and methods of 
investigation. Using their preferred specification, which focuses on within-state comparison of 
women with different probabilities of AFDC receipt, they find that higher welfare benefits 
encourage single mothers to form their own households instead of living with relatives (parents). 
Moffitt (1992) notes that although the studies from 1980s show slightly stronger evidence 
regarding the effect of welfare benefits on female headship decisions, the effects are small in 
magnitude. Studies in the 1990s and 2000s have included state fixed effects (Moffitt (1994)), 
individual fixed effects (Hoynes (1997)), and MSA fixed effects and MSA specific time trends 
(Blau et al. (2004)) to assess the robustness of findings from the earlier studies conducted in the 
1970s and 1980s; no clear consensus emerges from this new set of studies. Moffitt (1994) finds 
that including state fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the welfare effect on female headship 
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Reconciliation Act of 1996 substantially reformed the U.S. welfare system, the AFDC 
program was replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program 
which eliminated unrestricted family entitlement to cash assistance, increased work 
requirements for welfare recipients, and placed time limits on total benefit receipt. 5 It is 
possible that the welfare reform of 1996 may have influenced the living arrangements of 
single mothers in my sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for whites and the estimated coefficients become statistically insignificant, but in some of his 
specifications with state fixed effects he continues to find a positive statistically significant effect 
of welfare benefits for black women. After controlling for individual fixed effects, Hoynes (1997) 
is unable to find any significant relationship between welfare benefits and female headship for 
either whites or blacks. Blau et al. (2004) conclude that for black women, particularly the less 
educated, limiting welfare benefits will raise the likelihood of single mothers living with their 
relatives (parents). 
5 Blank (1997). 
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Table C.1 Estimates from Individual-Level Analysis of Living Arrangements (Without Individual Fixed Effects) 
 
Linear Probability Model 
Dependent Variable: Whether Young Adult Lives with Parents 
Unemployment rate for ages 20 to 29 -0.059 -0.054 0.016
(0.099) (0.101) (0.177)
2008-2013 dummy * unemployment rate for ages 20 to 29 -0.112
(0.191)
Employment-population ratio for ages 20 to 29 -0.007 -0.015 -0.015
(0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
2008-2013 dummy * employment-population ratio for ages 20 to 29 0.011
(0.043)
Unemployment rate for prime-age adults -0.026 0.022 -0.079 -0.108
(0.222) (0.233) (0.217) (0.251)
Annual median fair market rent in state (in logs) 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.020 0.024 0.024
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092)
Minimum wage (in logs) 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.059 0.059 0.057
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046)
p-Value: joint test for no effect of state-specific trend terms 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Observations 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996 193,996
Number of clusters 46 46 46 46 46 46
Note: All sepecifications include controls for average per capita income in state, race, gender, educational attainment, age-year, quarter, and 
state dummies, and linear state trends.  The analysis includes young adults 20-29 who are single, and not enrolled in school at the time they are 
first observed in sample. I focus on individuals who do not change their state of residence when they change their living arrangements.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, where the clustering is done by state *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
